A direct sale model for fresh vegetables based on a dual channel price game model in China

2015 ◽  
pp. 137-142
Author(s):  
Q. Gao ◽  
C.G. Li
Complexity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huang Yi-min ◽  
Li Qiu-xiang ◽  
Zhang Yu-hao

This paper, considering risk aversion and fair concern, establishes a dynamic price game model of a dual-channel supply chain in which dual-channel retailer sells products through traditional channel and online channel and the online retailer only sells products through online channel. The stability of the system and the influences of different parameter values on utilities are analyzed emphatically using game theory and nonlinear dynamic theory, such as 2D and 3D bifurcation diagram, parameter plot basin, chaos attractor, and sensitivity to initial value. The results find that the system is more likely to lose stability and fall into chaos with the customer demand fluctuating greatly. The system enters into chaos through flip bifurcation with the increase of the price adjustment speed; adjusting the risk-aversion levels or the fairness concern levels of the two retailers can make the system be in a stable state or delay the occurrence of system instability. When the system is in chaos, the average utility of the online retailer will decrease and one of the dual-channel retailers will increase. Using the state feedback control method, the system can return to a stable state from chaos by selecting appropriate control parameters. The research of this paper is of great significance to the decision-makers’ price decision and supply chain operation management.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Zhanbing Guo

Considering that the real competitions in service market contain two important factors, price and service, we build a dynamical price and service game model and study the complex dynamics of this bivariate game. Some special properties about the adjustment of service are noted by comparing our innovative bivariate game model with previous univariate game model. Besides, we discuss the stabilities of fixed points and compare the price and service game with price game. What is more, the recursive least-squares (RLS) estimation is introduced to substitute naive estimation; then the impacts of RLS estimation are studied by comparing it with naive estimation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 1769-1784
Author(s):  
Weijin Jiang ◽  
Xiaoliang Liu ◽  
Dejia Shi ◽  
Junpeng Chen ◽  
Yongxia Sun ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (5) ◽  
pp. 59-64
Author(s):  
Bicheng Yue

In a multichannel supply chain comprising of dual-channel retailers with both physical and online channels as well as single-channel e-tailers with online channels, a multichannel demand model for e-commerce is constructed based on customer channel preferences, and a Stackerberg game model with price competition dominated by dual-channel retailers and single-channel e-tailers as well as a Bertrand game model with equal rights are established to analyze the impact of different channel rights structures on the price, demand, and profit of the two retailers. The results show that the single-channel e-tailer under the dual-channel retailer-dominated game has the highest profit, and the dual-channel retailer under the single-channel e-tailer-dominated game has the highest profit; thus, both retailers should accept the other’s dominant channel rights for profit maximization.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document