scholarly journals Constitutional and administrative paradigms in judicial control over EU high and low politics

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. E-240-E-267
Author(s):  
Pola Cebulak

Abstract This article explores the particular tensions surrounding judicial review in EU external relations. The tensions are classified using a two-dimensional framework. Firstly, a distinction based on policy domains of high and low politics, which is derived from constitutional theory, and external to the CJEU; and secondly a distinction based on legitimizing paradigms of administrative (EU as effective global actor) or constitutional (judicial review as guarantee of fundamental rights) in character and determined by the Court itself. Even though one would expect a dominance of the administrative paradigm in the domain of high politics, the Court uses both the administrative and the constitutional paradigm in its external relations case-law. The decision on which of these becomes the guiding frame seems to depend more on the policy domain, and be made case by case, which suggests politically sensitive adjudication, rather than a coherent approach to legitimizing the nascent judicial review in EU external relations.

Author(s):  
Maria José Rangel de Mesquita

The article addresses the issue of judicial control of the implementation of Common Foreign and Security Policy at international regional level within the framework of the relaunching of the negotiation in view of the accession of the EU to the ECHR. Considering the extent of jurisdiction of the CJEU in respect of Common Foreign and Security Policy field in the light of its case law (sections 1 and 2), it analyses the question of judicial review of Common Foreign and Security Policy within international regional justice by the ECtHR in the light of the ongoing negotiations (section 3), in the perspective of the relationship between non-national courts (section 3.A), having as background the (2013) Draft Agreement of accession (section 3.B.1). After addressing the relaunching of the negotiation procedure (section 3.B.2) and the issue of CFSP control by the ECtHR according to the recent (re)negotiation meetings (section 3.B.3), some concrete proposals, including for the redrafting of the accession agreement, will be put forward (section 3.B.4), as well as a conclusion (section 4).


2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 356-370
Author(s):  
Maria José Rangel de Mesquita

The article addresses the issue of judicial control of the implementation of Common Foreign and Security Policy at international regional level within the framework of the relaunching of the negotiation in view of the accession of the EU to the ECHR. Considering the extent of jurisdiction of the CJEU in respect of Common Foreign and Security Policy field in the light of its case law (sections 1 and 2), it analyses the question of judicial review of Common Foreign and Security Policy within international regional justice by the ECtHR in the light of the ongoing negotiations (section 3), in the perspective of the relationship between non-national courts (section 3.A), having as background the (2013) Draft Agreement of accession (section 3.B.1). After addressing the relaunching of the negotiation procedure (section 3.B.2) and the issue of CFSP control by the ECtHR according to the recent (re)negotiation meetings (section 3.B.3), some concrete proposals, including for the redrafting of the accession agreement, will be put forward (section 3.B.4), as well as a conclusion (section 4).


Author(s):  
Otto Pfersmann

La posibilidad de que los individuos dispongan de un «recurso directo» para cuestionar normas del sistema jurídico ante el juez de la constitucionalidad no constituye un elemento necesario del Estado constitucional de Derecho. La institución de los «derechos fundamentales», no requiere, en cuanto tal, que la protección de los mismos deba corresponder al juez de la constitucionalidad de las leyes. Lo que permite distinguir los diferentes modelos es el grado en que concentran y distribuyen estas tareas (protección de derechos fundamentales y control de constitucionalidad de la ley, básicamente). Esto depende de varios factores: el grado de exhaustividad del control de la constitucionalidad de las normas, el tipo de supervisión (preventivo o correctivo), el número de órganos encargados del control y el número de componentes del mismo. Se plantea así el problema de la limitación que aqueja al Estado de Derecho, pues cuanto más exhaustiva pretende ser la realización del mismo, menos intensa resulta produciendo un paradójico debilitamiento del derecho fundamental y del principio de exhaustividad. Asistimos, pues, a una mutación del principio «monomicrodicástico» y exhaustivo de jurisdicción constitucional.The possibility for individuals to have a «direct action» to challenge the norms of the legal system before the judge of the constitutionality is not a necessary element of the constitutional Rule of law. The institution «fundamental rights» does not require, as such, that the judge of the constitutionality of the parliamentary statutes should grant their protection. What allows distinguishing the different models is the degree of the concentration and distribution of these basic tasks: protection of the fundamental rights, constitutional judicial review. This depends upon various factors: how exhaust the constitutional judicial review should be, what kind of constitutional supervision may be (preventive or corrective), the number of the organs charged with this task, and the number of its components. The question of the limitation of the Rule of Law is risen, because the more exhaustive its implementation is intended, the less intense, generating a paradoxal weakness of the fundamental right and the completeness principie. A phenomenon appears: the mutation of the «monomicrodicastic» principie and the completeness of the constitutional judicial review.


