scholarly journals Cross-Border Remote B2C Contracts in the Practice of the Court of Justice of the European Union: Is the Consumer always Right?

Lex Russica ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 130-138
Author(s):  
O. V. Sergeeva

The paper analyzes the legal positions of the Court of the European Union, developed when considering disputes arising from cross-border remote B2C (business to consumer) contracts. In particular, the criteria proposed by the Court of the European Union for determining the “orientation” of the professional party’s activity to the country of the consumer’s place of residence are being investigated. Based on the study of the practice of the Court of Justice of the European Union, it is concluded that consumers in the European Union are provided with increased legal protection as an economically weak party.The author summarizes that the Court of the European Union has developed a number of legal positions. In particular, the Court proposed an open list of criteria for determining the “direction” of the professional party’s activities to the country of the consumer’s place of residence. In addition, it was noted that the “direction of the professional party’s activities when concluding remote contracts is evidenced by the website that reads that the professional party implied the implementation of transactions with consumers residing in one or more member States, including the member State of the consumer’s place of residence. However, the mere fact of having access to the website of an intermediary or entrepreneur in the member state in which the consumer resides is not enough. The same applies to the indication of an e-mail address or other contact information, or the use of a language or currency that is usually used in the Member State of the place of establishment of an economic entity, which corresponds to paragraph 24 of the preamble to the Rome I Regulation.

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-107
Author(s):  
Stephan Rammeloo

On 25 October 2017 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) provided for a preliminary ruling in its Polbud judgment concerning a cross-border company conversion. This conversion had to be accomplished by transferring the company’s registered office from one EU Member State to another. The Court’s ruling – first, that such a transfer, whether or not involving at the same time the company’s headquarters or economic conduct, falls within the ambit of Articles 49 and 54 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on freedom of establishment, and, second, that legislative measures imposed on the migrating company by the Member State of origin entailing the winding-up of the company on the conclusion of a liquidation procedure are precluded – deserves approval. The Polbud judgment not only provides for clarity but also further completes the options of cross-border migration operations for companies and firms. At the same time, however, the Court’s ruling demonstrates the need to establish uniform legislative standards at the EU level, safeguarding the interests of all company stakeholders under the reign of Article 52 subsection 2 litera (g) TFEU. Both the experience with Directive 2005/56/EC on cross-border mergers and, from the late eighties of last century onwards, various initiatives having resulted in consecutive ‘pre-drafts’ for a Cross-border Company Migration Directive, may serve as guideline for further harmonisation in the field related. It is now for the Commission to take action, seeking a proper balance between the potentially diverging interests of all company stakeholders.


2015 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 412-415
Author(s):  
Ewelina Kajkowska

THE status of anti-suit injunctions in Europe has long given rise to controversy. The decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-536/13, Gazprom OAO [2015] All E.R. (EC) 711 sheds a new light on the relationship between anti-suit injunctions and the European jurisdiction regime embodied in the Brussels Regulation (Regulation No. 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters). In this much anticipated judgment, the Court of Justice confirmed that, by virtue of the arbitration exclusion in Article 1(2)(d) of the Brussels Regulation, Member State courts are not precluded from enforcing anti-suit injunctions issued by arbitration tribunals and aimed at restraining the proceedings before Member State courts. Although the decision was given before the Recast Brussels Regulation came into force (Regulation No. 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, effective from 10 January 2015), it can be assumed that the same conclusion would have been reached under the new law.


Author(s):  
Bernhard Schima

Article 228 EC If the Court of Justice of the European Union finds that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties, the State shall be required to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court.


Author(s):  
Denis Martin

Any citizen of the Union and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State has the right to refer to the European Ombudsman cases of maladministration in the activities of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union, with the exception of the Court of Justice of the European Union acting in its judicial role.


