scholarly journals Judicial Review oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi sebagai Fungsi Ajudikasi Konstitusional di Indonesia

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 70-79
Author(s):  
Diyar Ginanjar Andiraharja
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Judicial Activism

Penelitian ini ditujukan untuk menganalisa kewenangan  Judicial Review oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi sebagai ajudikasi konstitusional menurut prinsip konstitusionalisme dan demokrasi. Muncul penilaian terhadap Mahkamah Konstitusi selain menjadi negative legislator juga berkembang menjadi positive legislator yang merupakan kewenangan lembaga pembentuk undang-undang. Metode yang digunakan berupa penelitian hukum normatif. Kepustakan yang dikaji digunakan untuk menjwab pertanyaan penelitian.  Dari penelitian ini diungkapkan  Mahkamah Konsitusi dalam  menjalankan kewenangannya  melakukan Judicial Review, pada praktiknya terjadi suatu perdebatan di mana dalam model putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi dianggap bertentangan dengan prinsip konstitusionalitas dan prinsip demokrasi dalam hal pembentukan suatu kebijakan. Beberapa model tersebut dianggap melampaui kewenangan Mahkamah Konstitusi berupa adanya putusan yang berisi argumen kebijakan serta adanya putusan yang di dalamnya ada  perumusan norma baru. Kesimpulan dari penelitian ini aktivitas menafsirkan UUD 1945  memungkinkan  lahirnya sudut pandang judicial activism  yang dapat memposisikan Mahkamah Konstitusi sebagai badan peradilan  yang memiliki supremasi dalam ajudikasi  konstitusional, walaupun pembentukan Mahkamah Konstitusi itu  sendiri sebenarnya sebagai bagian dari upaya pembaharuan konstitusi dalam memperkuat prinsip pemisahan kekuasaan dan prinsip check and balances. Sehingga perlu dikedepankan  proporsionalitas peran Mahkamah Konstitusi dalam ajudikasi konstitusional. 

scholarly journals JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OR SELF-RESTRAINT : SOME INSIGHT INTO THE INDONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

Yuridika ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 145
Author(s):  
Radian Salman ◽  
Sukardi Sukardi ◽  
Mohammad Syaiful Aris
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Power Relationship ◽  
Judicial Activism ◽  
Conceptual Approach ◽  
Judicial Control ◽  
The One ◽  
Law Making

The Constitutional Court of Republic of Indonesia is centralized judicial review institution which implements a posteriori and abstract control. Constitutional court decision often politically sensitive and involve important issues. On the one hand handing down strong decisions that uphold important constitutional principles can bring great benefits to citizens and can strengthen support for democracy but on the other hand, strong role of the court in judicial review tends to encroach increasingly on the territory of the law making institution. This article examines the decision of constitutional court in the framework of a tension between constitutionalism and democracy, especially from theoretical or conceptual approach. As result of examining its decisions, Indonesian Constitutional Court may reflect two characters; judicial activism as characterized by acting as law-maker and using policy in judicial decisions and/ or judicial self-restraint.  Recent  Indonesian experience shows that judicial review of legislation is not a simply of judicial control over law-making institution, as it brings  tension in the context of power relations in the scheme of separation of power. Relationship between the court and legislature, in respective of judicial review, will culminate in the philosophy of the judiciary. However, as constitutionalism and democracy are virtue, decisions of the Constitutional Court in judicial review should create mode of self-limitation within the framework of the principle of separation of powers.

RESTRICTIONS ON JUDICIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN SPEECH: SILENCING CRITICISM OF LIBERAL ACTIVISM

2004 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 148-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lino A. Graglia
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
Election Campaign ◽  
Judicial Activism ◽  
Policy Choices ◽  
The World

Constitutional law in the United States is, for most practical purposes, the product of ‘judicial review’, the power of judges to disallow policy choices made by other officials or institutions of government, ostensibly because those choices are prohibited by the Constitution. This extraordinary and unprecedented power, America's dubious contribution to the science of government, has made American judges the most powerful in the world, not only legislators but super-legislators, legislators with virtually the last word. Because lawmaking power divorced from popular will is tyranny, most states have attempted to reconcile the lawmaking power of judges with representative self-government by subjecting all or some judges to some form of popular election. In all but four such states, judges, encouraged and supported by their fellow lawyers in the organized bar—would-be judges and beneficiaries of judicial power—have responded by adopting codes of judicial ethics that limit what candidates for election to judicial office are permitted to say. The effect is to undermine elections as a control on judicial power by limiting criticism of judicial activism, the misuse of judicial power.

