scholarly journals The best of both worlds? some reflections on the interaction between the common law and the Bill of rights in our new constitution

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Kate J O'Regan
Keyword(s):  
South African ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Organic System ◽  
The Common ◽  
South African Constitution ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Do So

The relationship between the Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution of 1996 and the common law is analyzed in this paper. "Common law" is understood broadly to include not only the Roman-Dutch law, but also the wide variety of legal sources and traditions which make up South African law, including African tradition, Muslim practice and the English law heritage.Firstly an exposition of the chief characteristics of the hybrid system of South African common law is given. It is shown that the common law is not codified; that it is a living and organic system of law constantly under legislative and judicial review; that its sources vary from judicial precedent to civilian authorities, English, indigenous customary and Muslim law; that the style of litigation and adjudication is English rather than Continental in Character and that when a common law rule is modified, it is done retrospectively in conflict with principles of legal certainty.Secondly the chief constitutional provisions relating to the relationship between the Constitution and the common law are considered. The supremacy clause (section 2) renders a common law rule which is inconsistent with the Constitution invalid from the date of the Constitution unless a court gives a different ruling in accordance with justice and equity. Courts have the inherent power to develop the common law, but the Constitutional Court may do so only in constitutional matters. Two forms of constitutional normative effects may be distinguished: direct (as in sections 2 and 8(1)) and indirect (as in section 39(2)). In terms of the latter the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights are to guide the development of the common law.Thirdly the interaction between the common law and the Constitution is thoroughly explored with reference to common law rules that are in conflict with the Constitution as well as where the common law already provides protection for the rights provided by the Bill of Rights. These matters are explored with reference to a number of recent judgments of the Constitutional Court, in some of which the common law was effectively developed.It is concluded that the firm normative thrust of the Constitution may well prove to be a rich source of principle for the development of the common law and that the flexibility of the common law may facilitate a cross-pollination between it and the Constitution.

The Diffuse and Second Look Models of Judicial Review

2021 ◽  
pp. 23-34
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Latin America ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Second Look ◽  
The Common

This chapter examines the two models of judicial review that exist in the common law countries: the Diffuse Model and the Second Look Model. The Diffuse Model of judicial review originated in the United States and has spread to India, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, most of the countries of Latin America, the Scandinavian countries (except for the Netherlands), and Japan. It is premised on the idea that a country’s written constitution is its supreme law and that courts, when deciding cases or controversies that are properly before them, are thus duty-bound to follow the constitution, which is supreme law, and not a contrary statute whenever those two items conflict. Meanwhile, the essence of the Second Look Model of judicial review is that a Supreme or Constitutional Court ought to have the power of judicial review, subject to some kind of legislative power of override. This, it is said, best harmonizes the advantages of a written constitution and a bill of rights enforced by courts with the imperatives of democratic self-government. The underlying goal is to obtain the advantages of both constitutional government and also of democratic government.

The Implementation of Constitutional Reform in the United Kingdom: Principles and Problems

1995 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 551-564
Author(s):  
Dawn Oliver
Keyword(s):  
United Kingdom ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Public Law ◽  
Constitutional Reform ◽  
Academic Literature ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
The Common ◽  
Executive Agencies ◽  
The Relationship

First, I want to express my gratitude and sense of honour in being invited to deliver the Lionel Cohen lecture for 1995. The relationship between the Israeli and the British legal systems is a close and mutually beneficial one, and we in Britain in particular owe large debts to the legal community in Israel. This is especially the case in my field, public law, where distinguished academics have enriched our academic literature, notably Justice Zamir, whose work on the declaratory judgment has been so influential. Israeli courts, too, have made major contributions to the development of the common law generally and judicial review very notably.In this lecture I want to discuss the process of constitutional reform in the United Kingdom, and to explore some of the difficulties that lie in the way of reform. Some quite radical reforms to our system of government — the introduction of executive agencies in the British civil service, for instance—have been introduced without resort to legislation. There has been a spate of reform to local government and the National Health Service.

scholarly journals Constitutional Mimicry and Common Law Reform in a Rights-Based Post-Colonial Setting: The Case of South Africa and Malawi

2009 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 142-170
Author(s):  
Sibo Banda
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Law Reform ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
The South ◽  
Post Colonial ◽  
The Common

AbstractCompetent courts in Malawi must, as courts have done in South Africa, undertake a radical path in order to enhance the common law position of distinct categories of persons. This article discusses judicial appreciation of the common law-changing function of a bill of rights and its associated values, and judicial understanding as to when such a function may be brought into play. The article examines approaches taken by courts in South Africa in determining the circumstances in which the South African Bill of Rights applies to private relationships, when private parties owe each other duties arising out of the Bill of Rights and the scope of a court's authority to amend the common law in that regard. The article projects the debate, analysis and critique of these approaches onto the Malawian legal landscape through a discussion of the tenant worker contracted on the Malawi private estate.

