scholarly journals Research on Multichannel Supply Chain Pricing Under Different Dominance

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (5) ◽  
pp. 59-64
Author(s):  
Bicheng Yue
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Single Channel ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Demand Model ◽  
Equal Rights ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Price Demand ◽  
The Impact

In a multichannel supply chain comprising of dual-channel retailers with both physical and online channels as well as single-channel e-tailers with online channels, a multichannel demand model for e-commerce is constructed based on customer channel preferences, and a Stackerberg game model with price competition dominated by dual-channel retailers and single-channel e-tailers as well as a Bertrand game model with equal rights are established to analyze the impact of different channel rights structures on the price, demand, and profit of the two retailers. The results show that the single-channel e-tailer under the dual-channel retailer-dominated game has the highest profit, and the dual-channel retailer under the single-channel e-tailer-dominated game has the highest profit; thus, both retailers should accept the other’s dominant channel rights for profit maximization.

scholarly journals The Impact of Price Comparison Service on Pricing Strategy in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qi Xu ◽  
Zheng Liu ◽  
Bin Shen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Study ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Price Comparison ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
The Impact

Recently, price comparison service (PCS) websites are more and more popular due to its features in facilitating transparent price and promoting rational purchase decision. Motivated by the industrial practices, in this study, we examine the pricing strategies of retailers and supplier in a dual-channel supply chain influenced by the signals of PCS. We categorize and discuss three situations according to the signal availability of PCS, under which the optimal pricing strategies are derived. Finally, we conduct a numerical study and find that in fact the retailers and supplier are all more willing to avoid the existence of PCS with the objective of profit maximization. When both of retailers are affected by the PCS, the supplier is more willing to reduce the availability of price information. Important managerial insights are discussed.

scholarly journals Study on Complex Advertising and Price Competition Dual-Channel Supply Chain Models Considering the Overconfidence Manufacturer

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Qiuxiang Li ◽  
Binshuo Bao
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Stable Region ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Channel Competition ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

In order to explore how the manufacturers make decisions when two manufacturers compete for local advertising investment, we examine two noncooperative models (Stackelberg and Nash game) and propose a cost sharing contract to investigate channel competition of dual-channel supply chain. The dominant power between manufacturer and retailer and the effect of channel competition strategy on price are mainly discussed. In addition, dynamic system concepts are integrated into Stackelberg game model based on bounded rational mechanism. We analyze the local stability and find that the stability level of the dual-channel supply chains depends crucially on the price adjustment speed, the level of demand uncertainty, and the risk preference. The outcome shows that, under the master-slave game model, the profits of manufacturers are greater than that under decentralized decision-making mode, and the profits of retailers under master-slave game model are less than that under decentralized decision-making mode. The profits of manufacturers and retailers in the stable region are greater than that in unstable region. Finally, the delay feedback control method is utilized and effectively controls the chaotic behavior of dual-channel supply chain model. The results have theoretical and practical significance for the game models in terms of advertising and price competition.

scholarly journals The Impact of Consumers’ Peer-Induced Fairness Concerns on Mixed Retail and E-Tail Channels

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Yan-Fei Zhao ◽  
Yong Wang ◽  
Guo-Qiang Shi
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Equilibrium Pricing ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Market Competitiveness ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
The Impact

With the rapid development of e-commerce, online retailing has become an important part of the market. In order to improve market competitiveness and increase market share, more and more retailers have opened both regular offline channel and online e-tail channel to sell products. Then how to price becomes an urgent problem for upstream manufacturers and dual-channel retailers when there is price competition between regular channel and e-tail channel, especially when consumers have peer-induced fairness concerns. However, linking consumers’ behavioral factors such as fairness concerns to pricing decisions of mixed retail and e-tail channels draws little attention in the literature on supply chain management. This paper incorporates “consumers’ peer-induced fairness concerns” (CPFC) into pricing decisions in a dyadic supply chain, where dual-channel retailer obtains products from manufacturers and then sells products to consumers through both regular channel and e-tail channel. We use game-theoretic models to analyze the equilibrium pricing strategies under the setting with “symmetry consumers’ peer-induced fairness concerns” (SCPFC) and with “asymmetry consumers’ peer-induced fairness concerns” (ACPFC), respectively. Detailed comparisons and numerical analysis are further conducted to examine the impacts of different types of CPFC on equilibrium pricing strategies and profits.

scholarly journals Pricing Decisions in a Competitive Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Duopolistic Recyclers

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Doo Ho Lee
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Experiment ◽  
End Of Life ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Game Model ◽  
New Materials ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Equilibrium Prices