Fantasies of Liberalism and Liberal Jurisprudence: State Law, Politics, and the Israeli Arab-Palestinian Community

2000 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 425-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gad Barzilai
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Legal Culture ◽  
Social Needs ◽  
Judicial Activism ◽  
New Era ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Supreme Court

Some thirty years after the Bergman decision, Israel's constitutional structure and legal culture are still not responsive to minority needs or, more broadly, to the social needs of deprived communities. The liberal language and judicial review of Knesset legislation that were empowered by Bergman have not reconciled this problematic discrepancy between jurisprudence and social needs.The Bergman ruling signified the onset of a new era in Israel jurisprudence — the era of liberalism, in that it generated the notion of judicial counter-majoritarianism as the center, however problematic, of democracy. It was a modest ruling and a careful one, dwelling only on procedural deficiencies as cause for judicial abrogation of parliamentary legislation. Later on, after 1992, and propelled by the spirit of judicial activism, the Supreme Court adopted a more expansive judicial policy. It asserted the need for much more active judicial review of the substance of Knesset legislation and even the possibility of annulling it if it fell within the provisions of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom and the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.

scholarly journals Ewolucja analitycznej teorii prawa a bezpośrednie stosowanie konstytucji

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-134
Author(s):  
Andrzej Bator
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Direct Application ◽  
Judicial Activism ◽  
Political Practice ◽  
Legal Doctrine ◽  
Modern Approach ◽  
Alternative Approaches ◽  
Direct Applicability ◽  
Theoretical Foundations

The paper analyses the sources of diversity in opinions about the acceptability of direct application of constitution by courts in the so-called confrontational version (a judicial review: the refusal of application of the parliamentary act which is incoherent with a constitution). I claim that such differences result from diverging assumptions accepted within analytic jurisprudence. More precisely speaking, the above differences stem from the three alternative approaches within analytic legal theory: a traditional, a modern, and a postmodern (postanalytic) one. Polish legal thought is dominated by the modern approach, what influence also a debate on the direct applicability of constitution. The modern approach hardly accepts a situation in which a legal professional (a judge) needs to face new social and political challenges. The more adequate in this respect seems to be the postanalytic approach. Thus, arguments which refuse the judge’s right to directly and autonomously apply the constitution against the parliamentary law (which are put forth by some representatives of both legal doctrine and judiciary), are based mainly upon the modern version of the analytic legal theory. Alternatively, the postanalytic perspective offers theoretical foundations for the acceptability of direct and autonomous judicial application of the constitution. As for the traditional version of analytic theory, it possesses some explanatory force towards Polish political practice of the day. Since it supports claims which question any form of judicial activism. This approach seems to undermine any reasons for the existence of independent constitutional judiciary, the direct application of constitution byordinary courts included.

scholarly journals ENTRE O ATIVISMO E (IN) OPERÂNCIA LEGISLATIVA: DELIBERAÇÃO E LEGITIMIDADE DAS DECISÕES DO SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL EM SEDE DE CONTROLE DE CONSTITUCIONALIDADE EM UM CONTEXTO DE NOVOS ARRANJOS INSTITUCIONAIS E DE REVISÃO DA TEORIA DA SEPARAÇÃO DOS PODERES

2014 ◽  
pp. 104
Author(s):  
Bruno Denis Vale Castro ◽  
Paulo Roberto Barbosa Ramos
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Institutional Arrangements ◽  
Judicial Activism ◽  
Revision Theory ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Creation ◽  
New Devices

