Application of the Principles of International Humanitarian Law (Principles of Distinction, Proportionality, and Precaution) to Armed Conflicts in Cyberspace

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 73-90
Author(s):  
Sergei Yu. Garkusha-Bozhko

Information technology development in the modern world affects all spheres of human activity on a global scale, including the sphere of military activities of States. The current level of military information technologies development allows us to talk about a possible new theater of military operations, namely, cyberspace. In this regard, it is necessary to analyze the problem of applying the principles of international humanitarian law (IHL), in particular the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution, to armed conflicts in cyberspace, which is the subject of this article. However, the application of the basic principles of this branch of international law in cyberspace raises a number of problematic issues that require in-depth research, specifically the application of principles of IHL to cyberspace. The research of such issues is the purpose of this article. Based on the results of this research, the author came to the following conclusions: 1) the application of the principle of distinction in cyberspace is unlikely to ensure the protection of dual-use objects. More important for the protection of such objects in cyberspace is the principle of proportionality; 2) whether IT companies that supply technical equipment and software for military needs qualify as a military facility depends on how much such a company is involved in procurement activities; 3) objects in cyberspace that support the military potential of a state are not military objects; 4) social networks are not military targets; 5) in the context of an armed conflict in cyberspace, the parties to such conflicts have a duty to carefully check the cyber means used in a cyber-attack for compliance with the prohibition of attacks of an indiscriminate nature; 6) the issue of taking precautionary measures against cyber-attacks and their consequences is at the stage of developing state practices. However, it should be assumed that this fact does not negate the obligation of States to take such measures in the event of cyber-attacksthis obligation lies with the States due to the application of the principles of IHL to cyberspace.

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 82-103
Author(s):  
Sergey Garkusha-Bozhko

The development of information technologies in the modern world affects all spheres of human activity, including the sphere of military activities of states. The current level of development of military information technologies allows us to talk about a new fifth possible theatre of military operations, namely, cyberspace. The Tallinn Manual on International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, developed in 2013 and updated in 2017 by experts from the NATO States, also confirms the likelihood of armed conflict in cyberspace. It is indisputable fact that cyber operations committed in the context of an armed conflict will be subject to the same rules of International Humanitarian Law that apply to such armed conflict. However, many cyber operations that can be classified as military operations may be committed in peacetime and are common cybercrimes. In such circumstances, it is imperative to distinguish between such cybercrimes and situations of armed conflict in cyberspace. Due to the fact, that there are only two types of armed conflict — international and non-international, this problem of differentiation raises the question of the typology of armed conflicts in relation to cyberspace. The main questions within the typology of cyber armed conflicts are: whether an international armed conflict can start solely as a result of a cyber-attack in the absence of the use of traditional armed force; and how to distinguish between ordinary criminal behaviour of individuals in cyberspace and non-international armed conflict in cyberspace? The purpose of this article is to provide answers to these urgent questions. The author analyses the following criteria that play a role in solving the above problems: criteria for assigning a cyber attack to a state and equating such a cyber-attack with an act of using armed force in a cyber armed conflict of an international character; and criteria for the organization of parties and the intensity of military actions in a non-international cyber armed conflict. Based on the results of this analysis, the author gives relevant suggestions for solving the above issues.


2021 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-26
Author(s):  
Oleksandra Severinova ◽  

The article analyzes the theoretical and methodological aspects of the formation and development of doctrinal ideas about the meaning of the concept of «armed conflict» in the history of world political and legal thought. The question of the name of the branch of law that regulates armed conflict, by analyzing its historical names such as «law of war», «laws and customs of war», «law of armed conflict», «international humanitarian law» and «international humanitarian law, used in armed conflicts». As a result of this analysis, it can be concluded that it would be most appropriate to use the terms «international humanitarian law» only in a narrow sense or «international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts», which is more cumbersome but most accurately describes the field. It is emphasized that due to the availability of new powerful weapons (economic, political, informational, cultural and weapons of mass destruction), which are dangerous both for the aggressor and for the whole world; the aggressor's desire to downplay its role in resolving conflicts in order to avoid sanctions from other countries and international organizations, as well as to prevent the loss of its authority and position on the world stage; the attempts of the aggressor countries to establish their control over the objects of aggression (including integrating them into their political, economic and security systems) without excessive damage to them is the transformation of methods and means of warfare. It is determined that the long history of the formation of the law of armed conflict has led to the adoption at the level of international law of the provision prohibiting any armed aggression in the world, which is reflected in such a principle as non-use of force or threat of force. At the same time, the UN Charter became the first international act in the history of mankind, which completely prohibited armed aggression and enshrined this principle at the international level, which is binding on all states of the modern world.


