Introduction to the conceptual cathegories of Biolaw / Introducción a las categorías conceptuales del bioderecho en la discrecionalidad jurídica

The identification of the epistemological dispersion regarding decisions made in Biolaw, becomes evident in the critical incorporation of materialism and new forms of physicalism, since its epistemological basis refers to a broader context than the unifyng relationship between mind and brain. Hence, the argumentative theories adopted by authors such as Wroblesky, Aarnio and Alexy, who identify a double requierement to justify, namely: 1) the internal justification, regulated by logic when connecting premises or staments that are part of the judicial reasoning; 2) the external justification that emphasizes in the arguments or reasons to justify those premises or staments. Biolaw implies recognizing that psychopathology has already traveled the road to understand phenomenoms suchs as intentionality, interpretation and interpretative assumptions of the architecture of legal decition. Those who study Biolaw must identify those assumptions that sometimes are thoughtless. This implies giving reasons about the underlying mind-body relationship, those elements that make up the legal the relavant human action, and the configuration of the basic human godos involved in the Litis of the Biolow. All these elements that forces us to rethink the cognitive status of the law in general, and the Biolaws in particular. ---------- La identificación de la denominada dispersión epistemológica en las decisiones en Bioderecho se evidencia en la incorporación crítica al materialismo, en particular, y a las nuevas formas de fisicalismo, ya que su base epistemológica se encuentra en un contexto mucho más amplio que la explicación unificadora de la relación mente-cerebro. De ahí que teorías de la argumentación adoptadas por autores como Wroblesky, Aarnio y Alexy identifican una doble exigencia en la justificación: por un lado, la llamada justificación interna, regulada por la lógica a la hora de conectar las premisas o conectar los enunciados que forman parte del razonamiento judicial y, por el otro, la justificación externa, focalizada en los argumentos o razones utilizados para justificar aquellas premisas o enunciados. El bioderecho implica reconocer que se plantea una crítica al materialismo y al fisicalismo, camino que ya la psicopatología recorrió para entender fenómenos como la intencionalidad, la interpretación de conductas humanas y los supuestos interpretativos de la arquitectura de la decisión jurídica. El estudioso del bioderecho debe identificar esos supuestos, muchas veces irreflexivos; ello implica dar razones acerca de la relación mente-cuerpo subyacente, los elementos que componen la acción humana jurídicamente relevante, la configuración de los bienes humanos básicos involucrados en la litis en el bioderecho; elementos todos estos que hacen necesario repensar el estatuto cognoscitivo del derecho, en general, y del bioderecho, en particular.

Consent, Forcible Intervention, and Internal Justification to Use Force

Consent has become an increasingly common legal justification for states wishing to intervene in internal strife. While the literature on this issue has increased exponentially in recent years, basic questions remain unanswered. In this brief piece, I will focus on two tricky issues: (a) Who can consent to the use of military force within a state? and (b) Under what circumstances can consent legalize forcible intervention? Concerning the latter question, this contribution identifies a missing link: usually, legal discourse deals with the issue of consent in disconnect from the question whether the internal resort to force was itself just. In this comment I suggest a preliminary way to mend this gap.

Summaries

Marijn Meijers Justifying eco-unfriendly behaviors. Implications for communication practice This article describes how people may justify their eco-unfriendly behaviors. It is described how people may use their own previous moral and environmentally friendly behaviors as a justification for environmentally unfriendly behaviors (part I: internal justification) and how people may use the behaviors of others and institutions (i.e., science) as a justification for environmentally unfriendly behaviors (part II: external justification). The article shows boundary conditions for justification effects and describes the implications that these effects have for communication practice. Keywords: licensing, justification, environmentally friendly, moral, sequential decision making

A Fourth in the Court: Why Are There Advocates General in the Court of Justice?

Why are there Advocates General in the Court of Justice of the European Union? A standard answer to this question is likely to be either a simple textual reference (because the Treaty provides for them); or an appeal to authority (because the original framers of the Treaties put them there, inspired by the French legal system); or a rather pragmatic appeal to their on-going utility (because they assist the Court and they do a great job); or any combination of these three. All of these explanations are valid. This contribution, however, attempts to go a little deeper in discerning what may be the ideological justification for Advocates General in the Court of Justice. It does so by carrying out a historical and comparative study concerning their origins and systemic justification from the vantage point of a national lawyer coming from a Member State that does not know any type of a ‘fourth in the court’.The first part of the contribution explains which factors have considerably eroded the position of Advocates General in the course of the last decade and why questions concerning their role and its justification became topical. Second, the commonly invoked reference to the French inspiration for introducing Advocates General is critically examined. It is suggested that justifications once provided with respect to the office of commissaire du gouvernement in the Conseil d’État can hardly be used on the European level with respect to Advocates General. Third, possibilities of internal justification of the role of Advocates General are examined: are Advocates General providing any unique assistance to the Court of Justice, which could not be provided for in different ways? With a negative answer to the latter question, the last part of the argument offers a simple yet solid overreaching justification as to why there should be Advocates General in the Court of Justice.

On There Being Wide Reflective Equilibria: Why it is Important to Put it in the Plural

Wide reflective equilibrium [WRE] is a distinctive coherentist method of justification or explanation or both, depending on the domain or purpose for which it is deployed. I deploy it principally as a method of justification for accounts of morality and normative political and social theory. But it is also used in many domains from the philosophy of mathematics and science to ethics and aesthetics. When deployed in domains as I deploy it for here, WRE starts with a cluster of societies’ specific considered judgments and uncontroversial empirical beliefs and theories and seeks to forge them into a coherent whole along with other considered judgments at all levels of generality. I use it here principally for a justification of political liberalism where it can and should be used for an internal justification, as John Rawls uses it, and as an external justification as Richard Rorty uses it. I use it for both. While these two modes of justification are distinct, they are compatible and importantly so. And for a more complete justification, both are required.L’équilibre réflectif étendu est une méthode cohérentiste distinctive de justification ou d’explication ou les deux, selon le domaine ou la fin pour laquelle on le déploie. Je le déploie principalement comme méthode de justification de comptes rendus de moralité et de théorie politique et sociale normative. Mais on l’utilise aussi dans plusieurs domaines à partir de la philosophie des mathématiques et de la science jusqu’à l’éthique et l’esthétique. Lorsqu’il est déployé dans des domaines comme je le déploie ici, l’équilibre réflectif étendu a comme point de départ un groupe de jugements considérés et de croyances et de théories empiriques non controversées spécifiques des sociétés et cherche à les organiser en un tout cohérent avec d’autres jugements considérés à tous les niveaux de généralité. Je l’utilise ici principalement pour justifier le libéralisme politique où l’on peut et on devrait l’utiliser pour une justification interne, comme le fait John Rawls, et pour une justification externe, comme le fait Richard Rorty. Je l’utilise pour les deux. Quoique ces deux modes de justification soient distincts, ils sont compatibles et ce de façon notable. Et pour une justification plus complète, il faut les deux.

Innocent Victim, Deserved Victim and Martyr: Observers' Reaction

Observers' reactions to, and internal justification of, the perceived victimization of another individual were investigated. Utilizing a “just world” model, three “perceived” conditions of victimization are employed: the innocent victim, the deserved victim, and the martyr. Several hypotheses are tested through the application of a two-way analysis of variance and several independent sample t tests. Only partial support for the “just world” model was demonstrated.