scholarly journals The cognitive biases of human mind in accepting and transmitting religious and theological beliefs: An analysis based on the cognitive science of religion

2020 ◽  
Vol 76 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sayyed M. Biabanaki
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Cognitive Biases ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Natural Phenomenon ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Science Of Religion

The cognitive science of religion (CSR) is an emerging field of cognitive science that gathers insights from different disciplines to explain how humans acquire and transmit religious beliefs. For the CSR scholars, the human mental tools have specific biases that make them susceptible to acceptance and transmission of religious beliefs. This article examines the characteristics of these biases and how they work, and shows that although our innate cognitive tendencies make our minds generally receptive to religion, they do not explain the emergence and endurance of specific religious beliefs in a particular culture. We will also show that although advocates of CSR study religion as a ‘natural’ phenomenon, and seek to discover the natural causes of the formation, acceptance, transmission and prevalence of religious beliefs, their efforts do not lead to decrease the validity of religious beliefs and rejection of ‘non-natural’ explanations of religious beliefs.

The 7E Model of the Human Mind: Articulating a Plastic Self for the Cognitive Science of Religion

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (5) ◽  
pp. 450-476
Author(s):  
Flavio A. Geisshuesler
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Religious Studies ◽  
The Self ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Cognitive Sciences ◽  
Religious Mind ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
Concrete Model

AbstractThis article proposes a 7E model of the human mind, which was developed within the cognitive paradigm in religious studies and its primary expression, the Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR). This study draws on the philosophically most sophisticated currents in the cognitive sciences, which have come to define the human mind through a 4E model as embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended. Introducing Catherine Malabou’s concept of “plasticity,” the study not only confirms the insight of the 4E model of the self as a decentered system, but it also recommends two further traits of the self that have been overlooked in the cognitive sciences, namely the negativity of plasticity and the tension between giving and receiving form. Finally, the article matures these philosophical insights to develop a concrete model of the religious mind, equipping it with three further Es, namely emotional, evolved, and exoconscious.

"What's HIDD'n in the HADD?"

2007 ◽  
Vol 7 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 341-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anders Lisdorf
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Basic Function ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Human Populations ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Neural Basis ◽  
Parsimonious Explanation ◽  
Science Of Religion

AbstractThe consensus in the cognitive science of religion is that some sort of hyperactive agency detection in the human mind is responsible for the origin and spread of beliefs in superhuman agents such as gods, spirits and ancestors among human populations. While it is expressed differently in different authors, they all agree that hyperactive agency detection is a basic function of human cognition. Most well known perhaps is the formulation of this by Justin Barrett as the Hyperactive Agency Detection Device or HADD. Problems, however, arise when we begin to consider the neural basis of this: It doesn't add up, or more precisely the HADD does not work that way. Like the magician pulling rabbits from the hat this explanation may be a "self"-conjuring trick, only for us the hat is a HADD and the rabbits are superhuman agents (no reference to were-rabbits intended). This paper will try to point to a more parsimonious explanation.

scholarly journals Mentalizing Mistakes: Distinguishing Mentalizing Ability from Bias in God Beliefs

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marjaana Lindeman ◽  
LeRon Shults
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
Conceptual Confusion ◽  
By Products

The claim that religions are by-products of evolutionary adaptations has been at the center of the cognitive science of religion since its inception nearly three decades ago. It has been argued that religious beliefs are manifestations of evolved hyperactive agent detection and other mentalizing biases, whose development required pan-human mentalizing abilities. Much of the current research on the cognitive underpinnings of religiosity seems to rest on the assumption that not only mentalizing biases but also mentalizing abilities give rise to god beliefs in the minds of contemporary individuals. However, this presupposes that the higher capacity an individual has for mentalizing the more likely he or she is to make mentalizing mistakes. We illustrate the conceptual confusion that results from this way of framing the discussion and point to empirical evidence that challenges this notion.

Locating the causes of religious commitment

2004 ◽  
Vol 27 (6) ◽  
pp. 752-753
Author(s):  
Harvey Whitehouse
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Religious Commitment ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Substantial Body ◽  
Broad Agreement ◽  
Lively Debate ◽  
Science Of Religion

Atran & Norenzayan (A&N) survey a substantial body of theory and evidence on which there is broad agreement in the cognitive science of religion. Some parts of their argument (for instance, concerning the causes of costly commitment to religious beliefs) are more speculative and remain a focus of lively debate and further research.

scholarly journals Religious Belief is Not Natural. Why Cognitive Science of Religion Does Not Show That Religious Belief is Trustworthy

Studia Humana ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 34-44
Author(s):  
Hans Van Eyghen
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Epistemic Status ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
World Religions ◽  
Cognitive Theories ◽  
Theories Of Religion ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
Afterlife Beliefs

