Behavioral Contract Law

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas S. Ulen

Abstract This article explores some behavioral findings that are relevant to three areas of contract: formation, performance, and remedies. I compare the rational choice theory analysis of various aspects of contract law with how behavioral findings lead to a change in our understanding of that area of law. A penultimate section considers several criticisms of behavioral economics. A concluding section calls for altering some settled understandings of contract law to accommodate behavioral results and for further research about some still uncertain aspects of contracting.

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 464-489 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marek Hudik

I compare two interpretations of the rational choice theory: decision-theoretic and price-theoretic. The former takes the assumption of utility maximization as a literal description of a decision procedure. The latter considers it as a modeling device used to explain changes/variability of behavior on an aggregate level. According to the price-theoretic interpretation, these changes/variability are explained by constraints (“prices”) rather than differences in intrinsic characteristics between human populations (“tastes”). While the decision-theoretic interpretation of rationality represents a possible foundation of the price-theoretic interpretation of rationality, I argue that it is not its only possible foundation. I then show that critiques raised by behavioral economics apply to the decision-theoretic interpretation and much less so to the price-theoretic one. From the perspective of the price theory, behavioral and rational choice models are predominantly complementary. Price-theoretic interpretation helps to explain why the rational choice theory continues to play an important role in economics, even after the behavioral revolution. JEL codes: D01, D03, B41, A10


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Pi

Abstract Skeptics of rational choice theory have long predicted that behavioral economics would radically transform the legislation, adjudication, and analysis of law. Using tort law as an exemplar, this Article maps out the narrow set of conditions where substantive law can be modified to accommodate irrational decision-makers. Specifically, this Article demonstrates that if injurers are systematically biased, and the due care standard can be expressed quantitatively, and victims are unable to take meaningful precautions, then imposing punitive damages can induce irrational injurers to exercise efficient precautionary care. In all other cases, it is better that the law adopt a presumption of rationality, regardless whether individuals behave rationally in fact.


2015 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 49-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bojan Krstic ◽  
Milos Krstic

In this paper, we have tried to explain the normative turn in more recent work on experimental economics and behavioral economics. In section two, we discussed the various arguments that philosophers have offered in related to a normative interpretation of rational choice theory. We used the Friedman-Savage work on Expected Utility Theory as an example of the differences between the way that economists and philosophers see rational choice theory. We concluded that economists have traditionally equated the normative with ethically. In the third part, we examined the results of experimental and behaviorial economic literature with emphasis on the influence of experimental psychology. We presented a number of empirical anomalies and we agreed that representatives of economic psychology tend to view rational choice theory as a normative theory of rationality. In the last part, we examined some of the causes and consequences of the normative turn.


OUGHTOPIA ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-282
Author(s):  
In-Kyun Kim ◽  
Myeong-Geon Koh

Author(s):  
Kealeboga J Maphunye

This article examines South Africa's 20-year democracy by contextualising the roles of the 'small' political parties that contested South Africa's 2014 elections. Through the  prism  of South  Africa's  Constitution,  electoral legislation  and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, it examines these parties' roles in South Africa's democratisation; their influence,  if any, in parliament, and whether they play any role in South Africa's continental or international engagements. Based on a review of the extant literature, official documents,  legislation, media, secondary research, reports and the results of South Africa's elections, the article relies on game theory, rational choice theory and theories of democracy and democratic consolidation to examine 'small' political parties' roles in the country's political and legal systems. It concludes that the roles of 'small' parties in governance and democracy deserve greater recognition than is currently the case, but acknowledges the extreme difficulty experienced by the 'small'  parties in playing a significant role in democratic consolidation, given their formidable opponent in a one-party dominant system.


Author(s):  
Michael Moehler

This chapter discusses contractualist theories of justice that, although they rely explicitly on moral assumptions in the traditional understanding of morality, employ rational choice theory for the justification of principles of justice. In particular, the chapter focuses on the dispute between Rawls and Harsanyi about the correct choice of principles of justice in the original position. The chapter shows that there is no winner in the Rawls–Harsanyi dispute and, ultimately, formal methods alone cannot justify moral principles. This finding is significant for the development of the rational decision situation that serves for the derivation of the weak principle of universalization for the domain of pure instrumental morality.


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