Political corruption in Central and Eastern Europe

Political scientists have conventionally distinguished between advanced liberal democracies; communist and post-communist states, and so-called third-world countries. Though used less frequently than was once the case, the groups or ones like them are distinguished because drawing general conclusions about the nature of political life requires being able to categorise in order to compare countries; and because, broadly speaking, the groups mark broad distinctions tending to correlate with a range of variables including political corruption. Placing, then, the liberal democracies of Western Europe in one category and the former communist countries of Europe, plus Russia, in another reveals that corruption is a larger problem in the latter part of the world than it is in the former. Against this background, the chapter looks at the historical context of corruption during the communist era. It then provides an overview of the extent of corruption in the post-communist era and of the variations in its extent between the states concerned –before explaining the distinctive reasons for the development of these levels of corruption, assessing their impact and looking at what is being done and needs to be done to reduce levels of corruption.

Anti-corruption: prevention and control

The chapter takes its point of departure from the fact that scandals of the kind considered in the previous chapter are important in driving efforts to tackle problems like corruption because they create the public pressure needed to ensure they are taken seriously. Against this background the chapter considers, first, the conditions under which measures to tackle corruption are likely to be more or less successful, bearing in mind that any given measure may work well in some contexts, less so in others. Then it asks about the conditions under which the authorities’ efforts to tackle corruption will be greater or lesser – bearing in mind that in order for the authorities to make any attempt to combat corruption, they have to be aware of it; they have to want to combat it, and they have to have adequate means to do so. Finally, in light of the factors influencing the efforts the authorities are likely to make in tackling corruption, the chapter considers what they are actually doing.

Political corruption and organised crime

This chapter takes its point of departure from the fact that corruption typically involves the interaction of a wide range of actors – including mediators and third-party enforcers specialised in the job of ensuring a sufficient degree of trust between the counterparts to enable transactions to be concluded successfully. It is on these third-party enforcers – referred to as ‘mafias’ – that the chapter focusses, as they offer the threat of violence to ensure that, once the parties to a corrupt exchange have agreed to do business, the terms are actually respected. To that extent, they offer something analogous to the insurance policies available, in the world of legal contracts, to protect firms and individuals against non-compliance or the consequences of non-compliance. They might also be regarded as analogous to legal debt collection agencies or private security firms, the difference being that once their services have been engaged, they cannot easily be dismissed. The chapter begins by looking at the characteristics of mafias, before considering the conditions under which they succeed in establishing themselves as powerful entities able to offer the protection and contract enforcement that are their distinguishing features. It then considers the relationship between mafias and corruption in some detail.

The causes and explanations of political corruption

The chapter explores how corruption can be explained or accounted for. It argues that there are two very broad questions facing scholars who have sought to explain corruption: 1) Under what conditions will individuals become caught up in it either as corruptors or the corrupted? 2) What explains why levels of corruption appear to be higher in some contexts than in others? The two questions, though related, are different. Thus, one of the suggestions one might make to explain why corruption seems more widespread among Nigerian than among UK civil servants, say, is that the former are paid much less than the latter. But though lower salaries might throw light on why there is more corruption among Nigerian than among British civil servants generally, it will not help us to understand why some Nigerian civil servants, assuming their salaries are uniformly low, behave corruptly while others remain honest. The chapter is therefore divided into two sections corresponding to the questions identified above followed by a section drawing some conclusions for the issue to be considered in the following chapter: the mechanisms and dynamics of corruption.

Definitions of political corruption, and why study corruption

Low and declining levels of trust in politicians, prompted in part by perceptions that they are too often to be found engaged in corruption and other forms of wrong-doing has in recent years turned corruption itself into a high-profile political issue. Against this background, the chapter considers what political corruption is, or might be, for the study of anything requires having a clear understanding of its nature. Then it discusses the different types of corruption to be found, and finally it says something about why their study might be important. The chapter argues that, understood as the adulteration of public by private interests, corruption is a relatively modern notion; suggests that it is possible to distinguish between four types of corruption understood in principal-agent terms, and makes the case that corruption is, as an object of study, important for its incidence and its effects.

