Teaching International Law in Jurisdictions with International Law Crisis

ICL Journal ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 259-280
Author(s):  
Noam Zamir ◽  
Mark D Kielsgard

AbstractThe normally challenging task of teaching international law is amplified when teaching international law in jurisdictions that face ongoing human rights problems and other failures of compliance with international law. In those jurisdictions, the dialectics between the globalized world economy and technology on the one hand and the intensification of hostility to human rights and substantive democracies (ie to the values of public international law) on the other hand are much more pronounced. Students will often resist international law and regard it as the ‘enemy of the state’ or a source of illegitimate foreign influence. The challenge of international law teachers in those jurisdictions is thus not only to teach international law but also to draw the students into – rather than alienate them from – thinking about their resistance to international law and about the relations between law, power and legitimacy. How to meet this and related challenges is the focus of this paper, which is based on the authors’ practical experiences of teaching international law in several jurisdictions with an international law crisis including Hong Kong, Israel, and the People’s Republic of China.

2013 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 196-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
ERIKA DE WET ◽  
JURE VIDMAR

AbstractThis article gives an overview of two competing paradigms in the practice of judicial organs for the resolution of norm conflicts, namely the paradigm of a human rights based hierarchy versus the paradigm of systemic integration or conflict avoidance. Judicial practice indicates that norm conflicts typically manifest themselves between human rights obligations on the one hand and other categories of international obligations on the other. Do judicial organs resolve such norm conflicts in a manner that favours human rights obligations? If so, this would support the view in the literature that the international legal order is increasingly operating within a paradigm of hierarchy, with human rights at its apex. The article addresses this question based on the results of a study conducted by 10 authors who have analysed the practice of domestic, regional, supranational and international courts in dealing with norm conflicts between human rights, on the one hand and the other sub-regimes of public international law mentioned above, on the other (de Wet and Vidmar 2011). The article argues that judicial practice reveals no clear or consistent patterns of a human rights based hierarchy in international law can currently be induced from the manner in which courts resolve norm conflicts in international law. Instead, courts avoid resolving norm conflicts within a paradigm of hierarchy and instead remain within a paradigm of systemic integration that is aimed at maximizing the accommodation of competing sub-regimes of public international law.


2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 147-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger O’Keefe

AbstractWhich is to prevail in a territorial dispute between the legal title of the one state and the actual display of sovereignty by the other? In the absence of any conventional or customary rule on point, Hersch Lauterpacht would have urged recourse to analogy with municipal private law. But the structural difference between the international and municipal legal orders and the availability of several pertinent private law analogies have complicated the answer to whether what is known as prescription finds a place in public international law. The recent resolution of the question highlights both the utility of and the risk of doctrinal imprecision involved in recourse by the international adjudicator to private law analogies.


International relations are increasingly judicialized by the increasing number of international courts and tribunals. On the one hand this judicialization of international law is hailed as a glimmer of more effective and legitimate world governance promoting human rights, justice, and peace. On the other hand critics highlight how sovereignty is increasingly constrained by international courts, and question the effectiveness, legitimacy, and future potential of these courts and tribunals. This book maps and assesses this development and the mixed reactions thereto, presenting the aspirations which international courts and tribunals (ICs) are living up to, and where they fall short. The first Part provides a general frame for these legitimacy concerns. It discusses the general functions of ICs; how they are governed; and possible alternatives to ICs. The second Part considers how the ICs appear to present their judgments in ways that legitimize them vis-à-vis states and other stakeholders; their inner workings; as well as their law-making role. The following Parts consider the various forms of backlash several of the ICs experience, and how the ICs, states, and civil society seek to respond to these challenges. The last Part deals with the fragmentary character of the international judiciary. An epilogue looks to the future of international judicialization.


2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (5) ◽  
pp. 861-895 ◽  
Author(s):  
Farhad Malekian

Love is a norm of concern of all states and its boundaries reach even beyond the erga omnes principle but ignorance constitutes the great deficiency of human beings in Islamic and public international law. Both legal disciplines are not only against cruel human violations but also any other minor wrong. The differences between them are not as significant as first assumed. Instead, it is the other way around: the similarities are so significant as to include the very cornerstones of the various frameworks and systems, namely, their underlying principles. A wide-ranging interpretation of Islamic and public international law sources is necessary in order to put an end to all cultural, ethnic, religious, legal and political conflicts with whatever means are available – whether derived from Islamic, European, or other sources. A civilized human rights system or union does not authorize the use of force, nor do they purchase or manufacture weapons in any circumstances, for any reason and to any degree. In other words, pure love constitutes not only the de facto, but also, the de jure criteria of the intention not to segregate.