2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 119-141
Author(s):  
국제인도법상 무력충돌의 분류를 위한 사이버 공격의 귀속 연구 Shin

1987 ◽  
Vol 27 (259) ◽  
pp. 376-378
Author(s):  
Brian Smith

The Canadian Red Cross Society has strongly supported the adoption of the Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 as logical, essential extensions of the Conventions. The Protocols bring the Conventions of 1949 up to date. They make the true application of international humanitarian law (IHL) in armed conflicts relevant, meaningful and possible in the modern world to fulfil its ultimate aim—to provide protection and assistance to all victims of all conflicts.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-60
Author(s):  
Yakov Haminskiy

The article deals with the use of cyber operations, cyber attacks, cyber wars, other types of cyber threats and criminal use of the latest information technologies, as well as the development and implementation of algorithms, methods and methods to combat these phenomena in the context of threats and challenges to the world community.


2014 ◽  
Vol 96 (893) ◽  
pp. 189-206 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael N. Schmitt

AbstractThe most significant debate regarding the applicability of international humanitarian law to cyber operations involves interpretation of the rules governing cyber “attacks”, as that term is understood in the law. For over a decade, the debate has been a binary one between advocates of the “permissive approach” developed by the author and a “restrictive approach” championed by those who saw the permissive approach as insufficiently protective of the civilian population and other protected persons and objects. In this article, the author analyses that debate, and explains a third approach developed during the Tallinn Manual project. He concludes by suggesting that the Tallinn Manual approach best approximates the contemporary law given the increasing value which societies are attributing to cyber activities.


2020 ◽  
Vol 102 (913) ◽  
pp. 481-492

Executive summary•Cyber operations have become a reality in contemporary armed conflict. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is concerned by the potential human cost arising from the increasing use of cyber operations during armed conflicts.•In the ICRC's view, international humanitarian law (IHL) limits cyber operations during armed conflicts just as it limits the use of any other weapon, means or method of warfare in an armed conflict, whether new or old.•Affirming the applicability of IHL does not legitimize cyber warfare, just as it does not legitimize any other form of warfare. Any use of force by States – cyber or kinetic – remains governed by the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant rules of customary international law, in particular the prohibition against the use of force. International disputes must be settled by peaceful means, in cyberspace as in all other domains.•It is now critical for the international community to affirm the applicability of international humanitarian law to the use of cyber operations during armed conflicts. The ICRC also calls for discussions among governmental and other experts on how existing IHL rules apply and whether the existing law is adequate and sufficient. In this respect, the ICRC welcomes the intergovernmental discussions currently taking place in the framework of two United Nations General Assembly mandated processes.•Events of recent years have shown that cyber operations, whether during or outside armed conflict, can disrupt the operation of critical civilian infrastructure and hamper the delivery of essential services to the population. In the context of armed conflicts, civilian infrastructure is protected against cyber attacks by existing IHL principles and rules, in particular the principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack. IHL also affords special protection to hospitals and objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, among others.•During armed conflicts, the employment of cyber tools that spread and cause damage indiscriminately is prohibited. From a technological perspective, some cyber tools can be designed and used to target and harm only specific objects and to not spread or cause harm indiscriminately. However, the interconnectivity that characterizes cyberspace means that whatever has an interface with the Internet can be targeted from anywhere in the world and that a cyber attack on a specific system may have repercussions on various other systems. As a result, there is a real risk that cyber tools are not designed or used – either deliberately or by mistake – in compliance with IHL.•States’ interpretation of existing IHL rules will determine the extent to which IHL protects against the effects of cyber operations. In particular, States should take clear positions about their commitment to interpret IHL so as to preserve civilian infrastructure from significant disruption and to protect civilian data. The availability of such positions will also influence the assessment of whether the existing rules are adequate or whether new rules may be needed. If States see a need to develop new rules, they should build on and strengthen the existing legal framework – including IHL.