O presente artigo se propõe a analisar a deliberação interna e legitimidade das decisões do Supremo Tribunal Federal em sede de Controle de Constitucionalidade, observada uma conjuntura de revisão da Teoria da Separação dos Poderes e necessidade de criação de novos arranjos institucionais. Neste aspecto, tem-se como objetivo geral repensar o papel do Supremo Tribunal Federal em um modelo de controle de constitucionalidade, bem como sua legitimidade, justificação de suas decisões e deliberação interna, superando a dicotomia ativismo judicial/ deferência ao legislativo, tendo em vista a necessidade de readequação da Teoria da Separação dos Poderes, de modo que se leve a Constituição a sério e se responda ao anseio de desenvolvimento democrático-social brasileiro.Por fim, considera-se que a necessidade de que algum órgão delibere em sede de controle de constitucionalidade não significa que esta deva ser permanente ou que não possa haver alguma espécie de diálogo entre os poderes, concebendo assim, que Supremo Tribunal Federal não detém o monopólio da guarda da Constituição, havendo a possibilidade de um papel mais protagonista do legislativo, a partir da utilização dos mecanismos já existentes ou mesmo da criação de novos dispositivos que permitam diálogos institucionais.Palavras-chave: Ativismo judicial. Diálogos institucionais. Controle de constitucionalidadeBETWEEN THE ACTIVISM AND LEGISLATIVE (IN) EFFICIENY: DELIBERATION AND LEGITIMACY OF DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN OFFICE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEXT OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND REVIEW OF THE THEORY OF SEPARATION OF POWERSABSTRACT: This article aims to analyze the internal deliberation and legitimacy of decisions of the Supreme Court in place of Judicial Review, observed a conjuncture Revision Theory of Separation of Powers and the need to create new institutional arrangements. In this respect, it has the general objective to rethink the role of the Supreme Court in a model of judicial review, as well as its legitimacy, justification of their decisions and internal deliberation, overcoming the dichotomy judicial activism /deference to the legislature, with a view the need to readjust the Theory of Separation of Powers, so that light the Constitution seriously and respond to the yearning of Brazilian democratic and social de-velopment. Finally, it is considered that the need for some body deliberates on seat of judicial review does not mean that it must be permanent or may not be some sort of dialogue between the powers, conceived so that the Supreme Court does not hold monopoly of safeguarding the Constitution , with the possibility of a more protagonist role of the legislature, from the use of existing or even the creation of new devices that allow institutional dialogue mechanisms.KEYWORDS: Judicial activism. Institutional dialogues. Judicial review.ENTRE EL ACTIVISMO Y LA (IN) OPERANCIA LEGISLATIVA: DELIBERACIÓN Y LA LEGITIMIDAD DE LAS DECISIONES DE LA CORTE SUPREMA EN LA SEDE DE CONTROL DE CONSTITUCIONALIDAD, EN UN CONTEXTO DE NUEVOS ARREGLOS INSTITUCIONALES Y LA REVISIÓN DE LA TEORÍA DE LA SEPARACIÓN DE PODERESRESUMEN: El articulo intenta analizar la deliberación interna y la legitimidad de las decisiones del Supremo Tribunal Federal en sede de Control de Constitucionalidad, observada una coyuntura de revisión de la Teoría de la Separa-ción de los Poderes y la necesidad de creación de nuevas relaciones institucionales. En ese aspecto, tiene como objetivo general pensar de otra forma el papel del Supremo Tribunal Federal en un modelo de control de constitu-cionalidad, y también su legitimidad, justificación de sus decisiones y deliberación interna, con la superación de la dicotomía activismo judicial/deferencia al legislativo, teniendo en vista la necesidad de readecuación de la Teoría de la Separación de los Poderes, de forma que se lleve a Constitución en serio y se presenta una respuesta a los deseos de desarrollo democrático-social brasileño. Al final, tiene en consideración la necesidad de que algún órgano delibere en sede de control de constitucionalidad no significa que este debe ser permanente o que no pueda haber alguna suerte de dialogo entre los poderes, concibiendo así, que el Supremo Tribunal Federal no detiene el mono-polio de la guardia de la constitución, habiendo la posibilidad de un papel más protagonista do legislativo, a partir de la utilización de los mecanismos ya existentes o mismo de la creación de nuevos dispositivos que vengan a permitir diálogos institucionales.PALABRAS CLAVE: Activismo judicial. Diálogos institucionales. Control de constitucionalidad

Who Guards the Guardians?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
András Sajó ◽  
Renáta Uitz
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Judicial Activism ◽  
Constitutional Interpretation ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
Constitutional Adjudication