Equality and Non-Discrimination in the South African Constitution

2000 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-71
Author(s):  
Joan Small ◽  
Evadne Grant
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
The South ◽  
Legal Effect ◽  
The Law ◽  
South African Constitution

Equality occupies the first place in most written constitutions, but in South Africa, its importance is magnified both in terms of the text of the Constitution and in terms of the context in which that Constitution operates. The Bill of Rights is expected, in South Africa, to help bring about the transformation of the society. These expectations of transformation through the operation of the Bill of Rights are informing the development of the law in relation to equality and non-discrimination by the Constitutional Court. The concept of discrimination is uniquely defined in the South African Bill of Rights. The Courts are struggling to give legal effect to the terminology. The test developed by the Court to interpret the equality clause, it is submitted, is comprehensive and informed. But the application of the test is sometimes problematic. This paper addresses the evolving concepts of equality and discrimination in South Africa and discusses some of the difficulties with certain aspects of the test for discrimination, including the concepts of unfairness and human dignity, which have caused division among the judiciary.

EU Countries and the UK

2021 ◽  
pp. 295-306
Author(s):  
Mads Andenas
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Court System ◽  
Eu Countries ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter compares European Union countries to the United Kingdom. It aims at ascertaining not so much whether a common core exists but how it is shaped and evolves, also in response to influences by supranational legal orders. EU countries do not adhere to one model. Administrative law is subject to rapid development, and even countries that share many structures and general features do not develop at the same speed or in the same direction. In the UK, there is no specialized administrative court jurisdiction. There is one general court system that deals with civil, criminal, and administrative cases; but there are many administrative tribunals and appeals tribunals. Nearly all the EU countries have a specialised administrative court system, and the majority has a constitutional court. The chapter considers the perceived divide between civil law countries and the common law in the UK, in the light of the relationship between national law and EU and European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) law. It also looks at the four main features of the legal systems selected for comparison: the constitutional relevance of judicial review; the limitations of judicial review; procedural errors or omissions; and annulment and damages.

Part VII Rights, Ch.44 Legality

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meagher Dan
Keyword(s):  
Future Development ◽  
Present Status ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Statutory Interpretation ◽  
Key Points ◽  
The Common ◽  
Normative Justification ◽  
Principle Of Legality ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Do So

This chapter identifies and explores the relationship between the common law principle of legality and the Australian Constitution. To this end, the chapter considers in some detail how the courts might use the Constitution to provide a stronger normative justification for the principle, better fix the content of the rights it operates to protect, and inform how it is applied. The analysis undertaken is based on the view that much of the recent (and likely future) development of the principle in Australia—indeed the principles of statutory interpretation more generally—may well be constitutionally driven. To do so, the present status of the principle of legality is outlined in this chapter. Its evolution in Australian law and the key points of doctrinal controversy and methodological disagreement are also traced and identified.

The Commonwealth of Australia

2021 ◽  
pp. 229-262
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi
Keyword(s):  
Federal Government ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
High Court ◽  
Parliamentary Government ◽  
The Common ◽  
The U.S

This chapter traces the development of judicial review in Australia, which was modeled on the U.S. system of judicial review. Australian judicial review evolved out of a need for an umpiring body in federalism and separation of powers cases. Indeed, the original purpose of the Australian High Court under the Australian Constitution was to umpire federalism disputes between the Commonwealth and the six Australian states, which predated the federal government of Australia; and to ensure that the traditionally guaranteed rights and freedoms of British subjects under the common law and responsible parliamentary government were respected regarding Australia’s citizens. The Australian Constitution does not have a Bill of Rights or an enumerated Judicial Review clause, but it does limit and enumerate the broad powers of the Australian federal government. The Framers of the Australian Constitution, like the Framers of the U.S. Constitution, assumed that the courts would have the power of judicial review. As a result, there is, in Australia, judicial review in federalism and separation of powers umpiring cases but not in Bill of Rights cases since there is essentially no Australian Bill of Rights.

scholarly journals PRESENCE AS A BASIS FOR THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT SOUNDING IN MONEY: THE “REAL AND SUBSTANTIAL CONNECTION” TEST CONSIDERED

Obiter ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
GMN Xaba
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Natural Justice ◽  
Recognition And Enforcement ◽  
Mere Presence ◽  
The Common ◽  
Foreign Judgment ◽  
Academic Debate

