Reformoptionen der Familienbesteuerung

2007 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Bergs ◽  
Clemens Fuest ◽  
Andreas Peichl ◽  
Thilo Schaefer

SummaryThe aging of the population in Germany has led to growing concerns among politicians about the economic situation of households with children. This is also reflected in the recent tax policy debate on reforming the taxation of families and married couples. The purpose of this paper is threefold. We use a micro­simulation approach to analyse how various reforms of family taxation would affect the incomes of families compared to singles and married couples without children. Moreover, we address the distributional effects across different income deciles. Finally, we quantify tax revenue effects as well as possible consequences for labour supply. We focus on limited real income splitting systems.The simulation results show that limited real income splitting produces rather moderate vertical distributional effects, compared e.g. with the joint family income splitting of the French type. Furthermore real income splitting would lower the marginal tax rate on the second earner’s income, creating incentives to take up employment. It would also generate additional tax revenue.

SERIEs ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 369-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nezih Guner ◽  
Javier López-Segovia ◽  
Roberto Ramos

AbstractCan the Spanish government generate more tax revenue by making personal income taxes more progressive? To answer this question, we build a life-cycle economy with uninsurable labor productivity risk and endogenous labor supply. Individuals face progressive taxes on labor and capital incomes and proportional taxes that capture social security, corporate income, and consumption taxes. Our answer is yes, but not much. A reform that increases labor income taxes for individuals who earn more than the mean labor income and reduces taxes for those who earn less than the mean labor income generates a small additional revenue. The revenue from labor income taxes is maximized at an effective marginal tax rate of 51.6% (38.9%) for the richest 1% (5%) of individuals, versus 46.3% (34.7%) in the benchmark economy. The increase in revenue from labor income taxes is only 0.82%, while the total tax revenue declines by 1.55%. The higher progressivity is associated with lower aggregate labor supply and capital. As a result, the government collects higher taxes from a smaller economy. The total tax revenue is higher if marginal taxes are raised only for the top earners. The increase, however, must be substantial and cover a large segment of top earners. The rise in tax collection from a 3 percentage points increase on the top 1% is just 0.09%. A 10 percentage points increase on the top 10% of earners (those who earn more than €41,699) raises total tax revenue by 2.81%.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (12) ◽  
pp. 175-192
Author(s):  
Anurag Pant ◽  
Raj K. Kohli

When to retire is an individual decision based on many criteria like health of the individual, family responsibilities, expected life of the individual, single family income or dual family income, and other such considerations. A financial consideration can also be made. Retiring early will imply a reduction in social security benefits for the rest of your life. Retiring later than your full retirement age can mean a significant bump in benefits for the rest of your life. This paper simulates different conditions to estimate how long a life one needs to live to recover from the reduction in benefits resulting from earlier retirements.  Specifically, we model four permutations of the time value of money and the marginal tax rate on early benefits. Our results show there are significant advantages of withdrawing early benefits in most cases where life expectancy is shorter. But when expected life terms are much higher above 83, delaying retirement can significantly enhance the payout of benefits.


ILR Review ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 426-432 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janet C. Hunt ◽  
Charles D. DeLorme ◽  
R. Carter Hill

This study examines the influence of taxation on the wife's choice between home and market production by treating the marginal tax rate as a decision variable. The data analyzed, from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, provide information on the annual hours that husbands and wives devote to market work and housework, including child care, whereas previous studies have measured only changes in market hours and have assumed, in effect, that all other hours were devoted to nonproductive leisure. The empirical results indicate that wives working outside the home react to higher levels of taxation by reducing their market hours and increasing their home production time. In fact, the hypothesis cannot be rejected that wives completely reallocate time lost from the labor market to nonmarket production in an attempt to restore household real income. The authors conclude that the production loss from progressive taxation is usually overstated, though wives may lose through depreciation of their market skills and society loses to the extent that specialization in the economy declines.


Author(s):  
Gerasimos T. Soldatos

This article examines the response of work effort to changes in wage and/or tax rates when (1) no part of the taxes returns back to taxpaying workers, but when a part goes back (2) through the provision of a pure public good or (3) through transfer payments. The work-effort ratio is found to be higher in a Leviathan state, but the comparison between the two other tax-use regimes is uncertain. The response of the effort ratio to a change in the wage ratio follows the same pattern, while this response is weakened by a change in the current tax rate and strengthened by a change in the future tax rate, regardless not only of the use of tax revenue, but also of its change over time. In the case of change, the comparison of effort ratios is clear only when the change prompts them to move in the same direction. Corollaries related to tax evasion point to the irrelevance of tax benefits for labour supply decisions.


2019 ◽  
Vol 129 (623) ◽  
pp. 2949-2977
Author(s):  
Wei Wang ◽  
Richard M H Suen

AbstractIs a more heterogeneous population beneficial or harmful to long-term economic performance? This article addresses this and other questions in a dynamic general equilibrium model where consumers differ in their labour productivity and time preference. We show how differences in the cross-sectional distribution of these characteristics can affect the economy via two channels. The first one involves changing the composition of the labour force; and the second one involves changing the cross-sectional distribution of the marginal tax rate. We show how these channels are, respectively, determined by the shape of the labour supply function and the curvature of the marginal tax function.


Significance This framework laid out two pillars of reform. Pillar One would see large companies liable for tax in the end-market jurisdiction where their goods or services are used or consumed. Pillar Two would set a minimum tax rate of 15%. Impacts Ireland will probably support the reforms by October, and in return it may get some concessions over implementation or sectoral coverage. Reduced corporate tax revenue may result in tighter fiscal spending, which would play into the hands of the opposition Sinn Fein. The corporate tax proposals come at a particularly bad time for the Irish economy, which is already facing the consequences of Brexit.


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