scholarly journals Wearing Two Hats: CEO Duality, Risk, Innovation, and Firm Performance in the IT Industry

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lakshmi Goel ◽  
Pieter de Jong
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
It Industry ◽  
Ceo Duality

scholarly journals The effect of diversification on firm performance: Evidence from Listed Companies in Vietnam

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (02) ◽  
pp. 2072-2180
Author(s):  
Dai Long Khuc ◽  
Thi Thu Bui ◽  
Quynh Mai Ha
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Gender Diversity ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Return On Equity ◽  
Independent Variables ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
And Gender ◽  
The Relationship

The study was conducted to investigate the relationship between diversification on Board and firm performance. The investigation has been performed using panel data procedure for a sample of 204 Vietnamese listed companies in two different groups: Large cap and Mid cap, listed in HOSE and HNX during the period of five years from 2015 to 2019. The study uses three performance measures (including return on equity, return on asset, Tobin’s Q) as dependent variable. The independent variables for measurement of diversification on Board are the number of females and the diversification for Supervisory Board are the number of females only. Other independent variables are average age of Board member, CEO duality and the number of independent directors. The results indicated that firm performance have positive relationship with nationality diversity on Board and gender diversity on Supervisory Board. CEO duality shows a significant result of negative effect on firm performance.

The Role of Board Leadership Structure in Firm Governance

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danuse Bement ◽  
Ryan Krause
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Independent Director ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Board Chair ◽  
Board Committees ◽  
Board Leadership ◽  
Leadership Structure ◽  
Board Leadership Structure

Boards of directors are governing bodies that reside at the apex of the modern corporation. Boards monitor the behavior of firm management, provide managers access to knowledge, expertise, and external networks, and serve as advisors and sounding boards for the CEO. Board attributes such as board size and independence, director demographics, and firm ownership have all been studied as antecedents of effective board functioning and, ultimately, firm performance. Steady progress has been made toward understanding how boards influence firm outcomes, but several key questions about board leadership structure remain unresolved. Research on board leadership structure encompasses the study of board chairs, lead independent directors, and board committees. Board chair research indicates that when held by competent individuals, this key leadership position has the potential to contribute to efficient board functioning and firm performance. Researchers have found conflicting evidence regarding CEO duality, the practice of the CEO also serving as the board chair. The effect of this phenomenon—once ubiquitous among U.S. boards—ranges widely based on circumstances such as board independence, CEO power, and/or environmental conditions. Progressively, however, potential negative consequences of CEO duality proposed by agency theory appear to be counterbalanced by other governance mechanisms and regulatory changes. A popular mechanism for a compromise between the benefits of CEO duality and independent monitoring is to establish the role of a lead independent director. Although research on this role is in its early stage, results suggest that when implemented properly, the lead independent director can aid board monitoring without adding confusion to a unified chain of command. Board oversight committees, another key board leadership mechanism, improve directors’ access to information, enhance decision-making quality by allowing directors to focus on specialized topics outside of board meetings, and increase the speed of response to critical matters. Future research on the governance roles of boards, leadership configurations, and board committees is likely to explore theories beyond agency and resource dependence, as well as rely less on collecting archival data and more on finding creative ways to access rarely examined board interactions, such as board and committee meetings and executive sessions.

scholarly journals The board of directors and firm performance: empirical evidence from listed companies

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 508-551 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandro Merendino ◽  
Rob Melville
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Content Type

PurposeThis study aims to reconcile some of the conflicting results in prior studies of the board structure–firm performance relationship and to evaluate the effectiveness and applicability of agency theory in the specific context of Italian corporate governance practice.Design/methodology/approachThis research applies a dynamic generalised method of moments on a sample of Italian listed companies over the period 2003-2015. Proxies for corporate governance mechanisms are the board size, the level of board independence, ownership structure, shareholder agreements and CEO–chairman leadership.FindingsWhile directors elected by minority shareholders are not able to impact performance, independent directors do have a non-linear effect on performance. Board size has a positive effect on firm performance for lower levels of board size. Ownership structure per se and shareholder agreements do not affect firm performance.Research limitations/implicationsThis paper contributes to the literature on agency theory by reconciling some of the conflicting results inherent in the board structure–performance relationship. Firm performance is not necessarily improved by having a high number of independent directors on the board. Ownership structure and composition do not affect firm performance; therefore, greater monitoring provided by concentrated ownership does not necessarily lead to stronger firm performance.Practical implicationsThis paper suggests that Italian corporate governance law should improve the rules and effectiveness of minority directors by analysing whether they are able to impede the main shareholders to expropriate private benefits on the expenses of the minority. The legislator should not impose any restrictive regulations with regard to CEO duality, as the influence of CEO duality on performance may vary with respect to the unique characteristics of each company.Originality/valueThe results enrich the understanding of the applicability of agency theory in listed companies, especially in Italy. Additionally, this paper provides a comprehensive synthesis of research evidence of agency theory studies.

scholarly journals CEO Duality Structure and Firm Performance in Pakistan

2014 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 57-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qaiser Rafique Yasser ◽  
Abdullah Al Mamun ◽  
Abdul Rahim Suriya
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Ceo Duality

scholarly journals CEO DUALITY AND FIRM PERFORMANCE IN BRAZIL: EVIDENCE FROM 2008

2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcio Alves Amaral-Baptista ◽  
Marcelo Cabús Klotzle ◽  
Maria Angela Campelo de Melo
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Performance Measures ◽  
Food Processing ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Stewardship Theory ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Leadership Structure ◽  
Systemic Crisis ◽  
Board Leadership Structure ◽  
The Relationship

This research investigates the relationship between CEO duality and the performance of Brazilian firms in 2008. While CEO duality has been the dominant board leadership structure of US corporations, Brazilian firms typically separate the roles of CEO and chairperson. During 2008, some Brazilian firms such as Sadia S/A (a multinational food processing company) adopted a dual leadership structure in an attempt to respond to the global systemic crisis. Using agency and stewardship theory perspectives, we tested our hypotheses with data of Brazilian listed companies. The empirical results indicate that companies where the CEO and chairperson are the same person have significantly higher performance (ROE). We also found a positive association between CEO duality and all other firm performance measures (ROA, ROC, MTBV), although the results were not statistically significant for these.

CEO Duality and Firm Performance

2020 ◽  
pp. 227-246
Author(s):  
Sandra Alves
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Least Square ◽  
Tobin’S Q ◽  
Monitoring And Control ◽  
Tobin's Q ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Ordinary Least Square ◽  
Leadership Structure ◽  
And Control

Two divergent theories emerge from the literature on CEO duality. The agency theory advocates that a dual CEO negatively affects corporate performance, because it compromises the monitoring and control of the CEO, whilst the stewardship theory suggests the contrary effect due to the unity of command it presents. For a sample of 26 non-financial listed Portuguese firms from 2002 to 2016, this study draws on agency and stewardship theories to evaluate the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance, proxied by Tobin's Q. Using ordinary least square (OLS) and two stage least squares (2SLS) techniques to control potential problems simultaneity between CEO duality and firm performance, the author finds a negative relationship between CEO duality and Tobin's Q. This suggests that investors perceive no value in having a concentration of power with a dual leadership structure. Therefore, this study recommends that the positions of chairman and CEO should be separated for listed Portuguese firms.

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