scholarly journals Reliability and Adaptability of Religious Beliefs in the Light of Cognitive Science of Religion

Studia Humana ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 64-73
Author(s):  
Konrad Szocik
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Cognitive Approach ◽  
Evolutionary Study ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Basic Concepts ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Cognitive Explanation

Abstract Cognitive approach towards the study of religion is a good and promising way. However, I think that this approach is too narrow and it would be better to use some basic concepts of CSR as a starting point for further, not cognitive explanation of religious. I suppose that religious beliefs should be explained also by their pragmatic functions because they were probably always associated with some pragmatic purposes at the group or at the individual levels. To develop further this last approach, the good explanatory way is the evolutionary study of religion.

scholarly journals Mentalizing Mistakes: Distinguishing Mentalizing Ability from Bias in God Beliefs

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marjaana Lindeman ◽  
LeRon Shults
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
Conceptual Confusion ◽  
By Products

The claim that religions are by-products of evolutionary adaptations has been at the center of the cognitive science of religion since its inception nearly three decades ago. It has been argued that religious beliefs are manifestations of evolved hyperactive agent detection and other mentalizing biases, whose development required pan-human mentalizing abilities. Much of the current research on the cognitive underpinnings of religiosity seems to rest on the assumption that not only mentalizing biases but also mentalizing abilities give rise to god beliefs in the minds of contemporary individuals. However, this presupposes that the higher capacity an individual has for mentalizing the more likely he or she is to make mentalizing mistakes. We illustrate the conceptual confusion that results from this way of framing the discussion and point to empirical evidence that challenges this notion.

How to Know You’ve Survived Death

2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 279-299 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claire White ◽  
Michael Kinsella ◽  
Jesse Bering
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Western Culture ◽  
Convincing Evidence ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Cognitive Approach ◽  
Human Survival ◽  
Past Life ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
Near Death Experiences

AbstractReports of people who have survived death have captured the attention of mainstream audiences. Why do these ideas enjoy persistent and widespread success in contemporary Western culture? Adopting a cognitive approach to the study of afterlife accounts and drawing upon our own research, we argue that mainstream survival narratives are popular because they provide convincing evidence that one has journeyed to another realm. Such accounts are convincing, in part, because they meet default cognitive assumptions about what human survival would look like if it were possible. We support this claim by highlighting recurring common themes in recounted episodes of near-death experiences and past life accounts and outlining how key findings in the cognitive science of religion, in conjunction with culturally situated accounts, can help scholars concerned with ideas about anomalous experiences to better understand their appeal.

Locating the causes of religious commitment

2004 ◽  
Vol 27 (6) ◽  
pp. 752-753
Author(s):  
Harvey Whitehouse
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Religious Commitment ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Substantial Body ◽  
Broad Agreement ◽  
Lively Debate ◽  
Science Of Religion

Atran & Norenzayan (A&N) survey a substantial body of theory and evidence on which there is broad agreement in the cognitive science of religion. Some parts of their argument (for instance, concerning the causes of costly commitment to religious beliefs) are more speculative and remain a focus of lively debate and further research.

The Argument from Positive Epistemic Status

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin L. Barrett
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Developmental Psychology ◽  
Scientific Research ◽  
Proper Function ◽  
Epistemic Status ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Proper Functioning ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Science Of Religion

Plantinga’s suggested argument for God from positive epistemic status takes as its starting point that many of our beliefs have positive epistemic status and that such positive status is best thought of as derived from our belief-forming faculties functioning properly in an appropriate environment. Plantinga suggests that this proper function is best understood in terms of a designer having engineered these faculties for particular purposes, the best candidate for this designer being God. A ready objection is that the needed “proper” functioning could be derived from evolution and, so, God is not obviously the best candidate for being the “designer.” This essay evaluates versions of this objection in reference to recent scientific research from cognitive developmental psychology and cognitive science of religion.

scholarly journals Religious Belief is Not Natural. Why Cognitive Science of Religion Does Not Show That Religious Belief is Trustworthy

Studia Humana ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 34-44
Author(s):  
Hans Van Eyghen
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Epistemic Status ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
World Religions ◽  
Cognitive Theories ◽  
Theories Of Religion ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
Afterlife Beliefs

