scholarly journals EDUCATION AS A FACTOR IN THE EVOLUTION OF A «REASONABLE PERSON» INTO A «REASONABLE PERSON».

2021 ◽  
Vol 101 (09) ◽  
pp. 101-126
Author(s):  
Yuri Dmitrievich Mishin ◽  
◽  
Pavel Mikhailovich Postnikov ◽  
Artur Aleksandrovich Blagorodov ◽  
Vladimir Timofeevich Prokhorov ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
John Gardner

Torts and Other Wrongs is a collection of eleven of the author’s essays on the theory of the law of torts and its place in the law more generally. Two new essays accompany nine previously published pieces, a number of which are already established classics of theoretical writing on private law. Together they range across the distinction between torts and other wrongs, the moral significance of outcomes, the nature and role of corrective and distributive justice, the justification of strict liability, the nature of the reasonable person standard, and the role of public policy in private law adjudication. Though focused on the law of torts, the wide-ranging analysis in each chapter will speak to theorists of private law more generally.


Author(s):  
John Oberdiek

Chapter 2 takes up the complex task of formulating a conception of risk that can meet the twin desiderata of practicality and normativity. Though neither an unreconstructed subjective nor objective account of risk can, on its own, play the role we need it to play in a moral context, the accounts can be combined to take advantage of their respective strengths. Much of the chapter is therefore devoted to explaining how to overcome this recalibrated perspective-indifference. The chapter defends the perspective of a particular interpretation of the reasonable person, well-known from tort law, as a way of bringing determinacy to the characterization of risk. Defending this evidence-relative perspective while criticizing competing belief- and fact-relative perspectives, the chapter argues that it has the resources to meet the twin desiderata of practicality and normativity.


1995 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carol L. Baird ◽  
Nora L. Bensko ◽  
Paul A. Bell ◽  
Wayne Viney ◽  
William Douglas Woody

Perceptions of sexual harassment were investigated as a function of perpetrators' and recipients' gender. Undergraduate students (100 women, 98 men) were presented 34 scenarios of men and women interacting at work. Participants were asked to read carefully each scenario and indicate on a scale anchored by 1 (strongly disagree) and 7 (strongly agree) their opinions as to whether the scenario represented an incident of sexual harassment. Analysis indicated that women rated “hostile environment” scenarios as more harassing than men, and male perpetrators were rated as more harassing than female perpetrators. Even though some scenarios were rated as more harassing than others, the full range of the 7-point scale was used on every scenario, indicating a lack of agreement on what constitutes harassment. This lack of agreement highlights the debate within the legal community about whether the “reasonable person” or the “reasonable woman” standard should be used to judge sexual harassment in the workplace.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhihao Zhang ◽  
Maxwell Good ◽  
Vera Kulikov ◽  
Femke van Horen ◽  
Andrew Kayser ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
pp. medethics-2020-107144
Author(s):  
Abeezar I Sarela

Cox and Fritz state the central problem as the absence of a framework for healthcare policy decisions; but, they overlook the theoretical underpinnings of public law. In response, they propose a two-step procedure to guide fair decision-making. The first step relies on Thomas Scanlon’s ‘contractualism’ for stakeholders to consider whether, or not, they could reasonably reject policy proposals made by others; then in the second step, John Rawls’s principles of justice are applied to these proposals; a fair policy requires to pass both steps. I argue that Cox and Fritz misinterpret Rawls. His theory has two stages: first, public reason is used to generate principles of justice; second, public reason is used to interpret and apply these principles. The second stage requires that proposals are based on the principles of justice from the first stage, and these proposals have to be acceptable to reasonable persons. Thus, Rawls’s theory does not need Scanlonian supplementation. Moreover, the application of Rawls’s theory in Cox and Fritz’s model is confusing. In any case, the problems with applying Rawlsian justice to healthcare can be located elsewhere. First, Rawls’s theory would treat healthcare simply as a ‘primary good’ or resource. Social justice ought to, instead, consider healthcare as an opportunity, in the manner conceived by Amartya Sen. Second, Rawlsian justice rests, ultimately, on the conception of a reasonable person; until and unless the characteristics of reasonable stakeholders are clarified, any model of health justice will remain hostage to the unreasonable.


