scholarly journals From Corporate Moral Agency to Corporate Moral Rights

2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-159 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avia Pasternak

Abstract Recent literature suggests that organizational entities, such as states and business corporations, can qualify as moral agents. Does it follow that, as members of our moral community, group agents are entitled to moral protections? This article explores the connection between groups’ moral agency and moral rights. I argue that corporate moral agency does not, in itself, ground a group’s claim for moral protections. Nevertheless, a group agent can be entitled to derivative moral rights protections, which attach to the group itself but are grounded in the interests of individuals, such as the group’s members. Furthermore, the agential status of a group helps to identify which rights can attach to it, given its moral agency. One such moral agency related right is a right not to be morally subverted. This right generates a duty for the group agent’s members to ensure that its decision-making process incorporates sound moral reasoning. The final part of the article applies these conclusions to recent debates on the rights of states. I argue that, as moral agents, states have a moral right not to be morally subverted. It follows that citizens have a pro tanto duty, directed at their state, not to engage in political activities that would subvert its moral powers.

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Alan D. Morrison ◽  
Rita Mota ◽  
William J. Wilhelm

We present a second-personal account of corporate moral agency. This approach is in contrast to the first-personal approach adopted in much of the existing literature, which concentrates on the corporation’s ability to identify moral reasons for itself. Our account treats relationships and communications as the fundamental building blocks of moral agency. The second-personal account rests on a framework developed by Darwall. Its central requirement is that corporations be capable of recognizing the authority relations that they have with other moral agents. We discuss the relevance of corporate affect, corporate communications, and corporate culture to the second-personal account. The second-personal account yields a new way to specify first-personal criteria for moral agency, and it generates fresh insights into the reasons those criteria matter. In addition, a second-personal analysis implies that moral agency is partly a matter of policy, and it provides a fresh perspective on corporate punishment.


2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia H WERHANE

AbstractIn 2011 the United Nations (UN) published the ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” Framework’ (Guiding Principles). The Guiding Principles specify that for-profit corporations have responsibilities to respect human rights. Do these responsibilities entail that corporations, too, have basic rights? The contention that corporations are moral persons is problematic because it confers moral status to an organization similar to that conferred to a human agent. I shall argue that corporations are not moral persons. But as collective bodies created, operated, and perpetuated by individual human moral agents, one can ascribe to corporations secondary moral agency as organizations. This ascription, I conclude, makes sense of the normative business responsibilities outlined in the Guiding Principles without committing one to the view that corporations are full moral persons.


Author(s):  
Silviya Serafimova

Abstract Moral implications of the decision-making process based on algorithms require special attention within the field of machine ethics. Specifically, research focuses on clarifying why even if one assumes the existence of well-working ethical intelligent agents in epistemic terms, it does not necessarily mean that they meet the requirements of autonomous moral agents, such as human beings. For the purposes of exemplifying some of the difficulties in arguing for implicit and explicit ethical agents in Moor’s sense, three first-order normative theories in the field of machine ethics are put to test. Those are Powers’ prospect for a Kantian machine, Anderson and Anderson’s reinterpretation of act utilitarianism and Howard and Muntean’s prospect for a moral machine based on a virtue ethical approach. By comparing and contrasting the three first-order normative theories, and by clarifying the gist of the differences between the processes of calculation and moral estimation, the possibility for building what—one might call strong “moral” AI scenarios—is questioned. The possibility of weak “moral” AI scenarios is likewise discussed critically.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 466-489 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean Fleming

Why, if at all, does it make sense to assign some responsibilities to states rather than to individuals? There are two contemporary answers. According to the agential theory, states can be held responsible because they are moral agents, much like human beings. According to the functional theory, states can be held responsible because they are legal persons that act vicariously through individuals, much like principals who act through agents. The two theories of state responsibility belong to parallel traditions of scholarship that have never been clearly distinguished. While the agential theory is dominant in IR, political theory, and philosophy, the functional theory prevails in International Law. The purpose of this article is to bridge the gulf between ethical and legal approaches to state responsibility. I argue that IR scholars and political theorists have much to gain from the functional theory. First, it provides a plausible alternative to the agential theory that avoids common objections to corporate moral agency. Second, the functional theory helps us to understand features of International Law that have puzzled IR scholars and political theorists, such as the fact that states are not held criminally responsible. I suggest that states can be ‘moral principals’ instead of moral agents.


