scholarly journals Randomized Wagering Mechanisms

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 1845-1852
Author(s):  
Yiling Chen ◽  
Yang Liu ◽  
Juntao Wang
Keyword(s):  
Pareto Optimality ◽  
Design Space ◽  
Incentive Compatibility ◽  
Ground Truth ◽  
Impossibility Result ◽  
Individual Rationality ◽  
Budget Balance ◽  
Information Elicitation ◽  
Recent Extension ◽  
Noisy Labels

Wagering mechanisms are one-shot betting mechanisms that elicit agents’ predictions of an event. For deterministic wagering mechanisms, an existing impossibility result has shown incompatibility of some desirable theoretical properties. In particular, Pareto optimality (no profitable side bet before allocation) can not be achieved together with weak incentive compatibility, weak budget balance and individual rationality. In this paper, we expand the design space of wagering mechanisms to allow randomization and ask whether there are randomized wagering mechanisms that can achieve all previously considered desirable properties, including Pareto optimality. We answer this question positively with two classes of randomized wagering mechanisms: i) one simple randomized lottery-type implementation of existing deterministic wagering mechanisms, and ii) another family of randomized wagering mechanisms, named surrogate wagering mechanisms, which are robust to noisy ground truth. Surrogate wagering mechanisms are inspired by an idea of learning with noisy labels (Natarajan et al. 2013) as well as a recent extension of this idea to the information elicitation without verification setting (Liu and Chen 2018). We show that a broad set of randomized wagering mechanisms satisfy all desirable theoretical properties.

scholarly journals An Axiomatic View of the Parimutuel Consensus Mechanism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rupert Freeman ◽  
David M. Pennock
Keyword(s):  
Pareto Optimality ◽  
Incentive Compatibility ◽  
The Other ◽  
Individual Rationality ◽  
Budget Balance ◽  
Incentive Compatible

We consider an axiomatic view of the Parimutuel Consensus Mechanism defined by Eisenberg and Gale (1959). The parimutuel consensus mechanism can be interpreted as a parimutuel market for wagering with a proxy that bets optimally on behalf of the agents, depending on the bets of the other agents.  We show that the parimutuel consensus mechanism uniquely satisfies the desirable properties of Pareto optimality, individual rationality, budget balance, anonymity, sybilproofness and envy-freeness. While the parimutuel consensus mechanism does violate the key property of incentive compatibility, it is incentive compatible in the limit as the number of agents becomes large. Via simulations on real contest data, we show that violations of incentive compatibility are both rare and only minimally beneficial for the participants. This suggests that the parimutuel consensus mechanism is a reasonable mechanism for eliciting information in practice.

scholarly journals Polyhedral Clinching Auctions for Two-Sided Markets

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hiroshi Hirai ◽  
Ryosuke Sato
Keyword(s):  
Pareto Optimality ◽  
Network Flow ◽  
Flow Model ◽  
Incentive Compatibility ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Matching Markets ◽  
Budget Balance ◽  
Multiunit Auctions ◽  
Exchange Markets ◽  
Two Sided Markets

In this paper, we present a new model and mechanisms for auctions in two-sided markets of buyers and sellers, where budget constraints are imposed on buyers. Our model incorporates polymatroidal environments and is applicable to a variety of models that include multiunit auctions, matching markets, and reservation exchange markets. Our mechanisms are built on the polymatroidal network flow model by Lawler and Martel. Additionally, they feature nice properties such as the incentive compatibility of buyers, individual rationality, Pareto optimality, and strong budget balance. The first mechanism is a two-sided generalization of the polyhedral clinching auction by Goel et al. for one-sided markets. The second mechanism is a reduce-to-recover algorithm that reduces the market to be one-sided, applies the polyhedral clinching auction by Goel et al., and lifts the resulting allocation to the original two-sided market via the polymatroidal network flow. Both mechanisms are implemented by polymatroid algorithms. We demonstrate how our framework is applied to the Internet display advertisement auctions.

scholarly journals Partial Multi-Label Optimal Margin Distribution Machine

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nan Cao ◽  
Teng Zhang ◽  
Hai Jin
Keyword(s):  
Ground Truth ◽  
Data Sets ◽  
Real World Data ◽  
Generalization Performance ◽  
The Core ◽  
Unseen Data ◽  
Margin Distribution ◽  
Minimum Margin ◽  
Core Problem ◽  
Noisy Labels

Partial multi-label learning deals with the circumstance in which the ground-truth labels are not directly available but hidden in a candidate label set. Due to the presence of other irrelevant labels, vanilla multi-label learning methods are prone to be misled and fail to generalize well on unseen data, thus how to enable them to get rid of the noisy labels turns to be the core problem of partial multi-label learning. In this paper, we propose the Partial Multi-Label Optimal margin Distribution Machine (PML-ODM), which distinguishs the noisy labels through explicitly optimizing the distribution of ranking margin, and exhibits better generalization performance than minimum margin based counterparts. In addition, we propose a novel feature prototype representation to further enhance the disambiguation ability, and the non-linear kernels can also be applied to promote the generalization performance for linearly inseparable data. Extensive experiments on real-world data sets validates the superiority of our proposed method.