Abstract It is widely acknowledged that the new emerging discipline cognitive science of religion has a bearing on how to think about the epistemic status of religious beliefs. Both defenders and opponents of the rationality of religious belief have used cognitive theories of religion to argue for their point. This paper will look at the defender-side of the debate. I will discuss an often used argument in favor of the trustworthiness of religious beliefs, stating that cognitive science of religion shows that religious beliefs are natural and natural beliefs ought to be trusted in the absence of counterevidence. This argument received its most influential defense from Justin Barrett in a number of papers, some in collaboration with Kelly James Clark. I will discuss their version of the argument and argue that it fails because the natural beliefs discovered by cognitive scientists of religion are not the religious beliefs of the major world religions. A survey of the evidence from cognitive science of religion will show that cognitive science does show that other beliefs come natural and that these can thus be deemed trustworthy in the absence of counterevidence. These beliefs are teleological beliefs, afterlife beliefs and animistic theistic beliefs.

Darwin's Doubt, Non-deterministic Darwinism and the Cognitive Science of Religion

Philosophy ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 85 (4) ◽  
pp. 465-483
Author(s):  
Robin Attfield
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Evolutionary Theory ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Charles Darwin ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Cast Doubt ◽  
Science Of Religion

AbstractAlvin Plantinga, echoing a worry of Charles Darwin which he calls ‘Darwin's doubt’, argues that given Darwinian evolutionary theory our beliefs are unreliable, since they are determined to be what they are by evolutionary pressures and could have had no other content. This papers surveys in turn deterministic and non-deterministic interpretations of Darwinism, and concludes that Plantinga's argument poses a problem for the former alone and not for the latter. Some parallel problems arise for the Cognitive Science of Religion, and in particular for the hypothesis that many of our beliefs, including religious beliefs, are due to a Hypersensitive Agency-Detection Device, at least if this hypothesis is held in a deterministic form. In a non-deterministic form, however, its operation need not cast doubt on the rationality or reliability of the relevant beliefs.

scholarly journals Reliability and Adaptability of Religious Beliefs in the Light of Cognitive Science of Religion

Studia Humana ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 64-73
Author(s):  
Konrad Szocik
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Cognitive Approach ◽  
Evolutionary Study ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Basic Concepts ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Cognitive Explanation

Abstract Cognitive approach towards the study of religion is a good and promising way. However, I think that this approach is too narrow and it would be better to use some basic concepts of CSR as a starting point for further, not cognitive explanation of religious. I suppose that religious beliefs should be explained also by their pragmatic functions because they were probably always associated with some pragmatic purposes at the group or at the individual levels. To develop further this last approach, the good explanatory way is the evolutionary study of religion.

scholarly journals The Naturalness of Religion: What It Means and Why It Matters

2018 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 84-102
Author(s):  
Lari Launonen
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Human Development ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Freedom Of Religion ◽  
Cognitive Systems ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
The Future ◽  
New Material ◽  
Science Of Religion

Summary“Religion is natural” has become a common thesis in Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR). The claim, however, is often ambiguous. This paper seeks to clarify and evaluate the naturalness of religion thesis that flows from CSR theories pointing to the optimal compatibility between recurrent religious concepts and the ordinary operations of the human mind. For the naturalness thesis to be scientifically valid, some criteria for naturalness are needed. Robert McCauley has suggested four typical marks for natural cognitive systems, but his account suffers from the inability to point to any causal operations in human development responsible for the naturalness of religion. Even if naturalness is a problematic concept, the science behind it may nevertheless carry interesting implications. First, since Christian theologians have traditionally viewed man as naturally religious, CSR offers new material for theological considerations. Second, it may also help us make predictions about the future of religion. Third, it has been argued that the naturalness thesis offers support for freedom of religion.

scholarly journals The Epistemic Parity of Religious-Apologetic and Religion-Debunking Responses to the Cognitive Science of Religion

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (7) ◽  
pp. 466
Author(s):  
Walter Scott Stepanenko
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Argumentative Strategies ◽  
Science Of Religion

Recent work in the cognitive science of religion has challenged some of the explanatory assumptions of previous research in the field. Nonetheless, some of the practitioners of the new cognitive science of religion theorize in the same skeptical spirit as their predecessors and either imply or explicitly claim that their projects undermine the warrant of religious beliefs. In this article, I argue that these theories do no additional argumentative work when compared to previous attempts to debunk religious belief and that these recent debunking efforts are very much motivated by methodological commitments that are shared with canonical research. I contend that these argumentative strategies put debunkers very much on an epistemic par with religious apologists: both advocate responses to the cognitive science of religion that are primarily motivated by methodological commitments.

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