2021 ◽  
pp. 69-81
Author(s):  
Jian Li ◽  
Henry Chan

Multiple myeloma is a condition that affects predominantly the older population. There are now various approved chemotherapy regimens as a result of advances in treatment. Choosing the optimal regimen for older patients with myeloma remains a challenge because of frailty and a lack of head-to-head comparisons between backbone regimens. The purpose of this literature review is to summarise the recent literature on frailty assessment, disease biology, and treatment efficacy in the frontline and relapsed settings to aid the decision-making process.


2006 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 23-30
Author(s):  
John P Sullins lll

In this paper I argue that in certain circumstances robots can be seen as real moral agents. A distinction is made between persons and moral agents such that, it is not necessary for a robot to have personhood in order to be a moral agent. I detail three requirements for a robot to be seen as a moral agent. The first is achieved when the robot is significantly autonomous from any programmers or operators of the machine. The second is when one can analyze or explain the robot’s behavior only by ascribing to it some predisposition or ‘intention’ to do good or harm. And finally, robot moral agency requires the robot to behave in a way that shows and understanding of responsibility to some other moral agent. Robots with all of these criteria will have moral rights as well as responsibilities regardless of their status as persons.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10(4) (10(4)) ◽  
pp. 1357-1369
Author(s):  
Alpheaus Litheko ◽  
Marius Potgieter

Rural tourism, if strategically developed and managed, can make a substantial positive contribution towards the prosperity of the rural community. The management of the community group as primary stakeholders within a rural tourism development context is essential to enhance the rural collective economy of a region, augmenting the rural appearance, strengthening the rural civilisation construction, reducing the urban-rural gap, and building a cohesive and harmonious community. The primary objective is to examine the community group’s level of involvement in rural tourism development programmes; as well as to establish their level of participation in rural tourism development activities. A survey was undertaken to obtain the quantitative data needed from the community group. The findings show that the involvement of the community group in the decision-making process will assist in the effective implementation of projects without delays and contribute towards the sustainable development of rural tourism. The management of sustainable rural tourism development therefore necessitates that the needs of the community group are considered in the decision-making process and their participation therein. Participation facilitates rational cooperation, strengthens partnerships, builds trust and credibility, empowers the community group, and therefore makes management more effective.


2009 ◽  
Vol 17 (6) ◽  
pp. 1065-1070 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diana Catarina Ferreira de Campos ◽  
João Manuel Garcia do Nascimento Graveto

This paper is a literature review based on articles in the nursing field about shared clinical decision. The objectives are to examine the role of nurses and patients in the decision-making process in the context of clinical practice. To support these themes, a review of recent literature was conducted with the following results: patients prefer shared decision-making with professionals who should support and provide information to patients in order to overcome the barriers hampering patients' involvement in decision-making. There is a clear need for more research studies that address the problems in the clinical decision-making process so as to contribute to healthcare improvement.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Onni Hirvonen

AbstractAttributing moral responsibility to an agent requires that the agent is a capable member of a moral community. Capable members of a moral community are often thought of as moral reasoners (or moral persons) and, thus, to attribute moral responsibility to collective agents would require showing that they are capable of moral reasoning. It is argued here that those theories that understand collective reasoning and collective moral agency in terms of collective decision-making and commitment – as is arguably the case with Christian List and Philip Pettit’s theory of group agency – face the so-called “problem of the first belief” that threatens to make moral reasoning impossible for group agents. This paper introduces three possible solutions to the problem and discusses the effects that these solutions have in regard to the possibility of attributing moral responsibility to groups.


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