2007 ◽  
Vol 76 (4) ◽  
pp. 435-464 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Morten Haugen

AbstractSocial human rights are not held to belong to the category of jus cogens norms. At the same time these human rights protect vital matters, such as the right to adequate food, which obviously has a relationship to the right to life. On the other hand, the annexes to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement, which are binding on all WTO member States, has implied a shift from the old General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) to the WTO, from pure contractual treaties to more standard-setting treaties. The article seeks to analyse if the obligations erga omnes and the concept of 'multilateral obligations' are applicable to distinguish between human rights treaties on the one hand and WTO agreements on the other. The background of the analysis is also the work of the International Law Commission (ILC) Study Group on fragmentation of international law, finalised in 2006. The article finds that there is still uncertainty regarding the exact meaning of the term 'multilateral obligations'. Hence, other concepts such as 'absolute obligations' might be preferred in order to characterise human rights treaties, and hence implicitly acknowledge that treaties that protect vital matters may prevail over other treaties, based on the interests which are to be protected.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 143
Author(s):  
Saido J. Hasso ◽  
Khalida Th. Maree

There is no doubt about the seriousness of terrorism، and there is no dispute that it must be combated and eradicated، to protect the security and safety of the society. International law does not prevent states from resorting to laws and taking necessary measures to combat terrorism. However, these laws, procedures and restrictions must conform to international human rights standards، and the interests of which the restrictions preserve are less valuable than the rights themselves, which means there must be a balance between the security and safety of society on the one hand and the preservation of rights and freedoms on the other, but the problem lies in the misuse of this right and these standards by criminalizing a wide range of permissible acts, to achieve political goals، and the liquidation of opponents and other illegal objectives.


2014 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-151
Author(s):  
Frédérique Lozanorios

When the Security Council authorizes a State or an international organization to use force, it entrusts it with authority over the chain of command of the operation. That is why the un has always declined to assume responsibility for conduct occurring in the context such operations. While this position is widely supported by practice, and by the 2011 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (dario) of the International Law Commission (ilc), certain cases brought before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) such as Behrami/Saramati have challenged this principle. These cases had the merit of bringing to the fore uncertainties about the rules of responsibility applicable to complex schemes of peacekeeping. This study aims to address the question: in the light of the dario, to what extent could responsibility be attributed to the un for conduct occurred in the framework of authorized operations, and what kind of responsibility would that be? First, it argues that no basis can be found in the principles of independent responsibility to justify the attribution of wrongful conduct committed on the occasion of authorized operations to the un, unless in exceptional factual circumstances. Second, it contends that indirect responsibility could be an appropriate way to apprehend the specific relationships established between the un on the one hand and the operations it has authorized on the other hand.


2008 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-290 ◽  
Author(s):  
FLEUR JOHNS ◽  
THOMAS SKOUTERIS ◽  
WOUTER WERNER

This special issue of the Leiden Journal of International Law on the Nigerian international lawyer Taslim Olawale Elias (1914–91) marks the second of the journal's Periphery Series. The collection of essays featured here serves essentially two functions. On the one hand, it pays tribute to an exceptional jurist whose work marked international legal scholarship during the years of decolonization. On the other, it invites critical engagement with the theme of international law's ‘periphery’. The centre–periphery formulation, as explained elsewhere, owes its provenance mostly to recent debates in political economy. It is a spatial metaphor which postulates a structural relationship between a presumed ‘centre’, typically portrayed as advanced or metropolitan, and a less developed and provincial ‘periphery’. In such debates the centre–periphery opposition is assumed as stable, decisive, and representative of the empirical reality of a ‘world out there’. The Periphery Series was launched in 2007, with a special issue on the Chilean jurist Alejandro Álvarez, to foster engagement with the discursive function of centre–periphery oppositions in public international law in its various iterations, and to confront questions of resource allocation, dependency, geography, and power.


ANCIENT LAND ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 03 (04) ◽  
pp. 19-21
Author(s):  
Chingiz Nasimi Chingizzadeh ◽  

Human rights and trademark laws do not go well together. This is partly the result of an educational tradition and the division of legal research into private and commercial law on the one hand and public law, international law and human rights law on the other. This division is also reinforced by the historical judiciary in many countries. However, human rights concerns are becoming more and more relevant in trademark law. Keywords: Intellectual property, trademark, human rights, freedom of expression, privacy, property


2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 403-426
Author(s):  
Sondre Torp Helmersen

Abstract The People’s Republic of China (‘China’) has adopted legislation threatening to invade the Republic of China (‘Taiwan’) if the latter declares independence. Threats of force are prohibited by the UN Charter Article 2(4) and equivalent customary international law. This article proceeds along two apparently contradictory strands. On the one hand, the prohibition probably does not apply to non-State entities such as the Republic of China. One the other hand, the ICJ stated in the Nuclear Weapons opinion that ‘if the use of force itself in a given case is illegal […] the threat to use such force will likewise be illegal’. If the Republic of China declares independence it will become a State, making a PRC invasion illegal. Therefore, the PRC’s current threats should also be illegal. The best way to resolve this apparent paradox is to say that the ICJ’s ‘Nuclear Weapons principle’ must be nuanced.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document