scholarly journals Miller’s Tale: Why the Sympathy Principle is Inadequate

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joe Slater
Keyword(s):  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Richard Miller

Abstract In the aftermath of Peter Singer’s ‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’, the argument he put forward received significant criticism, largely on the grounds that it demanded too much of moral agents. Several attempts have been made since to formulate moral principles that adequately express the stringency of our duties of beneficence. Richard Miller proposed one such option, which has several advantages over Singer’s principle. In particular, because it concerns our dispositions rather than operating over every possible occasion for beneficence, it avoids problems of iterative demands. However, I argue that Miller’s principle is inadequate, because 1) it seems too weak, 2) it appears to be ambiguous and 3) it can give unduly harsh verdicts on unlucky moral agents.

Ethics and action

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matt King
Keyword(s):  
Joint Ventures ◽  
Action Theory ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Moral Requirement ◽  
Close Attention ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Difficult Cases ◽  
Moral Requirements

Moral theories are theories of right action. Moral principles are meant to guide action. And, if moral rules exist, they apply to all agents. Theories of action and agency seek to determine what counts as an action, what distinguishes agents from nonagents and the principles that govern what happens when agents act. These joint ventures both depend on and inform one another. When we deliberate about what to do, we often consider what moral requirements we might be under. We think about what we morally ought to do. It often seems like the answer to that question can depend on what sorts of abilities we have, what options are available. If I cannot do something, either because I lack the ability to do it or because I do not have the opportunity to act in that way, then plausibly it is not the case that I should do that thing. More importantly, perhaps, it is not the case that I failed a moral requirement. So what sorts of abilities do we have and how do they constrain what we ought to do? Moral principles tell us what we should do. But action theory tells us that what people do is a complicated affair. Typically, agents want and believe things, form intentions to act, then act on those intentions, while producing various results or outcomes. So an important question for ethics and action theory is: What parts of my action determine whether I act wrongly? Am I morally evaluable only for those parts I intend explicitly? Or must I answer for unintended consequences? In difficult cases, which take priority? Only moral agents need concern themselves with right action. However, we also think that morality is not optional. If some action is wrong, then no one should do it. No matter how much you want to, you still should not. And this seems like an important and necessary feature of morality. Ethicists have struggled, however, to justify why moral requirements should be universally binding. Some think that if we pay close attention to what it is to be an agent, one who performs actions for reasons, then we will find such a justification. Thus, a major foundational question of morality depends on a deeply foundational question from action theory: What does agency consist in?

scholarly journals Identifikácia aplikovanej morálnej filozofie akcentujúcej úvahy ekologického typu – ekologická etika.

Envigogika ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lubov Vladyková
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Environmental Problems ◽  
Ecological Ethics ◽  
Intellectual Activity ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Analytical Skills ◽  
Ethics Research ◽  
The Two Cultures ◽  
The Individual

Working on the assumption that it is in the nature of ecological ethics to overcome the barriers between the “two cultures” by theorists from both cultures communicating with each other, seeking a common language. The present study is inclined to (in accordance with the pragmatic requirement to find a functioning solution to environmental problems, or in other words, the interdisciplinary vision) attend to the contextual and situational dimension of ethical integration and decision-making in the problematic of eco-ethics research and management. Ethical integration is not just a theoretical or intellectual activity (i.e. a philosophical assimilation of different values, responsibilities and interests) but it is also a form of practical reasoning, which is often realized by contradictory moral agents in complex and often empirically and morally ambiguous situations. We assume that the most important integrating role in every reasonable model of ethical analysis must focus on our actions and must have a methodological nature: an increase in the sensibility of the individual towards the ethical context of practice (his understanding of the relevant moral principles concerning practice) and support the development of individual’s imagination and analytical skills, to enhance his capacity to reflect on moral ecological and environmental problems and address them in a more creative and systematic way.