2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 321-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jasper Krommendijk

Historical background of the inclusion of social rights in the Charter of Fundamental Rights – Distinction between rights and principles – Similarities between the conditions for direct effect and the criteria for distinguishing between Charter rights and principles – Implications of this distinction for the possibilities of judicial review – Reluctance of the ECJ to explicitly deal with the distinction until Glatzel, as illustrated by its earlier judgments in Dominguez and AMS.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Thym

Five decades of interaction between the Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Court of Justice – Reversal of the Solange decisions – Jurisdictional upgrade of the Charter under domestic constitutional law – Continuity of the ultra vires and constitutional identity caveats – Differences between the First and Second Senate in the approach towards EU law – Preliminary references as a new normality – Projection of the experience and doctrinal rigour of the German fundamental rights case law on the European level – ‘Primary’ application of the Grundgesetz as pragmatic guidance – Gradual evolution of overarching standards – Ordinary courts as an institutional counterbalance to the Bundesverfassungsgericht – Insistence on leeway for relative national autonomy in the interpretation and application of the Charter.


Author(s):  
Beatrice I. Bonafè

Abstract The main purpose of this article is to investigate the role that international obligations of criminalization do play and could play in the judicial review carried out by the Italian Constitutional Court. It is divided into three main parts. The Court’s case law is examined first, a general and theoretical appraisal of the Court’s approach follows, and further implications of that approach are taken into account at the end. The author maintains that the Court is quite deferential to international obligations and, despite the significant constitutional constraints surrounding criminal law-making, it seems prepared to let criminalization obligations have various legal effects in the Italian national legal order.


2006 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 349-383
Author(s):  
Richard P. Church

Why do nine Supreme Court justices have the power to overturn the choices of a majority in a democratic nation? This question, known as the counter-majoritarian problem, has driven constitutional theory for the past forty years. Likewise, it is the question at the heart of Jed Rubenfeld'sFreedom and Time, A Theory of Constitutional Self-Government. In responding to this question, Rubenfeld argues that freedom and democracy require temporal extension, precluding either freedom or democracy from being reduced to the immediately present majority will of a people. Therefore, Rubenfeld concludes that the checks on the immediate will of the people at the heart of constitutional judicial review are not only democratically permissible but a necessity.


2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chuks Okpaluba

‘Accountability’ is one of the democratic values entrenched in the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. It is a value recognised throughout the Constitution and imposed upon the law-making organs of state, the Executive, the Judiciary and all public functionaries. This constitutional imperative is given pride of place among the other founding values: equality before the law, the rule of law and the supremacy of the Constitution. This study therefore sets out to investigate how the courts have grappled with the interpretation and application of the principle of accountability, the starting point being the relationship between accountability and judicial review. Therefore, in the exercise of its judicial review power, a court may enquire whether the failure of a public functionary to comply with a constitutional duty of accountability renders the decision made illegal, irrational or unreasonable. One of the many facets of the principle of accountability upon which this article dwells is to ascertain how the courts have deployed that expression in making the state and its agencies liable for the delictual wrongs committed against an individual in vindication of a breach of the individual’s constitutional right in the course of performing a public duty. Here, accountability and breach of public duty; the liability of the state for detaining illegal immigrants contrary to the prescripts of the law; the vicarious liability of the state for the criminal acts of the police and other law-enforcement officers (as in police rape cases and misuse of official firearms by police officers), and the liability of the state for delictual conduct in the context of public procurement are discussed. Having carefully analysed the available case law, this article concludes that no public functionary can brush aside the duty of accountability wherever it is imposed without being in breach of a vital constitutional mandate. Further, it is the constitutional duty of the courts, when called upon, to declare such act or conduct an infringement of the Constitution.


Author(s):  
Tatiana N. Mikheeva ◽  
◽  
Anastasiya Yu. Stepanova ◽  

2014 ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
Przemysław Florjanowicz-Błachut

The core function of the judiciary is the administration of justice through delivering judgments and other decisions. The crucial role for its acceptance and legitimization by not only lawyers, but also individulas (parties) and the hole society plays judicial reasoning. It should reflect on judge’s independence within the exercise of his office and show also judicial self-restraint or activism. The axiology and the standards of proper judicial reasoning are anchored both in constitutional and supranational law and case-law. Polish Constitutional Tribunal derives a duty to give reasoning from the right to a fair trial – right to be heard and bring own submissions before the court (Article 45 § 1 of the Constitution), the right to appeal against judgments and decisions made at first stage (Article 78), the rule of two stages of the court proceedings (Article 176) and rule of law clause (Article 2), that comprises inter alia right to due process of law and the rule of legitimate expactation / the protection of trust (Vertrauensschutz). European Court of Human Rights derives this duty to give reasons from the guarantees of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of European Convention of Human Rights. In its case-law the ECtHR, taking into account the margin of appreciation concept, formulated a number of positive and negative requirements, that should be met in case of proper reasoning. The obligation for courts to give sufficient reasons for their decisions is also anchored in European Union law. European Court of Justice derives this duty from the right to fair trial enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Standards of the courts reasoning developed by Polish constitutional court an the European courts (ECJ and ECtHR) are in fact convergent and coherent. National judges should take them into consideration in every case, to legitimize its outcome and enhance justice delivery.


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