Author(s):  
Robert Schütze

This chapter describes the direct enforcement of European law in the European Courts. The judicial competences of the European Courts are enumerated in the section of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) dealing with the Court of Justice of the European Union. The chapter discusses four classes of judicial actions. The first class is typically labelled an ‘enforcement action’ in the strict sense of the term. This action is set out in Articles 258 and 259 TFEU and concerns the failure of a Member State to act in accordance with European law. The three remaining actions ‘enforce’ the European Treaties against the EU itself. These actions can be brought for a failure to act, for judicial review, and for damages.


2020 ◽  
pp. 205-239
Author(s):  
Sylvia de Mars

This chapter addresses the Treaty's provisions on the enforcement of EU law, particularly looking at Articles 258–260 TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). The European Commission's enforcement action, known as ‘infringement proceedings’, is set out in Article 258 TFEU. If the Commission proves an infringement has occurred, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) will issue a binding verdict that requires the Member State to rectify the breach: in other words, to amend its domestic laws until they are compliant with EU law. Article 260 TFEU makes clear, however, that the CJEU can only order ‘compliance’. Article 259 sets out a very similar process, rarely used, for Member State v Member State infringement proceedings. The chapter then considers the CJEU's development of the principles of direct and indirect effect and state liability, and explores the remedies for breaches of EU law. It also assesses the impact of Brexit on the enforcement of EU law.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 333-343 ◽  
Author(s):  
Achim Seifert

Article 45 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding legislation of a Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which the workers employed in the establishments of a group located in the territory of that Member State are deprived of the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections of workers’ representatives to the supervisory board of the parent company of that group, which is established in that Member State, and as the case may be, of the right to act or to continue to act as representative on that board, where those workers leave their employment in such an establishment and are employed by a subsidiary belonging to the same group established in another Member State.


2012 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 529-561 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michal Bobek

AbstractWhy are there Advocates General in the Court of Justice of the European Union? A standard answer to this question is likely to be either a simple textual reference (because the Treaty provides for them); or an appeal to authority (because the original framers of the Treaties put them there, inspired by the French legal system); or a rather pragmatic appeal to their on-going utility (because they assist the Court and they do a great job); or any combination of these three. All of these explanations are valid. This contribution, however, attempts to go a little deeper in discerning what may be the ideological justification for Advocates General in the Court of Justice. It does so by carrying out a historical and comparative study concerning their origins and systemic justification from the vantage point of a national lawyer coming from a Member State that does not know any type of a ‘fourth in the court’.The first part of the contribution explains which factors have considerably eroded the position of Advocates General in the course of the last decade and why questions concerning their role and its justification became topical. Second, the commonly invoked reference to the French inspiration for introducing Advocates General is critically examined. It is suggested that justifications once provided with respect to the office of commissaire du gouvernement in the Conseil d’État can hardly be used on the European level with respect to Advocates General. Third, possibilities of internal justification of the role of Advocates General are examined: are Advocates General providing any unique assistance to the Court of Justice, which could not be provided for in different ways? With a negative answer to the latter question, the last part of the argument offers a simple yet solid overreaching justification as to why there should be Advocates General in the Court of Justice.


2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (6) ◽  
pp. 741-745
Author(s):  
Timo Tohidipur

The emerging of an early idea, – the idea of a united Europe in peace replacing the destructive force of nationalism – could not have been a proper blueprint for the formation of a European Society until the brute force of the two World Wars prepared the ground for the awareness of political, economical, and social necessities. The first chapter in the book of the European Union regarding this founding idea was written back in 1951/52 by establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as a Community based upon law. At first, following Jean Monnet's sectoral approach toward integration in connection with the idea of supranationalism, unifying element should have been the supranational administrative body called “High Authority” (former name of the Commission in the first ESCS-Treaty). Given that the ECSC arose on the basis of law, one of the first and most important questions seemed to be the need of legal protection framing and balancing the power of the nearly almighty High Authority. This need should be satisfied by the establishment of a European Court of Justice (ECJ) as a permanent Court in the ECSC-Treaty. Although the shape of the former European Community has been immensely changed and extended through the years of integrational process, the once established ECJ still remains the judicial core in the institutional structure. But how did the system of legal protection react on the defiances of the integrational process?


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