1996 ◽  
Vol 78 (1) ◽  
pp. 329-330 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Douglas Woody ◽  
Wayne Viney ◽  
Paul A. Bell ◽  
Nora L. Bensko

Previous research suggests that women are more likely than men to perceive a hostile environment of sexual harassment in job-related scenarios. Such findings raise questions about whether a “reasonable woman” standard might be preferable to a “reasonable person” standard for adjudication of some sexual harassment cases. There are sound arguments for both positions, and there is no basis at the present time for unequivocal and categorical support for one position over the other.


Bioethics ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 274-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jake Greenblum ◽  
Ryan Hubbard

Author(s):  
María Lucrecia Rovaletti

ABSTRACTThis work tries to show how autonomy principle can turn ethos of health agent and, with it, of contemporary practices. This principle leave aside paternalistic moral. In that, “professional criterion” decides information to know and it leads to autonomous moral of reasonable person where individuals play an active role in made of social order. However, “autonomy” should be understood in a broader sense than a Kantian one. It shouldn´t be already focused on “autonomous person”, this level deeper and last, but on more peripheral level of “choices” and “autonomous actions”, considering subject competence according to minimum, medium and maximum levels (Drane). If paternalistic model is based on “deterministic and causal logic”, autonomy model is attached to the “probabilistic and statistical logic”. With that, it´s proposed now a “rational decision theory” that learns us how decide in “uncertainty” situations, but without arriving at certainty. Rational decision is the most probable one and nobody can ask more. In that way, the matter of informed consent is opened to new perspectives, which have to make a change not only in logic of health team, but also in logic of patients and of social groups. Lastly, psychodynamic psychology has helped to humanize dyadic relationships where the unconscious plays an important role such as those linking patient to therapist, client to professional and subject to researcher. Thus, the application to them of psychoanalytic mechanisms such as transference and countertransference can illuminate their nature and help to resolve any negative transference that may be obstructing their dialogical space.RESUMENSe intenta mostrar cómo el principio de autonomía puede transformar el ethos de los agentes de salud y con ello las prácticas contemporáneas. Este principio deja de lado una moral paternalista donde el “criterio profesional” decide la información a conocer y da paso a una moral autónoma de la persona razonable donde los individuos juegan un rol activo en la puesta del orden social. Pero la “autonomía”, debe entenderse en un sentido más amplio que el kantiano y no centrado ya en la “persona autónoma”, ese nivel más profundo y último, sino en el más periférico de las “elecciones” o “acciones autónomas”, considerando la competencia del sujeto de acuerdo a sus niveles mínimo, mediano y máximo (Drane). Si el modelo paternalista se basa en un “lógica determinista y causalista”, el modelo de la autonomía se adscribe a una “lógica de la probabilidad y estadística”. Con ello se postula ahora una “teoría de la decisión racional”, que nos enseña a cómo decidir en situaciones de “incertidumbre”, aunque sin llegar a la certeza. La decisión racional es la más probable y nadie puede exigir más. De este modo, la cuestión del consentimiento infor-mado se abre a nuevas perspectivas, que deberá producir un cambio no sólo en la lógica de los equipos de salud, sino también en la de los mismos pacientes y en los conjuntos sociales. Finalmente, los aportes del campo «Psi» han contri-buido a humanizar la relación terapeuta-paciente, profesional–usuario, investigador-investigado, en la medida que se plantea en ella también la dimensión inconsciente. Precisamente la noción de transferencia y contra-transferencia postulada por el psicoanálisis, posibilita evaluar la incidencia de estos vínculos y permiten disolver las transferencias negativas que pueden obstaculizar este espacio dialógico.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-4
Author(s):  
John G. Stackhouse

Take your pick: it’s a target-rich environment. Creation of the entire universe in a week. A talking serpent and a death-dealing fruit. A worldwide flood. A fugitive nation hurrying on dry ground across the floor of the Red Sea. A city’s walls falling flat at the sound of trumpets. The sun standing still. Any one of a hundred implausibilities that would make a reasonable person say, “Come on. Get serious.”...


2021 ◽  
pp. 136-145
Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird

Negligence refers to conduct that does not conform to what would be expected of a reasonable person. Along with intention and recklessness, negligence involves a failure to comply with an objective standard of conduct; that is, all of them are forms of fault. To prove negligence, the prosecution is not required to show that the accused failed to foresee a relevant risk; it only has to establish that his conduct failed to comply with a reasonable standard. A person is negligent if he is not able to comply with an objective standard of behaviour set by the law. This chapter deals with crimes of negligence and negligence as mens rea, negligence as the basis of liability, degrees of negligence, negligence as a form of culpable fault, and negligence and capacity.


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