Abstract It is widely acknowledged that the new emerging discipline cognitive science of religion has a bearing on how to think about the epistemic status of religious beliefs. Both defenders and opponents of the rationality of religious belief have used cognitive theories of religion to argue for their point. This paper will look at the defender-side of the debate. I will discuss an often used argument in favor of the trustworthiness of religious beliefs, stating that cognitive science of religion shows that religious beliefs are natural and natural beliefs ought to be trusted in the absence of counterevidence. This argument received its most influential defense from Justin Barrett in a number of papers, some in collaboration with Kelly James Clark. I will discuss their version of the argument and argue that it fails because the natural beliefs discovered by cognitive scientists of religion are not the religious beliefs of the major world religions. A survey of the evidence from cognitive science of religion will show that cognitive science does show that other beliefs come natural and that these can thus be deemed trustworthy in the absence of counterevidence. These beliefs are teleological beliefs, afterlife beliefs and animistic theistic beliefs.

scholarly journals The cognitive biases of human mind in accepting and transmitting religious and theological beliefs: An analysis based on the cognitive science of religion

2020 ◽  
Vol 76 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sayyed M. Biabanaki
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Cognitive Biases ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Natural Phenomenon ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Science Of Religion

The cognitive science of religion (CSR) is an emerging field of cognitive science that gathers insights from different disciplines to explain how humans acquire and transmit religious beliefs. For the CSR scholars, the human mental tools have specific biases that make them susceptible to acceptance and transmission of religious beliefs. This article examines the characteristics of these biases and how they work, and shows that although our innate cognitive tendencies make our minds generally receptive to religion, they do not explain the emergence and endurance of specific religious beliefs in a particular culture. We will also show that although advocates of CSR study religion as a ‘natural’ phenomenon, and seek to discover the natural causes of the formation, acceptance, transmission and prevalence of religious beliefs, their efforts do not lead to decrease the validity of religious beliefs and rejection of ‘non-natural’ explanations of religious beliefs.

Darwin's Doubt, Non-deterministic Darwinism and the Cognitive Science of Religion

Philosophy ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 85 (4) ◽  
pp. 465-483
Author(s):  
Robin Attfield
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Evolutionary Theory ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Charles Darwin ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Cast Doubt ◽  
Science Of Religion

AbstractAlvin Plantinga, echoing a worry of Charles Darwin which he calls ‘Darwin's doubt’, argues that given Darwinian evolutionary theory our beliefs are unreliable, since they are determined to be what they are by evolutionary pressures and could have had no other content. This papers surveys in turn deterministic and non-deterministic interpretations of Darwinism, and concludes that Plantinga's argument poses a problem for the former alone and not for the latter. Some parallel problems arise for the Cognitive Science of Religion, and in particular for the hypothesis that many of our beliefs, including religious beliefs, are due to a Hypersensitive Agency-Detection Device, at least if this hypothesis is held in a deterministic form. In a non-deterministic form, however, its operation need not cast doubt on the rationality or reliability of the relevant beliefs.

The cognitive science of religion: philosophical observations

2008 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
LEO NÄREAHO
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Research Programme ◽  
Semantic Role ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Cognitive Approach ◽  
Causal Explanations ◽  
Science Of Religion

AbstractThe cognitive science of religion seeks to find genuine causal explanations for the origin and transmission of religious ideas. In the cognitive approach to religion, so-called intuitive and counter-intuitive concepts figure importantly. In this article it is argued that cognitive scientists of religion should clarify their views about the explanatory and semantic role they give to counter-intuitive concepts and beliefs in their theory. Since the cognitive science of religion is a naturalistic research programme, it is doubtful that its proponents can remain neutral on important ontological questions.

scholarly journals The Epistemic Parity of Religious-Apologetic and Religion-Debunking Responses to the Cognitive Science of Religion

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (7) ◽  
pp. 466
Author(s):  
Walter Scott Stepanenko
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Argumentative Strategies ◽  
Science Of Religion

Recent work in the cognitive science of religion has challenged some of the explanatory assumptions of previous research in the field. Nonetheless, some of the practitioners of the new cognitive science of religion theorize in the same skeptical spirit as their predecessors and either imply or explicitly claim that their projects undermine the warrant of religious beliefs. In this article, I argue that these theories do no additional argumentative work when compared to previous attempts to debunk religious belief and that these recent debunking efforts are very much motivated by methodological commitments that are shared with canonical research. I contend that these argumentative strategies put debunkers very much on an epistemic par with religious apologists: both advocate responses to the cognitive science of religion that are primarily motivated by methodological commitments.

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