The Russia Connection

2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Anna Batta ◽  
John Ishiyama

What explains receptivity of citizens in the post-communist world to Russian influence? popular attitudes in Central and Eastern Europe about Russia's role in the world and seeks to find answers to the question: does ideology or economic factors most influence support for Russia in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe? We use survey data from the Pew Research Center (2017) to assess the drivers for popular support of Russia. We find that the primary driver of individual-level support of Russia is political attitudes associated with the Far Right, but that this relationship also varies by country.

Author(s):  
James L. Newell

Political scientists have conventionally distinguished between advanced liberal democracies; communist and post-communist states, and so-called third-world countries. Though used less frequently than was once the case, the groups or ones like them are distinguished because drawing general conclusions about the nature of political life requires being able to categorise in order to compare countries; and because, broadly speaking, the groups mark broad distinctions tending to correlate with a range of variables including political corruption. Placing, then, the liberal democracies of Western Europe in one category and the former communist countries of Europe, plus Russia, in another reveals that corruption is a larger problem in the latter part of the world than it is in the former. Against this background, the chapter looks at the historical context of corruption during the communist era. It then provides an overview of the extent of corruption in the post-communist era and of the variations in its extent between the states concerned –before explaining the distinctive reasons for the development of these levels of corruption, assessing their impact and looking at what is being done and needs to be done to reduce levels of corruption.


2019 ◽  
Vol 118 (806) ◽  
pp. 96-102
Author(s):  
Tomasz Inglot

“The region has seen a radical shift from widespread unemployment to labor shortages, a historic expansion in higher-education opportunities, and unprecedented mass migration to the West.” Seventh in a series on social mobility around the world.


1999 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
C.D. Daykin ◽  
D. Lewis

ABSTRACTSocial security pension schemes around the world are facing a number of problems, of which demographic ageing is the most commonly discussed. This paper provides an overview of expected future demographic developments in European Union and some other OECD countries, and evaluates some of the range of solutions which have been, or are being, considered to address this and other problems facing social security in the late 1990s, drawing on examples from OECD countries, from Latin America and from central and eastern Europe. Consideration is given to the possibilities for increasing the level of funding in social security pension schemes or developing funded complementary pension schemes.


2002 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 579-593
Author(s):  
BÉLA GRESKOVITS

ABSTRACT What is attempted in the East is catching up with the West from a recent position of worse-than-Latin-American economic backwardness. Until now, populations that were sentenced to political patience by the logic of poor democracies have reluctantly backed this enormous effort. Central and Eastern Europe’s post-socialist path is characterized by an increasingly discredited ideology of a return to Europe and a non- European combination of substitute institutions of development: radical opening towards the world economy, damaged institutions of labor representation, eroded state capacity, and often strong private and foreign dominance in the financial and other strategic sectors. There is a chance for a few countries to succeed. Yet various development traps may be more likely in the end than a “Great Spurt” in the Gerschenkronian sense.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-30
Author(s):  
Jasper Muis ◽  
Tobias Brils ◽  
Teodora Gaidytė

Abstract While debates about far-right populism often concentrate on Central and Eastern Europe, research on these parties predominantly focuses on Western countries. Addressing this remarkable gap, this article revisits the ‘protest voting’ explanation for electoral support for the far right. Using European Social Survey data (2002–16) from 22 countries, we show that political dissatisfaction is a stronger explanatory factor when far-right parties are in opposition, but is a less important determinant of electoral support when they are in government. Previous findings based on Western Europe – which similarly showed that the anti-elite hypothesis is less relevant when far-right parties join government coalitions – travel well to post-communist European countries. In Hungary and Poland, we even find that far-right voters have become less distrustful of national political institutions than the rest of the electorate. Our conclusion implies that anti-elite populism is context-dependent and has limited use for understanding successes of leaders such as Wilders, Salvini and Orbán.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document