CONDITIONALIZATION AND LIKELIHOOD DOMINANCE IN GROUP BELIEF FORMATION

1990 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Genest ◽  
S. Weerahandi ◽  
J. V. Zidek
Keyword(s):  
Belief Formation ◽  
Group Belief

scholarly journals Collective Epistemic Luck

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Moisés Barba ◽  
Fernando Broncano-Berrocal
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Luck ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Bottom Line ◽  
Deliberative Methods ◽  
Collective Beliefs ◽  
Satisfactory Account ◽  
Group Belief ◽  
Collective Belief

AbstractA platitude in epistemology is that an individual’s belief does not qualify as knowledge if it is true by luck. Individuals, however, are not the only bearers of knowledge. Many epistemologists agree that groups can also possess knowledge in a way that is genuinely collective. If groups can know, it is natural to think that, just as true individual beliefs fall short of knowledge due to individual epistemic luck, true collective beliefs may fall short of knowledge because of collective epistemic luck. This paper argues, first, that the dominant view of epistemic luck in the literature, the modal view, does not yield a satisfactory account of lucky collective beliefs. Second, it argues that collective epistemic luck is better explained in terms of groups lacking (suitably defined) forms of control over collective belief formation that are specific to the different procedures for forming collective beliefs. One of the main implications of this, we will argue, is that groups whose beliefs are formed via internal deliberation are more vulnerable to knowledge-undermining collective luck than groups that form their beliefs via non-deliberative methods, such as non-deliberative anonymous voting. The bottom line is that the greater exposure to knowledge-undermining luck that deliberation gives rise to provides a reason (not a conclusive one) for thinking that non-deliberative methods of group belief formation have greater epistemic value.

Consciousness, Metacognition, & Perceptual Reality Monitoring

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hakwan Lau
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Reality Monitoring ◽  
Conscious Perception ◽  
Brute Fact ◽  
Higher Order Theory ◽  
Subjective Level

I introduce an empirically-grounded version of a higher-order theory of conscious perception. Traditionally, theories of consciousness either focus on the global availability of conscious information, or take conscious phenomenology as a brute fact due to some biological or basic representational properties. Here I argue instead that the key to characterizing the consciousness lies in its connections to belief formation and epistemic justification on a subjective level.

The Dynamics of Belief Formation and Price Momentum

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Dontoh ◽  
Joshua Ronen ◽  
Bharat Sarath
Keyword(s):  
Belief Formation ◽  
Price Momentum

Why so Negative? Belief Formation in Boom and Bust Markets

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pascal Kieren ◽  
Jan Müller-Dethard ◽  
Martin Weber
Keyword(s):  
Belief Formation ◽  
Negative Belief ◽  
Boom And Bust

Core Criteria I

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanford C. Goldberg
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Forming Process ◽  
Epistemic Criteria ◽  
Problem Of The Criterion

Chapter 3 deals with the first issue one faces in the task of articulating the explicit epistemic criteria for belief: the problem of the criterion. It is tempting to suppose that a belief can be normatively proper from the epistemic point of view only if the believer can certify for herself the reliability of every belief-forming process on which she relied. But insisting on this quickly leads to the threat of an infinite regress. This chapter defends a foundationalist response to this problem, according to which we enjoy a default (albeit defeasible) permission to rely on certain cognitive processes in belief-formation. These are processes that satisfy what the author calls the Reliabilist Rationale. Importantly, our permissions here are social: any one of us is permitted to rely on any token process that satisfies this rationale, whether the token process resides in one’s own mind/brain or that of another epistemic subject.

Skepticism and Credulity: A Model and Applications to Political Spin, Belief Formation, and Decision Weights

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
James David Campbell
Keyword(s):  
Decision Maker ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Stylized Facts ◽  
Psychological Mechanism ◽  
Decision Weights

Abstract In this paper I model a decision maker who forms beliefs and opinions using a dialectic heuristic that depends on their degree of skepticism or credulity. In an application to political spin, two competing parties choose how to frame commonly observed evidence. If the receiver is sufficiently credulous, equilibrium spin is maximally extreme and generates short, superficial news cycles. When receivers vary in their skepticism, there is partisan sorting by skepticism parameter: the more credulous group systematically favors one party and displays hostility to evidence and a media they see as biased. In behavioral applications in which the frames arise from the decision maker’s internal deliberation, a decision maker with the same credulous nature would display known behavioral anomalies in forming beliefs and forming decision weights from stated probabilities. The dialectic model therefore captures a simple psychological mechanism and matches closely some stylized facts across these three disparate applications.

Justified Group Belief, Group Knowledge and Being in a Position to Know

Episteme ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Jakob Koscholke
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Single Group ◽  
Group Knowledge ◽  
Group Belief ◽  
Group Member

Abstract Jennifer Lackey has recently presented a new and lucid analysis of the notion of justified group belief, i.e. a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a group to justifiedly believe some proposition. In this paper, however, I argue that the analysans she proposes is too narrow: one of the conditions she takes to be necessary for justified group belief is not necessary. To substantiate this claim, I present a potential counterexample to Lackey's analysis where a group knows and thus justifiedly believes some proposition but there is no single group member who actually believes that proposition. I close by defending the example against the objection that the group in question does not know but is at most in a position to know the target proposition.

Group Belief

2020 ◽  
pp. 3-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Ågotnes ◽  
Yì N. Wáng
Keyword(s):  
Group Belief

scholarly journals Emotional Tagging and Belief Formation: The Long-Lasting Effects of Experiencing Communism

2019 ◽  
Vol 109 ◽  
pp. 567-571 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Laudenbach ◽  
Ulrike Malmendier ◽  
Alexandra Niessen-Ruenzi
Keyword(s):  
Formation Process ◽  
Crucial Role ◽  
Underlying Mechanism ◽  
Memory Formation ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Long Term Effects ◽  
Long Run

Growing evidence in macrofinance suggests long-lasting effects of personally experienced outcomes on beliefs. To understand the underlying mechanism we turn to the neurological foundations of memory formation. We propose that emotional tagging plays a crucial role in assigning weights in the belief formation process. We use exposure to communism as well as variation in its emotional tagging to predict long-run beliefs. We show that living under communism has long-term effects on beliefs about its benefits. In addition, positive and negative emotional tags strongly affect the (pro- or anti-communist) direction of beliefs, providing anchors to memory that seem hard to reverse.

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