Moral Agency, Commitment, and Impartiality

1996 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neera K. Badhwar
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Moral Identity ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Political Morality ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Conception Of The Good ◽  
The Right

Liberal political philosophy presupposes a moral theory according to which the ability to assess and choose conceptions of the good from a universal and impartial moral standpoint is central to the individual's moral identity. This viewpoint is standardly understood by liberals as that of a rational human (not transcendental) agent. Such an agent is able to reflect on her ends and pursuits, including those she strongly identifies with, and to understand and take into account the basic interests of others. From the perspective of liberalism as a political morality, the most important of these interests is the interest in maximum, equal liberty for each individual, and thus the most important moral principles are the principles of justice that protect individuals' rights to life and liberty.According to the communitarian critics of liberalism, however, the liberal picture of moral agency is unrealistically abstract. Communitarians object that moral agents in the real world neither choose their conceptions of the good nor occupy a universalistically impartial moral standpoint. Rather, their conceptions of the good are determined chiefly by the communities in which they find themselves, and these conceptions are largely “constitutive” of their particular moral identities. Moral agency is thus “situated” and “particularistic,” and an impartial reflection on the conception of the good that constitutes it is undesirable, if not impossible. Further, communitarians contend, the good is “prior” to the right in the sense that moral norms are derived from, and justified in terms of, the good. An adequate moral and political theory must reflect these facts about moral agency and moral norms.

Rights and Interests in a Participatory Market Society

1994 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henk van Luijk
Keyword(s):  
Civil Society ◽  
Business Ethics ◽  
Human Action ◽  
Special Relation ◽  
Ethical Practices ◽  
Market Society ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Moral Behaviour ◽  
Rights And Interests

Abstract:In this paper I try to enlarge the scope of the questions commonly treated in business ethics. I first argue that not motives but action structures should form the basis of our analytical endeavours. I then distinguish three basic structures in human action: self-directed, other-including and other-directed actions. These structures, when linked with the concepts of interests and legitimate claims or rights, lead to a taxonomy of moral behaviour in business that I describe as, respectively, transactional, recognitional and participatory ethics, three distinct realms of moral behaviour, each characterized by a specific set of moral principles and a special relation between moral agents. My contention is that, up to now, analysis in business ethics has largely been focused on issues in the field of recognitional ethics. The discipline itself as well as ethical practices in business may greatly profit by paying explicit attention to market morality and transactional ethics as well as to the non-enforceable we-alliances of a participatory ethics, increasingly possible and needed in present-day civil society.

scholarly journals Understanding the Role of Moral Principles in Business Ethics: A Kantian Perspective

2011 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffery Smith ◽  
Wim Dubbink
Keyword(s):  
Business Ethics ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Moral Questions

ABSTRACT:Does effective moral judgment in business ethics rely upon the identification of a suitable set of moral principles? We address this question by examining a number of criticisms of the role that principles can play in moral judgment. Critics claim that reliance on principles requires moral agents to abstract themselves from actual circumstances, relationships and personal commitments in answering moral questions. This is said to enforce an artificial uniformity in moral judgment. We challenge these critics by developing an account of principle-based moral judgment that has been widely discussed by contemporary Kantian scholars. In so doing we respond to some basic problems raised by so-called “moral particularists” who voice theoretical objections to the role of principles as well as to contemporary business ethicists who have criticized principle-based moral judgment along similar lines. We conclude with some future areas of research.

Common-sense ethics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlotte R. Brown
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Ordinary People ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Main Figure

‘Common-sense ethics’ refers to the pre-theoretical moral judgments of ordinary people. Moral philosophers have taken different attitudes towards the pre-theoretical judgments of ordinary people. For some they are the ‘facts’ which any successful moral theory must explain and justify, while for others the point of moral theory is to refine and improve them. ‘Common Sense ethics’ as a specific kind of moral theory was developed in Scotland during the latter part of the eighteenth century to counter what its proponents saw as the moral scepticism of David Hume. Thomas Reid, the main figure in this school, and his followers argued that moral knowledge and the motives to abide by it are within the reach of everyone. They believed that a plurality of basic self-evident moral principles is revealed by conscience to all mature moral agents. Conscience is an original and natural power of the human mind and this shows that God meant it to guide our will. A deeply Christian outlook underwrites their theory.

Moral principles and cognitive load

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanne M. Watkins ◽  
Simon M. Laham
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Load ◽  
Moral Principles

Axioms of Morality

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-45
Author(s):  
Michael Clunn
Keyword(s):  
Human Life ◽  
Building Blocks ◽  
Moral Principles

Foundationalism states that philosophy must begin from basic building blocks and construct arguments based on these. The axioms of existence, consciousness, and identity are three primary axioms which cannot be denied without being self-defeating. These axioms are also common to all human life. This paper explores ways to construct moral principles and virtues from these foundational cornerstones.

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