In the course of the recent revival of the study of Comparative Law, repeated attempts have been made to define the nature and province of this branch of the law. Some writers maintain that Comparative Law represents a method of study rather than a department of legal science. They point to the fact that the technique of comparing different legal systems can be employed in almost every branch of the law and that Comparative Law, unlike the branches of positive law, does not fulfil a definite function in the life of society. In particular, writers on jurisprudence and history such as J. Bryce, Holland and Professor Jenks are inclined to subscribe to this view. Among the jurists who have made a special study of Comparative Law, Professor Gutteridge and Professor Kaden are strongly in favour of this view. Professor Gutteridge says: ‘The comparative method lends itself to the study of any branch of legal learning.’ According to Professor Kaden, it is the province of Comparative Law to disclose the points of agreement and difference in the solution which is provided by several legal systems for the same legal problem. The learned writer denies, however, that it is the function of Comparative Law to found a system of legal abstractions on the results of factual comparison. On the other hand, a number of students of Comparative Law consider their subject as a special branch of the science of law. Professor Saleilles, Professor Lambert and Professor Rabel support this view.
Money Laundering Crime in a Legal Comparative Perspective. Considerations of Comparative Law Against the Background of Legal Systems of the Selected European, Asian and the American Continent Countries