A somewhat contested basis of international competence in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in South Africa is mere presence. Over the years, an academic debate has raged in South Africa over mere presence as a basis of jurisdiction for the enforcement of foreign judgments sounding in money. A recent decision by the Constitutional Court makes the topic worth revisiting.Practical circumstances, social and political considerations as well as natural justice inevitably call for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. As Forsyth aptly puts it “[a] plaintiff may sue in one country and hear with pleasure judgment given in his favour, then discover, to his dismay, that the defendant, with his assets, has absconded to another country”. In such a situation, the judgment has become brutum fulmen in the court which pronounced it and the plaintiff is placed in a grossly prejudicial position. However, because of widely accepted values and principles, legal systems of the world recognize and appreciate that a judgment rendered by the courts of one country may be enforced elsewhere, provided certain conditions are satisfied.Under South African common law one of the conditions for the enforcement of foreign judgments is that the court which pronounced the judgment must have had jurisdiction to entertain the case according to the principles of our law with reference to the jurisdiction of foreign courts. (In Reiss Engineering Co Ltd v Insamcor (Pty) Ltd 1983 (1) SA 1033 (W) 1037B the court stated that the mere fact that the foreign court may have had jurisdiction under its own laws, is not conclusive. Instead, the question of jurisdiction has to be determined in the light of the principles of our law on the jurisdiction of foreign courts. Other requirements for recognition and enforcement are that (i) the foreign judgment must be final and conclusive in its effect and not have become superannuated; (ii) the recognition and enforcement of the judgment by South African courts should not be contrary to public policy; (iii) the foreign judgment should not have been obtained by fraudulent means; (iv) the judgment must not involve the enforcement of a penal or revenue law of the foreign state; and (v) the enforcement of the foreign judgment must not be precluded by the provisions of the Protection of Business Act 99 of 1978, as amended. See Jones v Krok 1995 (1) SA 667 (AD) 685B−D.) This note is concerned only with the requirement that the foreign court that pronounced the judgment must have had jurisdiction to entertain the case according to the principles of our law with reference to the jurisdiction of foreign courts. The other four requirements are outside the scope of this paper and will not be discussed. It appears that the requirement that the foreign court must have had jurisdiction is a tenet central to the common law world. This requirement is a concept sui generis which is not affected by the internal jurisdiction rules of the foreign court, nor by the internal jurisdiction rules of the South African courts. Under South African common law there are, at least, two grounds which have been established with absolute clarity, that clothe a foreign court with international competence.

scholarly journals The Constitutional Role of the Courts under the NZ Bill of Rights: Three Narratives from Attorney-General v Taylor

2017 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 547
Author(s):  
Claudia Geiringer
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Close Analysis ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Court Of Appeal

In Attorney-General v Taylor, New Zealand's Court of Appeal upheld the High Court's recognition, and exercise, of an implied jurisdiction to make (non-binding) declarations of legislative inconsistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (the NZ Bill of Rights). Recognition of this novel jurisdiction says something important about the evolution of judicial-legislative relations under the NZ Bill of Rights. The question is: what exactly? This article suggests that a close analysis of the Court of Appeal's decision in Taylor in fact discloses three interwoven narratives that speak to the constitutional role of the courts in enforcing the NZ Bill of Rights: the NZ Bill of Rights as "legal benchmark"; the NZ Bill of Rights as "facilitator of inter-branch dialogue"; and the "common law-fuelled bill of rights". The article unpicks these narratives, explores the relationship between them and discusses the extent to which they succeed in accommodating or justifying the new declaratory remedy.

scholarly journals Muslim personal law and the meaning of "law" in the South African and Indian constitutions

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 50
Author(s):  
Christa Rautenbach
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Muslim Population ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Law And Legislation ◽  
Personal Law

The Muslim population of South Africa follows a practice which may be referred to asMuslim personal law. Although section 15 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 recognises religious freedom and makes provision for the future recognition of other personal law systems, Muslim personal law is, at this stage, not formally recognised in terms of South African law. Since Muslim personal law receives no constitutional recognition the question may be asked whether the 1996 Constitution, and in particular the Bill of Rights as contained in chapter 2 of the 1996 Constitution, is applicable to "non-recognised" Muslim personal law. The answer to this question depends to a large extent on the meaning of "law" as contained in the 1996 Constitution.When the viewpoint of academic writers and the courts are evaluated it seems as if the meaning of law in South Africa is restricted to the common law, customary law and legislation. If such a viewpoint is to be followed, Muslim personal law is excluded from the scrutiny of the Bill of Rights. It is, however, inconceivable that there might be certain areas of "law" that are not subject to the scrutiny of the Bill of Rights. In this note it will be argued that Muslim personal law should be regarded as law in terms of the 1996 Constitution, or in the alternative, that Muslim personal law (or at least Muslim marriages) should be recognised in terms of section 15 of the 1996 Constitution.Due to the historical resemblance between South Africa and India the meaning of"law" as contained in the 1996 Constitution will be compared with the meaning of "law" as contained in the Constitution of India. Although the Constitution of India indirectly gives recognition to various personal laws in India, these personal laws are not subject to the provisions of the Constitution of India. Therefore, it would be argued that one should approach the Constitution of India with caution when its provisions are compared to those of the 1996 Constitution of South Africa.

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