The Determinants of Mutual Fund Starts: Is Real Estate Different?

Keyword(s):  
2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ratish C Gupta ◽  
Dr. Manish Mittal

The Indian mutual fund industry is one of the fastest growing and most competitive segments of the financial sector. The extent of under-penetration in the market is a sore point with the financial services industry, with a large amount of savings being channelized into fixed deposits, gold and real estate rather than the capital markets. The mutual fund industry is yet to spread its reach beyond Tier I cities. The top fifteen cities contribute to 85% of the pie, with the remaining 15% distributed among other cities. The study seeks to determine the impact of decision making of investors on current situation of mutual fund industry.


2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-65
Author(s):  
Pierpaolo Pattitoni ◽  
Barbara Petracci ◽  
Valerio Potì ◽  
Massimo Spisni

Purpose – The aim of this paper is to focus on different compensation structures for real estate mutual fund Management Companies and assess whether management fees paid on either Net Asset Value (NAV) or Gross Asset Value (GAV) generate distorted incentives relative to those generated by performance fees paid on the market value of the fund. Design/methodology/approach – To test whether management fees induce Management Companies to opportunistic behaviors, the relative effect of NAV- and GAV-based fees is compared over time using a plethora of econometric models. Findings – It is found that Management Companies that are paid GAV-based fees start with higher leverage to expand assets under management, then, subsequently, drive leverage and over-investment down as fund maturity approaches to minimize the negative impact of negative NPV investments on the final market value of the fund and therefore on performance fees paid at maturity. Research limitations/implications – A dataset of Italian listed real estate mutual funds is used. While the Italian market can be considered an ideal setting for an empirical analysis, studies on other countries would make it possible to test implications of the model that are only weakly identified in our setting. Practical implications – Results could be important when designing managerial contracts. Originality/value – It is shown that Management Companies actively manage the size of their balance sheet to maximize fees, and that NAV-based fees produce effects similar to market-based fees in terms of managerial incentives.


Author(s):  
James L. Kuhle ◽  
Rafiqul Bhuyan

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">Historically, </span><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-style: italic; mso-ansi-language: EN;" lang="EN">little evidence has been found to suggest that real estate investments exhibit superior returns. Further, it appears that real estate mutual fund managers do not possess the ability to consistently beat benchmark averages. However, there have been mixed results for REITs indicating they might be characterized by inefficiencies that could be exploited by informed fund managers. In this analysis, we examine whether mutual fund managers who have concentrated in real estate assets have statistically outperformed other categories of equity mutual funds as well as the S&amp;P 500 and various NAREIT Indexes. </span></span></p>


2020 ◽  
pp. 074391562097090
Author(s):  
Joseph Johnson ◽  
Gerard J. Tellis ◽  
Noah VanBergen

Mutual fund advertisers often highlight their funds’ past returns albeit with an SEC mandated disclosure. To ascertain whether the SEC disclosure is effective and how it could be improved, the authors conduct seven experiments of individuals’ choices of mutual funds with ads touting past success plus disclosures. These experiments lead to several findings: First, current SEC disclosures do not work because investors fall prey to the hot hand bias and believe that past performance trends will continue. Second, while investors comprehend the content of the SEC disclosure, they misapply it. Third, an alternate stronger, less ambiguous disclosure effectively attenuates investors’ preferences for funds with longer (vs. shorter) performance runs. Fourth, the authors also show that only a disclosure that directly relates to the beliefs that give rise to the hot hand bias overcomes peoples’ tendency to chase returns. Fifth, these findings generalize to the real estate context. This is the only research that shows that when the SEC disclosure found in mutual fund ads is pitted against the hot hand bias, the hot hand wins out. Yet, a strongly worded disclosure has some success at debiasing individuals. Implications for policy makers, practitioners, and consumers are discussed.


2013 ◽  
Vol 29 (6) ◽  
pp. 1641
Author(s):  
Kevin Chiang ◽  
Zhenhua Rui ◽  
Craig Wisen ◽  
Xiyu Thomas Zhou

Real estate mutual fund expense ratios are analyzed using panel data comprising 1,130 observations. The results show that expense ratio is inversely related to share class assets, fund family size, and fund age. Conversely, the expense ratio is positively related to larger funds and fund families with superior performance. This result is interesting because individual fund classes with favorable performance are associated with lower expense ratios. The results are robust to common estimation methodologies.


2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 19
Author(s):  
Russell M. Price

The performance of REITs may determine the level of holdings in real estate mutual funds. My study combines the process of asset composition of REITs with the REITs contribution in real estate mutual fund portfolios. There is a 2% to 3% increase in REIT holdings when the dividend yield increases by 1%. The relationship is strongest during the tech bubble period. This will give the investment advisor a look into management of real estate related assets in their respective portfolios.


2012 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 17
Author(s):  
James L. Kuhle

<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span><p style="margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; text-align: justify; mso-pagination: none;" class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">Historically, mixed evidence has been reported suggesting that mutual fund managers exhibit superior returns based on the length of their tenure.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Further, the result of tenure performance for real estate mutual fund managers has been reported with mixed results.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Therefore, it is the purpose of this research to consider the effect of management tenure on the overall performance of various classes of equity mutual funds, including those funds that invest exclusively in real estate assets. These results are studied over periods of three, five, and ten-year manager tenure to determine if there is significantly better performance among various tenure groups. </span></span></p><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span>


2006 ◽  
Vol 32 (12) ◽  
pp. 988-996 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Philpot ◽  
Craig A. Peterson

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects of individual manager characteristics on real estate mutual fund (REMF) performance. Human capital theory predicts that factors like education, experience and professional certifications improve skill sets and thus performance. Conversely, capital markets theory suggests that these things may be irrelevant in the management of mutual funds.Design/methodology/approachA total of 63 REMFs were sampled over the period 2001‐2003 and equations were estimate regressing, alternatively, risk‐adjusted return, market risk and management fees on a series of fund variables and manager characteristics including the manager's tenure, whether the fund manager holds a professional certification, whether the manager has specific real estate experience, and whether the fund is team‐managed.FindingsModest evidence is found that team‐managed funds have lower risk‐adjusted returns than solo‐managed funds. Managers with longer tenure tend to pursue higher market risk levels, and there is no relation between manager characteristics and management fees.Research limitations/implicationsThis study considers only one cross‐sectional time period. Future research might use longitudinal data.Practical implicationsDespite real estate being a specialized field of finance, there is little if any support for the predictions of human capital theory that experience, education and training result in greater performance among managers of REMFs.Originality/valueThis paper extends prior work in mutual fund management characteristics and fund performance to real estate funds.


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