2016 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kosmas Pipyros ◽  
Lilian Mitrou ◽  
Dimitris Gritzalis ◽  
Theodoros Apostolopoulos

Purpose – The increasing number of cyber attacks has transformed the “cyberspace” into a “battlefield”, bringing out “cyber warfare” as the “fifth dimension of war” and emphasizing the States’ need to effectively protect themselves against these attacks. The existing legal framework seem inadequate to deal effectively with cyber operations and, from a strictly legal standpoint, it indicates that addressing cyber attacks does not fall within the jurisdiction of just one legal branch. This is mainly because of the fact that the concept of cyber warfare itself is open to many different interpretations, ranging from cyber operations performed by the States within the context of armed conflict, under International Humanitarian Law, to illicit activities of all kinds performed by non-State actors including cybercriminals and terrorist groups. The paper initially presents major cyber-attack incidents and their impact on the States. On this basis, it examines the existing legal framework at the European and international levels. Furthermore, it approaches “cyber warfare” from the perspective of international law and focuses on two major issues relating to cyber operations, i.e. “jurisdiction” and “attribution”. The multi-layered process of attribution in combination with a variety of jurisdictional bases in international law makes the successful tackling of cyber attacks difficult. The paper aims to identify technical, legal and, last but not least, political difficulties and emphasize the complexity in applying international law rules in cyber operations. Design/methodology/approach – The paper focuses on the globalization of the “cyber warfare phenomenon” by observing its evolutionary process from the early stages of its appearance until today. It examines the scope, duration and intensity of major cyber-attacks throughout the years in relation to the reactions of the States that were the victims. Having this as the base of discussion, it expands further by exemplifying “cyber warfare” from the perspective of the existing European and International legal framework. The main aim of this part is to identify and analyze major obstacles that arise, for instance in terms of “jurisdiction” and “attribution” in applying international law rules to “cyber warfare”. Findings – The absence of a widely accepted legal framework to regulate jurisdictional issues of cyber warfare and the technical difficulties in identifying, with absolute certainty, the perpetrators of an attack, make the successful tackling of cyber attacks difficult. Originality/value – The paper fulfills the need to identify difficulties in applying international law rules in cyber warfare and constitutes the basis for the creation of a method that will attempt to categorize and rank cyber operations in terms of their intensity and seriousness.


2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hemen Philip Faga

AbstractThis paper is an attempt to draw distinctive lines between the concepts of cybercrime, cyber-attack, and cyber warfare in the current information age, in which it has become difficult to separate the activities of transnational criminals from acts of belligerents using cyberspace. The paper considers the implications of transnational cyber threats in international humanitarian law (IHL) with a particular focus on cyber-attacks by non-state actors, the principles of state responsibility, and the implications of targeting non-state perpetrators under IHL. It concludes that current international law constructs are inadequate to address the implications of transnational cyber threats; the author recommends consequential amendments to the laws of war in order to address the challenges posed by transnational cyber threats.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 110
Author(s):  
Helen Wilson ◽  
Patrick van Esch

<p>Cyberspace has emerged as the 5th domain combat zone from which large scale cyber-attacks are launched at an adversary anonymously in milliseconds, by a single stroke on a computer keyboard or mobile device. Such cyber-warfare operations deliberately seek to deceive, degrade, destroy or disrupt computer systems and networks in a battle-space that transcends borders, under the shroud of secrecy to the attacker’s identity or source (Herbert, 2012). Unlike past armed conflicts between nations, conventional weaponry, warring combatants and military objectives were readily identifiable features of the conflict. Cyber-warfare, is asymmetric and can be deceptively and expeditiously instigated by States, Non-State actors, organised groups or sole operators targeting computer networks (e.g. Estonian attack in 2007, Stuxnet attack in 2010).</p>


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