This chapter examines constitutional adjudication as a mechanism designed to ensure that the constitution is properly observed. It begins with an overview of the development of constitutional review power and its prevailing modalities around the globe, focusing primarily on the emergence of specialized constitutional courts. It describes models and variations of constitutional review, along with the politics of apex courts. Turning to the constitutional review of legislation, the chapter considers what interpreting a constitution means in practice and whether fears of judicial self-aggrandizement through constitutional interpretation are justified. Finally, it discusses accusations of judicial activism and deference levelled against apex courts as well as the mounting opposition to judicial review.

scholarly journals JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN INDONESIA

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 160-177
Author(s):  
Rahayu Prasetianingsih
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Judicial Activism ◽  
Constitutional Interpretation ◽  
National Assembly ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Culture ◽  
The Government

The existence of Constitutional Court becomes important as requisite for the rule of law principle and democracy in Indonesia. Amendment of the Constitution by Indonesia National Assembly has chosen to share judicial power held by the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court with the authority to judicial review of legislation to the Constitution. The Constitutional Court as Guardian of the Constitution has its own role in establishing constitutional culture in Indonesia. Commitment to constitutionalism is adistinctive constitutional culture which will also develop the constitution itself. Commitment to UUD 1945 as the limitation to the powers and a guarantee of constitutional rights that must be protected by the Constitutional Court with the authority to review as the implementation of Indonesia constitutionalism. Constitutional culture discuss in this paper is focused on understanding constitutional culture which will affect the implementation of the constitution by "the formal institutions of the state", especially in relation to the citizenry. The Constitutional Court in review of the legislation to the constitution has used various methods of Constitutional interpretation to uphold the law and substantive justice. From several decisions seem that the constitutional interpretation made by the Constitutional Court was expanding the existing notions of UUD 1945 or event change the constitution. The Constitutional Court leads to judicial activism and can be said that the constitutional court has become super body. On the other side, presence of the Constitutional Court expected to complement the government system of Indonesia, in accordance with the function can motivate the performance of other state institutions, in this case the legislator in order to establish better legislation. Abstrak: Mahkamah Konstitusi menjadi syarat penting bagi terwujudnya prinsip negara hukum dan demokrasi di Indonesia. Perubahan Konstitusi oleh Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat telah membagi kekuasaan kehakiman kepada Mahkamah Agung dan Mahkamah Konstitusi dengan kewenangan pengujian undang-undang terhadap Konstitusi. Mahkamah Konstitusi sebagai Penjaga Konstitusi memiliki peran tersendiri dalam membangun budaya konstitusi di Indonesia. Komitmen terhadap konstitusionalisme merupakan budaya konstitusi yang khas yang juga akan mendinamisasi konstitusi itu sendiri. Komitmen terhadap UUD 1945 sebagai pembatasan kekuasaan dan jaminan hak konstitusional yang harus dilindungi oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi dengan kewenangan pengujian sebagai implementasi konstitusionalisme Indonesia. Budaya konstitusi yang dibahas dalam tulisan ini fokus pada pemahaman budaya konstitusi yang akan mempengaruhi pelaksanaan konstitusi oleh "lembaga formal negara", terutama dalam kaitannya dengan warga negara. Mahkamah Konstitusi dalam menguji undang-undang terhadap konstitusi telah menggunakan berbagai metode penafsiran Konstitusi untuk menegakkan hukum dan keadilan substantif. Dari beberapa putusan tampak bahwa penafsiran konstitusi yang dilakukan oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi merupakan perluasan dari pengertian UUD 1945 yang sudah ada atau bahkan mengubah konstitusi. Mahkamah Konstitusi mengarah pada judicial activism dan dapat dikatakan bahwa Mahkamah Konstitusi telah menjadi super body. Di sisi lain, kehadiran Mahkamah Konstitusi diharapkan dapat melengkapi sistem pemerintahan Indonesia, sesuai dengan fungsinya dapat memotivasi kinerja lembaga negara lainnya, dalam hal ini pembentuk undang-undang agar dapat membentuk peraturan perundang-undangan yang lebih baik.Kata Kunci: Judicial Review, Penafsiran Konstitusi, Budaya Konstitusi  

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