In this study, we consider a three-echelon closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a collector, and two duopolistic recyclers. In the supply chain, the collector collects end-of-life products from consumers in the market. Then, both recyclers purchase the recyclable waste from the collector, and each recycler turns them into new materials. The manufacturer has no recycling facilities; therefore, the manufacturer only purchases the recycled and new materials for its production from the two recyclers. Under this scenario, price competition between recyclers is inevitable. With two pricing structures (Nash and Stackelberg) of the leaders group and three competition behaviors (Collusion, Cournot, and Stackelberg) of the followers group, we suggest six different pricing game models. In each of them, we establish a pricing game model among the members, prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium prices of the supply chain members, and discuss the effects of competition on the overall supply chain’s profitability. Our numerical experiment indicates that as the price competition between recyclers intensifies, the supply chain profitability decreases. Moreover, the greater the recyclability degree of the waste is, the higher the profits in the supply chain become.

scholarly journals Product bundling and advertising strategy for a duopoly supply chain: a power-balance perspective

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarat Kumar Jena ◽  
Abhijeet Ghadge
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Market Size ◽  
Power Balance ◽  
Supply Chain Network ◽  
Product Bundling ◽  
Advertising Strategy ◽  
Advertising Effort ◽  
Total Profit ◽  
The Impact

AbstractThe paper studies product bundling in a duopoly supply chain network under the influence of different power-balance structures, bundling decisions and advertising efforts on total supply chain profit. Mathematical models comprising two manufacturers and a single retailer are developed to capture the impact of bundling policy and advertisement strategy under three power-balance structures, namely Manufacturer Stackelberg, Retailer Stackelberg and Vertical Nash. Following game theory models and numerical examples, the study found that the total profit of the supply chain is undifferentiated under the manufacturer Stackelberg and Vertical Nash case in the manufacturer bundling and retailer bundling strategies. However, total supply chain profit under manufacturer bundling strongly dominates under retailer bundling in Retailer Stackelberg and Vertical Nash, and remains valid under multiple settings of market size, price elasticity and advertising elasticity. It is also found that manufacturer bundling is significantly affected by advertising effort compared to retailer bundling. The study contributes to the literature interfacing supply chain and marketing by studying bundling policy and advertising strategy simultaneously for homogenous products, under various power-balance structures and price competition.

Influence of the Chinese Government Subsidy Policies on Supply Chain Members’ Profits: An Agent-Based Modeling and Simulation Approach

2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 623-632
Author(s):  
Ran Zhang ◽  
◽  
Jie Lin ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Modeling And Simulation ◽  
Agent Based Modeling ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Demand Model ◽  
Profit Model ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
The Impact

The series of subsidy policies launched by the Chinese government has affected supply chain members’ profits distribution. To explore this influence, an agent-based model was designed, and experiments were conducted under different subsidy levels. Our model focused on the ordinary business entities and their activities in the supply chain. By investigating the real world and other researchers’ studies, agent simulation class library (e.g., control agents, cooperation/collaboration agents, and fractal simulation agents) and their decision knowledge bases were designed to simulate the supply chain members’ behaviors, decision processes, and operation and production activities and behaviors. Price model, demand model and profit model under the subsidy were built to evaluate the supply chain members’ profits under different subsidy scenarios. Finally, a multi-echelon appliance supply chain model was constructed, and experiments were performed with different levels of subsidy limit. Results showed that the supply chain members’ profits increased under the government subsidy policy. The agent-based modeling and simulation method provides a novel approach to explore the impact on profit distribution.

scholarly journals Pricing Decisions of a Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Uncertain Demand of Indirect Channel

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jie Gao ◽  
Xiong Wang ◽  
Qiuling Yang ◽  
Qin Zhong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Uncertain Demand ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
The Impact

The dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) which is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer under uncertain demand of an indirect channel is constructed. In this paper, we establish three pricing models under decentralized decision making, namely, the Nash game between the manufacturer and the retailer, the manufacturer-Stackelberg game, and the retailer-Stackelberg game, to investigate pricing decisions of the CLSC in which the manufacturer uses the direct channel and indirect channel to sell products and entrusts the retailer to collect the used products. We numerically analyze the impact of customer acceptance of the direct channel (θ) on pricing decisions and excepted profits of the CLSC. The results show that when the variableθchanges in a certain range, the wholesale price, retail price, and expected profits of the retailer all decrease whenθincreases, while the direct online sales price and manufacturer’s expected profits in the retailer-Stackelberg game all increase whenθincreases. However, the optimal recycling transfer price and optimal acquisition price of used product are unaffected byθ.

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