Political corruption in the developing and newly industrialised states

Distinguishing between less developed, or developing, countries, on the one hand, and newly industrialised countries (NICs) on the other, the chapter discusses, first, the extent and causes of corruption in these countries; second the effects of corruption there, and finally, attempts to combat it. The chapter argues that the problems of corruption in the two types of country are of a somewhat different order of magnitude deriving, ultimately, from their distinctive characteristics. These are, in the case of the developing countries, limited manufacturing sectors; dependence on raw materials, or agricultural commodities, for export earnings (and therefore unusually heavily reliance on world markets over which they have little control); weak states. In the NICs, stronger states have enabled them to undergo rapid industrialisation and urbanisation such as to lead them, in terms of (what is often export-led) growth, to outpace their developing-country counterparts. Consequently, relatively high levels of corruption in the NICs have not been as strong a break on economic and social improvement as they have in the developing countries.

Political corruption and scandal

The chapter takes its point of departure from the fact that corruption is by definition an illegitimate activity and therefore likely to remain hidden. If revealed, therefore, it may give rise to scandal. But corruption and scandal are related in complex ways. In order to disentangle them the chapter considers, first, a working definition of scandal as this makes it possible to identify its main characteristics and thus the conditions that have to be fulfilled in order for a scandal to be ignited. It then considers how scandals are brought into being, what their consequences are and how, through the mas media, they unfold. Its argument is that having a comprehensive understanding of the significance of corruption as a phenomenon requires an exploration of how the political scandal it may produce typically develops, as it is through scandal that corruption has some of its most significant impacts.

The growth, spread and measurement of corruption

The chapter explores the growing levels of academic concern with political corruption as an object of investigation since the early 1990s and at the problems involved in its measurement. It thus discusses why the topic was relatively neglected before the 1990s and why there has been growing interest in the phenomenon since then. It then considers the various difficulties involved in quantifying it. The issue is important since providing solutions to problems presupposes being able to analyse them, and analysis presupposes measurement. The two issues – measurement and the attention to corruption – are very much linked since one of the reasons for the relative neglect of the phenomenon until recent years has been precisely the difficulties involved in measuring it.

Corruption in liberal democracies: a case study of Italy

The chapter takes its point of departure from the discussion, in earlier chapters, of the different types of corruption there may be; the possible causes of corruption and the mechanisms by which it can spread; the relationship between corruption and organised crime; the exposure of corruption and the effects of such exposure, and how governments and other political authorities can and do attempt to prevent and control corruption. Chapter 8 therefore explores how these kinds of issues manifest themselves in the Italian case with the aim of drawing some conclusions concerning corruption in liberal democracies generally. Italy, is used in other words, as the basis for a case study, that is the study of an entity not for its own sake, but because it is taken to be an example of a larger category: liberal democracies in the present case. In these regimes, the institutions most prone to corruption are those – like the parties, the legislature and the media – that act as channels of communication, linking civil society and the state. State agencies themselves – the military, schools, the judiciary, the police – are all relatively clean, being much more corrupt in the non-democracies.

The mechanisms and dynamics of corruption

This chapter considers the conditions that have to be met in order for corrupt transactions to be possible at all. It argues that a lack of trust undermines prospects for the successful conclusion of corrupt transactions: because each party knows that the other cannot denounce cheating to the authorities without incriminating himself, each is fearful of being cheated by the other and is therefore incentivised to hold back from making a corrupt agreement in the first place. And yet corrupt agreements are made and corrupt transactions are successfully carried out. This is because of the mechanisms and dynamics involved – which have the effect, precisely, of helping the parties to overcome the trust problem. The 'mechanisms' are the resources, social and personal, psychological and material, the parties bring to the transaction, the 'dynamics' the patterns of action and interaction, through which the transactions take place. Showing how mechanisms and dynamics enable the overcoming of each of the problems that each of the parties face at each stage of the corrupt transaction makes it possible to understand how corruption itself ‘works’ in practice.