scholarly journals Determinants of Development of Third Party Liability Insurance: Selected Approaches, Experience and Trends in Poland

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-138
Author(s):  
Maria Gasińska

Abstract The article constitutes an attempt at discussing the determinants of the development of third party liability insurance in historical perspective and on the basis of the observation of trends witnessed in this field nowadays. The identified factors are linked to the functioning of both the demand and the supply aspect of the third party liability insurance market, providing a valuable indicator for insurance practice. The past decade has witnessed steady, though slow, expansion of the third party liability insurance market in terms of the number of contracts concluded, the share of the contributions toward it in the total contribution value as well as the level of the gross contribution assigned. The article characterizes four groups of factors responsible for the third party liability insurance market expansion, namely: (a) determinants resulting from relations between the parties and subjects of the third party liability insurance relation against the complex nature and specific character of the third party liability function; (b) determinants linked to the dynamic development of the so called risk-generating techniques and technologies leading to growth in the development of the so-called damage potential threatening both participants in the production process (including the service provision process) as well as product users and service recipients; (c) determinants of socioeconomic character, in particular the level of legal and insurance awareness of potential damage perpetrators and injured parties as well as material standing of households and financial standing of economic entities; (d) determinants linked to legal regulations, in particular, the leading role of regulations separating the compensatory function of third party liability with respect to the penal function in shaping the scope and value of regulations tightening the scope and principles of third party liability in certain areas of economic turnover and introducing insurance compulsion.

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (101) ◽  
pp. 3-17
Author(s):  
Marcin Orlicki

The aim of the article is to describe the principles of liability of autonomous and dependent possessors as well as of users of personal transportation devices for damage caused by their movement. The liability of holders of such devices is independent of their fault and is based on the principle of risk. However, in the event of a collision between two such transporters or a personal transportation device with a car or a motorcycle, the liability shall be based on the principle of guilt. The liability of the user of a personal transportation device is also fault-based. Owners of personal transportation devices are not subject to the motor third-party liability insurance. As long as these devices are not legally required to be registered, there is no effective mechanism to control the fulfilment of the third-party liability insurance obligation. It is therefore not possible to introduce compulsory liability insurance. However, it is necessary and important to popularize and strengthen the insurance coverage under liability insurance in private life, including liability for damage resulting from the usage of personal transportation devices.


2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ping Su ◽  
Shuguang Liu ◽  
Jun Lin

Purpose This paper aims to study a dominant e-retailer operating its own e-marketplace (B2C) to host peer competitor as well as acting as a traditional retailer (“dual-format” retailing as in Mantin and Krishnan 2014). The dominant retailer offers a two-part tariff charging scheme to a third-party seller. The seller decides whether to join the e-marketplace. The present paper is interested in addressing the following questions: What is the pricing equilibrium before/after the formation of the e-marketplace? What will be the “optimal” charging scheme? What is the impact on the e-marketplace operator if the third-party seller has the option to become “featured”. Design/methodology/approach This paper adopts a stylized model to capture the competition between the two retailers and applies game theory to solve the pricing equilibrium. The authors model the dual-format retailing in a two-stage decision: Stage 1, the e-marketplace operator offers a two-part tariff; Stage 2, if the other retailer is participating, they engage in a pricing competition. They assume that the e-marketplace operator is a profit maximizer by choosing its charging scheme subject to the condition that the participating retailer is no worse off. Findings The authors find that the e-retailer and the third-party seller in the e-marketplace are not always hurt by intensified price competition. They identify conditions under which higher expected prices are charged as a result of agglomeration effect. The authors’ model also provides theoretical evidence on this popular charging scheme, and shows the feasible region in which the e-marketplace operator could allocate the surplus resulted from the formation of the e-marketplace between itself and the participating retailer. Finally, the authors demonstrate that if the third-party seller has the option to become a “featured” retailer (He and Chen, 2006), it can be detrimental to the e-marketplace operator. Originality/value This work is different in three ways: First, the authors model an e-marketplace adopting a “dual-format” retailing, facing the trade-off between its direct retailing revenue and the rents collected from the member store, while the literature mainly focuses on e-marketplaces playing the intermediary role. Second, they explicitly model the “market expansion effect” caused by the agglomeration after the formation of the e-marketplace. The present study complements this stream of research by investigating and providing theoretical evidence on the charging scheme popularly adopted by the e-marketplaces and proposes ways to share the surplus to the participating store.


1991 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 165-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nico Dellaert ◽  
Hans Frenk ◽  
Bob van der Laan

2005 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 190-196
Author(s):  
Violeta Keršuliene

Compulsory Third Party Liability Insurance is ranked as one of the most risky kinds of insurance. In the course of introducing the compulsory Third Party Liability Insurance for construction designers and contractors in Lithuania the experience of foreign countries was used for setting the insurance object, the criteria for the insured events and the third party rights for insisting on liability (restitution) for damages. The article analyses the provisions of law of construction and by‐laws regulating compulsory Third Party Liability Insurance for construction designers and contractors as well as the object of the compulsory Third Party Liability Insurance and differences between the compulsory and voluntary Third Party Liability Insurance for construction designers and contractors have been outlined. The evidence and conditions of the insured events within the Third Party Liability Insurance are reviewed and the insured event has been distinguished from a number of other events.


2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaclyn M. Moloney ◽  
Chelsea A. Reid ◽  
Jody L. Davis ◽  
Jeni L. Burnette ◽  
Jeffrey D. Green

Author(s):  
Chen Lei

This chapter examines the position of third party beneficiaries in Chinese law. Article 64 of the Chinese Contract Law states that where a contract for the benefit of a third party is breached, the debtor is liable to the creditor. The author regards this as leaving unanswered the question of whether the thirdparty has a right of direct action against the debtor. One view regards the third party as having the right to sue for the benefit although this right was ultimately excluded from the law. Another view, supported by the Supreme People’s Court, is that Article 64 does not provide a right of action for a third party and merely prescribes performance in ‘incidental’ third party contracts. The third view is that there is a third party right of action in cases of ‘genuine’ third party contracts but courts are unlikely to recognize a third party action where the contract merely purports to confer a benefit on the third party.


Author(s):  
Sheng-Lin JAN

This chapter discusses the position of third party beneficiaries in Taiwan law where the principle of privity of contract is well established. Article 269 of the Taiwan Civil Code confers a right on the third party to sue for performance as long as the parties have at least impliedly agreed. This should be distinguished from a ‘spurious contract’ for the benefit of third parties where there is no agreement to permit the third party to claim. Both the aggrieved party and the third party beneficiary can sue on the contract, but only for its own loss. The debtor can only set off on a counterclaim arising from its legal relationship with the third party. Where the third party coerces the debtor into the contract, the contract can be avoided, but where the third party induces the debtor to contract with the creditor by misrepresentation, the debtor can only avoid the contract if the creditor knows or ought to have known of the misrepresentation.


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