scholarly journals Efficient multiunit auctions for normal goods

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 361-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Baisa
Keyword(s):  
Incentive Compatibility ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Impossibility Theorem ◽  
Budget Balance ◽  
Auction Design ◽  
Vickrey Auction ◽  
Multiunit Auctions ◽  
Private Values ◽  
Multidimensional Types ◽  
Normal Goods

I study multiunit auction design when bidders have private values, multiunit demands, and non‐quasilinear preferences. Without quasilinearity, the Vickrey auction loses its desired incentive and efficiency properties. I give conditions under which we can design a mechanism that retains the Vickrey auction's desirable incentive and efficiency properties: (1) individual rationality, (2) dominant strategy incentive compatibility, and (3) Pareto efficiency. I show that there is a mechanism that retains the desired properties of the Vickrey auction if there are two bidders who have single‐dimensional types. I also present an impossibility theorem that shows that there is no mechanism that satisfies Vickrey's desired properties and weak budget balance when bidders have multidimensional types.

An Auction Based Task Dispatching and Pricing Mechanism in Bike-sharing

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bing Shi ◽  
Yaping Deng ◽  
Han Yuan
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Optimal Algorithm ◽  
Incentive Compatibility ◽  
Unit Cost ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Budget Balance ◽  
Coverage Ratio ◽  
Bike Sharing ◽  
Dispatching Algorithm ◽  
Strategy Proof

Abstract As a green and low-carbon transportation way, bike-sharing provides lots of convenience in the daily life. However, the daily usage of sharing bikes results in dispatching problems, i.e. dispatching bikes to the specific destinations. The bike-sharing platform can hire and pay to workers in order to incentivize them to accomplish the dispatching tasks. However, there exist multiple workers competing for the dispatching tasks, and they may strategically report their task accomplishing costs (which are private information only known by themselves) in order to make more profits, which may result in inefficient task dispatching results. In this paper, we first design a dispatching algorithm named GDY-MAX to allocate tasks to workers, which can achieve good performance. However it cannot prevent workers strategically misreporting their task accomplishing costs. Regarding this issue, we further design a strategy proof mechanism under the budget constraint, which consists of a task dispatching algorithm and a worker pricing algorithm. We theoretically prove that our mechanism can satisfy the properties of incentive compatibility, individual rationality and budget balance. Furthermore we run extensive experiments to evaluate our mechanism based on a dataset from Mobike. The results show that the performance of the proposed strategy proof mechanism and GDY-MAX is similar to the optimal algorithm in terms of the coverage ratio of accomplished task regions and the sum of task region values, and our mechanism has better performance than the uniform algorithm in terms of the total payment and the unit cost value.

scholarly journals The Core of a Reinsurance Market

1981 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard Baton ◽  
Jean Lemaire
Keyword(s):  
Pareto Optimality ◽  
Individual Rationality ◽  
Pareto Optimal ◽  
Collective Rationality ◽  
Important Special Case ◽  
The Core ◽  
Premium Calculation ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Special Case ◽  
Reinsurance Market

In a series of celebrated papers, K. Borch characterized the set of the Pareto-optimal risk exchange treaties in a reinsurance market. However, the Pareto-optimality and the individual rationality conditions, considered by Borch, do not preclude the possibility that a coalition of companies might be better off by seceding from the whole group. In this paper, we introduce this collective rationality condition and characterize the core of this game without transferable utilities in the important special case of exponential utilities. The mathematical conditions we obtain can be interpreted in terms of insurance premiums, calculated by means of the zero-utility premium calculation principle. We then show that the core is always non-void and conclude by an example.

scholarly journals Ex-post IR Dynamic Auctions with Cost-per-Action Payments

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weiran Shen ◽  
Zihe Wang ◽  
Song Zuo
Keyword(s):  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Incentive Compatibility ◽  
Individual Rationality ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Dynamic Auctions ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Ad Auctions ◽  
The Cost ◽  
General Reduction

Motivated by online ad auctions, we consider a repeated auction between one seller and many buyers, where each buyer only has an estimation of her value in each period until she actually receives the item in that period. The seller is allowed to conduct a dynamic auction but must guarantee ex-post individual rationality. In this paper, we use a structure that we call credit accounts to enable a general reduction from any incentive compatible and ex-ante individual rational dynamic auction to an approximate incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational dynamic auction with credit accounts. Our reduction obtains stronger individual rationality guarantees at the cost of weaker incentive compatibility. Surprisingly, our reduction works without any common knowledge assumption. Finally, as a complement to our reduction, we prove that there is no non-trivial auction that is exactly incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational under this setting.

Canons of Just Taxation: Efficiency and Fairness in an Economy with a Public Good

1986 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 448-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis Sullivan ◽  
Harris Schlesinger
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Pareto Optimality ◽  
Individual Rationality ◽  
Pareto Optimal ◽  
Optimal Point ◽  
Progressive Taxation ◽  
Lindahl Equilibrium ◽  
Close Relationship ◽  
Rawlsian Justice ◽  
Pareto Optimal Point

This article analyzes the relationships among three canons of “just” taxation: Pareto optimality, individual rationality, and fairness (nonenvy). Using a helpful device called a Kolm triangle, the analysis shows that the fair and Pareto optimal point need not be individually rational, that it will involve progressive taxation, and that it bears no particular relationship to Lindahl equilibrium, but a rather close relationship to Rawlsian justice.

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