Wittgenstein, Wissen und die Gnade der Natur

Conceptus ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 42 (101-102) ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Tolksdorf

AbstractThis paper is an attempt to explain Wittgenstein’s remark that „It is always by favor of Nature that one knows something.“ In this regard, two positions are distinguished. The first one is the standard interpretation within analytic epistemology. Alternatively, I will suggest another possibility to interpret Wittgenstein’s remark, which is inspired by John McDowell’s epistemological disjunctivism. As I am going to show, the alternative is the better choice.

Author(s):  
Chienkuo Mi ◽  
Shane Ryan

In this paper, we defend the claim that reflective knowledge is necessary for extended knowledge. We begin by examining a recent account of extended knowledge provided by Palermos and Pritchard (2013). We note a weakness with that account and a challenge facing theorists of extended knowledge. The challenge that we identify is to articulate the extended cognition condition necessary for extended knowledge in such a way as to avoid counterexample from the revamped Careless Math Student and Truetemp cases. We consider but reject Pritchard’s (2012b) epistemological disjunctivism as providing a model for doing so. Instead, we set out an account of reflection informed by Confucianism and dual-process theory. We make the case that reflective knowledge offers a way of overcoming the challenge identified. We show why such knowledge is necessary for extended knowledge, while building on Sosa’s (2012) account of meta-competence.


Author(s):  
Tiago Camarinha Lopes

Abstract The paper presents both the key arguments and the historical context of the socialist economic calculation debate. I argue that Oskar Lange presented the most developed strategy to deal with bourgeois economics, decisively helping to create the scientific consensus that rational economic calculation under socialism is possible. Lange’s arguments based on standard economic theory reveal that the most ardent defenders of capitalism cannot reject socialism on technical terms and that, as a consequence, the Austrian School was left with no choice but to diverge from mainstream economics in its search to develop a framework that could support its political position. This shows that Mises’ challenge from 1920 was solved and has been replaced by a political posture developed by Hayek and leading Austrians economists, who have been struggling since the 1980s to revise the standard interpretation of the socialist economic calculation debate. I argue that this revision should not be uncritically accepted and conclude that socialism cannot be scientifically rejected; it can only be politically rejected, by those whose economic interests it opposes.


Author(s):  
Norihiro Yamada ◽  
Samson Abramsky

Abstract The present work achieves a mathematical, in particular syntax-independent, formulation of dynamics and intensionality of computation in terms of games and strategies. Specifically, we give game semantics of a higher-order programming language that distinguishes programmes with the same value yet different algorithms (or intensionality) and the hiding operation on strategies that precisely corresponds to the (small-step) operational semantics (or dynamics) of the language. Categorically, our games and strategies give rise to a cartesian closed bicategory, and our game semantics forms an instance of a bicategorical generalisation of the standard interpretation of functional programming languages in cartesian closed categories. This work is intended to be a step towards a mathematical foundation of intensional and dynamic aspects of logic and computation; it should be applicable to a wide range of logics and computations.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-152
Author(s):  
Christopher T. Buford ◽  

Those who endorse a knowledge-first program in epistemology claim that rather than attempting to understand knowledge in terms of more fundamental notions or relations such as belief and justification, we should instead understand knowledge as being in some sense prior to such concepts and/or relations. If we suppose that this is the correct approach to theorizing about knowledge, we are left with a residual question about the nature of those concepts or relations, such as justification, that were thought to be first but are now second. Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa has recently proposed that we understand justification in terms of potential knowledge. Ichikawa combines his view of knowledge and justification with what initially seems to be a natural complement, epistemological disjunctivism. While Ichikawa focuses on hallucination, I shift the focus to illusion. I argue that the combination of justification as potential knowledge and epistemological disjunctivism entails that perceptual beliefs that arise from illusions are not justified.


ECONOMICS ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 87-94
Author(s):  
Željko V. Račić

Summary The theory of fuzzy sets allows to analyze insufficiently precise, accurate, complete phenomena which can not be modeled by the theory of probability or interval mathematics. We define fuzzy sets as sets where the boundary of the set is unclear and depends on subjective estimation or individual preference. In addition to the standard interpretation scale, described above, a set of numbers to each qualitative attribute must be assigned. In addition to the standard interpretation scale a set of numbers to each qualitative attribute must be assigned. First of all, it is necessary to determine the procedure for determining fuzzy numbers describing the attributes. One of the imperfections of the fuzzy sets is subjectivism when defining the boundaries of fuzzy sets and functions of belonging, which can significantly influence the final decision. The decision maker’s subjectivity is also present in the determination of weighted coefficients. However, in case of giving weight, fixed values are necessary. Some decisions require multidisciplinary knowledge, so the decision-making process includes more group decision-makers, who independently give their grades.


Problemos ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 97 ◽  
pp. 123-131
Author(s):  
Jonas Dagys

The article raises the question what is the content of Frege’s infamous notion of Bedeutung? It is claimed that the so–called standard interpretation of this notion – Bedeutung as referential relation between a name and an object – was developed and established evaluating Frege’s ideas in philosophy of language in isolation from his logicist ideas. However, precisely his logicist concerns have motivated Frege’s interest in semantic issues. A broader consideration of Frege’s works reveals an internalist and rationalist notion of meaning, that is based on the context principle, and that should not be reduced to mere reference. The question of the meaning of subsentential components, for Frege, is closely related to the question of the meaning of the whole sentence, that is, the meaning of sub–sentential components should be construed as secondary with regard to the meaning of the whole sentence.


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