scholarly journals Number of Bidders and the Winner’s Curse

Author(s):  
Ronald Peeters ◽  
Anastas P. Tenev

Abstract Within an affiliated value auction setting, we study the relationship between the number of bidders and the winner’s curse in terms of its frequency of occurrence and its expected harm. From a design perspective, we find that both the number of bidders and the level of affiliation are instrumental when choosing an auction format and whether to encourage or discourage bidder participation.

Author(s):  
Indranil K. Ghosh ◽  
John L. Fizel ◽  
Ido Millet ◽  
Diane H. Parente

The Winner’s Curse is a common phenomenon mostly in auctions, even though it has applications in a diverse range of fields. We define the idea of a Winner’s Curse and specify the types of auctions in which this could be prevalent. We look at the data provided by a major multinational corporation on online procurement auctions conducted by them. We specify the relationship that the prevalence of the Winner’s Curse would have on the success of such procurement auctions. Using this theoretical background, we analyze the given data and show that in some cases, the presence of the Winner’s Curse and the subsequent need for bidders to show caution in the presence of the Winner’s Curse could lead to lower auction success for the firm. We specify the particular cases where this is true. This leads to Managerial Implications for firms wishing to conduct procurement auctions online and we spell them out. We also provide some examples of how firms might try and lower the negative effects of the Winner’s Curse. Finally we provide some future research ideas that may be pursued and some additional readings for the curious reader.


2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wouter van den Bos ◽  
Arjun Talwar ◽  
Samuel McClure

Author(s):  
Leopoldo Fergusson ◽  
Pablo Querubin ◽  
Nelson A. Ruiz ◽  
Juan F. Vargas

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (10) ◽  
pp. 5660
Author(s):  
Elena Guidetti ◽  
Matteo Robiglio

In recent years, the heritage preservation debate has seen a growing interest in emerging theories in which the concept of potential plays an essential role. Starting from the assumption that memory is an evolving mental construct, the present paper introduces the concept of “transformative potential” in existing buildings. This novel concept regards the inevitability of loss and the self-destructive potential as part of the transformation of each building. The “transformative potential” is defined here as the relationship between spatial settings and material consistency. This research hypothesizes five “transformative potential” types by analyzing five best-practices adapted ruins in the last 15 years. The analysis integrates quantitative and qualitative research methods: morphological analysis (dimensional variations, critical redrawing, configuration patterns) and decay stages evaluation (shearing layers analysis, adaptation approaches). The goal is to test the “transformative potential” effectiveness in outlining patterns between specific stages of decay and adaptive design projects. Adaptation projects may actualize this potential in a specific time through incremental and decremental phases, outlining a nonlinear relationship between decay and memory. The study provides insights for future research on adapting existing buildings in a particular decay stage.


2004 ◽  
Vol 94 (5) ◽  
pp. 1452-1475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence M Ausubel

When bidders exhibit multi-unit demands, standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes. This article proposes a new ascending-bid auction for homogeneous goods, such as Treasury bills or telecommunications spectrum. The auctioneer announces a price and bidders respond with quantities. Items are awarded at the current price whenever they are “clinched,” and the price is incremented until the market clears. With private values, this (dynamic) auction yields the same outcome as the (sealed-bid) Vickrey auction, but has advantages of simplicity and privacy preservation. With interdependent values, this auction may retain efficiency, whereas the Vickrey auction suffers from a generalized Winner's Curse.


1988 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 191-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard H Thaler

Next time that you find yourself a little short of cash for lunch, try the following experiment in your class. Take a jar and fill it with coins, noting the total value of the coins. Now auction off the jar to your class (offering to pay the winning bidder in bills to control for penny aversion). Chances are very high that the following results will be obtained: (1) the average bid will be significantly less than the value of the coins (bidders are risk averse); (2) the winning bid will exceed the value of the jar. Therefore, you will have money for lunch, and your students will have learned first-hand about the “winner's curse.” The winner's curse cannot occur if all the bidders are rational, so evidence of a winner's curse in market settings would constitute an anomaly. However, acting rationally in a common value auction can be difficult. Solving for the optimal bid is not trivial. Thus, it is an empirical question whether bidders in various contexts get it right or are cursed. I will present some evidence, both from experimental and field studies, suggesting that the winner's curse may be a common phenomenon.


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