A Cooperation Advantage for Theory of Mind in Children and Adults

2021 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-40
Author(s):  
Lily Tsoi ◽  
J. Kiley Hamlin ◽  
Adam Waytz ◽  
Andrew Scott Baron ◽  
Liane Lee Young

Three studies test whether people engage in mental state reasoning or theory of mind (ToM) differently across two fundamental social contexts: cooperation and competition. Study 1 examines how children with an emerging understanding of false beliefs deploy ToM across these contexts. We find that young preschool children are better able to plant false beliefs in others' minds in a cooperative versus competitive context; this difference does not emerge for other cognitive capacities tested (e.g., executive functioning, memory). Studies 2a and 2b reveal the same systematic difference in adults' ToM for cooperation and competition, even after accounting for relevant predictors (e.g., preference for a task condition, feelings about deception). Together, these findings provide initial evidence for enhanced ToM for cooperation versus competition in early development and also adulthood.

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dana Schneider ◽  
Anne Grigutsch ◽  
Matthias Schurz ◽  
Romi Zäske ◽  
Stefan R. Schweinberger

It has been hypothesized that visual perspective-taking, a basic Theory of Mind mechanism, might operate quite automatically particularly in terms of ´what´ someone else sees. As such we were interested in whether different social categories of an agent (e.g., gender, race, nationality) influence this mental state ascription mechanism. We tested this assumption by investigating the Samson level-1 visual perspective-taking paradigm using agents with different ethnic nationality appearances. A group of self-identified Turkish and German participants were asked to make visual perspective judgments from their own perspective (self-judgment) as well as from the perspective of a prototypical Turkish or German agent (other-judgment). The respective related interference effects - altercentric and egocentric interferences - were measured. When making other-judgments, German participants showed increased egocentric interferences for Turkish compared to German agents. Turkish participants showed no ethnic group influence for egocentric interferences and reported feeling associated with the German and Turkish nationality to a similar extent. For self-judgments, altercentric interferences were of similar magnitude for both ethnic agents in both participant groups. Overall this indicates that in level-1 visual perspective-taking, other-judgments and related egocentric interferences are sensitive to social categories and are better described as a flexible, controlled and deliberate mental state ascription mechanism. In contrast, self-judgments and related altercentric interference effects are better described as automatic, efficient and unconscious mental state ascription mechanisms. In a broader sense the current results suggest that we should stop considering automaticity an all-or-none principle when it comes theory of mind processes.


Author(s):  
Constance Th. W. M. Vissers ◽  
Daan Hermans

The implications of a hearing loss can go far beyond the linguistic domain. Several studies have revealed that deaf and hard-of-hearing children are at risk in their social-emotional development. This chapter argues that executive functions and theory of mind are two central underlying cognitive factors in people’s social-emotional functioning. We briefly review what is currently known about executive functioning and theory-of-mind development in deaf and hard-of-hearing children and adolescents and then present a cognitive model with a central role for inner speech in relation to executive functioning and theory of mind. We hypothesize that inner speech both enables and urges the regulation of oneself (executive function) and also the mentalization of one’s own and others’ inner worlds (theory of mind). We discuss the implications for assessing and treating social-emotional problems in deaf and hard-of-hearing children and adolescents.


2012 ◽  
Vol 84 (4) ◽  
pp. 1442-1458 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna R. McAlister ◽  
Candida C. Peterson

Author(s):  
Tiffany Tong ◽  
Jacqueline Urakami ◽  
Mark Chignell ◽  
Mary C. Tierney ◽  
Jacques S. Lee

We are developing whack-a-mole games for cognitive assessment. In prior research, we have shown that variants of the game assess cognitive speed and executive functioning (response inhibition), and can be used to screen for delirium in emergency departments. We have also found that whack-a-mole game performance is significantly correlated with overall Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE) scores. In this paper, we report the results of a study that assessed the relationship of our serious game for cognitive assessment with specific components of the MMSE. We found that game performance is correlated most strongly with the orientation to time items component of MMSE and that the combination of three elements of the MMSE (attention and calculation; orientation to time; repetition) accounted for almost half of the variance in game performance in our sample.


2014 ◽  
Vol 39 (6) ◽  
pp. 519-529 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evren Etel ◽  
Bilge Yagmurlu

This study had two aims. The first aim was to measure mental state understanding in institution-reared children by using a theory of mind (ToM) scale, and to examine the role of cultural context in sequencing of ToM acquisition. The other aim was to investigate ToM in relation to social competence and executive function (EF). Due to its pronounced role in mental state understanding and social interactions, we assessed receptive language as well. The participants were 107 institution-reared children aged 3 to 5 years in Turkey. Two visits were held within 2 days for behavioral assessments. In the first visit, the ToM scale was administered; in the second visit, the child was given the language test and the EF tasks. The social competence scales were completed by the child’s primary care provider in the institution. Guttman scaling analysis revealed that an understanding of diverse beliefs developed earlier than knowledge access, favoring the “individualistic pattern.” The regression analysis showed that EF was a significant predictor of ToM, but neither of them was associated with social competence when age was controlled. Receptive language predicted social competence and EF directly, and ToM indirectly through EF, pointing to the importance of this ability for early development.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jordan E. Theriault ◽  
Adam Waytz ◽  
Larisa Heiphetz ◽  
Liane Young

The theory of mind network (ToMN) is a set of brain regions activated by a variety of social tasks. Recent work has proposed that these associations with ToMN activity may relate to a common underlying computation: processing prediction error in social contexts. The present work presents evidence consistent with this hypothesis, using a fine-grained item analysis to examine the relationship between ToMN activity and variance in stimulus features. We used an existing dataset (consisting of statements about morals, facts, and preferences) to explore variability in ToMN activity elicited by moral statements, using metaethical judgments (i.e. judgments of how fact-like/preference-like morals are) as a proxy for their predictability/support by social consensus. Study 1 validated expected patterns of behavioral judgments in our stimuli set, and Study 2 associated by-stimulus estimates of metaethical judgment with ToMN activity, showing that ToMN activity was negatively associated with objective morals and positively associated with subjective morals. Whole brain analyses indicated that these associations were strongest in bilateral temporoparietal junction (TPJ). We also observed additional by-stimulus associations with ToMN, including positive associations with the presence of a person (across morals, facts, and preferences), a negative association with agreement (among morals only), and a positive association with mental inference (in preferences only, across 3 independent measures and behavioral samples). We discuss these findings in the context of recent predictive processing models, and highlight how predictive models may facilitate new perspectives on metaethics, the centrality of morality to personal identity, and distinctions between social domains (e.g. morals vs. preferences).


2016 ◽  
Vol 371 (1686) ◽  
pp. 20150067 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Schmelz ◽  
Josep Call

Cooperation and competition are two key components of social life. Current research agendas investigating the psychological underpinnings of competition and cooperation in non-human primates are misaligned. The majority of work on competition has been done in the context of theory of mind and deception, while work on cooperation has mostly focused on collaboration and helping. The current impression that theory of mind is not necessarily implicated in cooperative activities and that helping could not be an integral part of competition might therefore be rather misleading. Furthermore, theory of mind research has mainly focused on cognitive aspects like the type of stimuli controlling responses, the nature of representation and how those representations are acquired, while collaboration and helping have focused primarily on motivational aspects like prosociality, common goals and a sense of justice and other-regarding concerns. We present the current state of these two bodies of research paying special attention to how they have developed and diverged over the years. We propose potential directions to realign the research agendas to investigate the psychological underpinnings of cooperation and competition in primates and other animals.


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