scholarly journals Conceptual issues on Kant’s theory of inner experience

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-134
Author(s):  
Héctor Luis Pacheco Acosta
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Inner Experience ◽  
Inner Sense ◽  
Transcendental Apperception

Abstract: this paper discusses the use of certain terms associated to I. Kant’s account of inner experience. Inner experience is a subject matter relevant in Kant’s thought, which encompasses metaphysical and anthropological issues worthy of consideration. By examining the Critique of Pure Reason and the Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view, one can see the confused use of the terms: inner sense, empirical, pure, and transcendental apperception, discursive and intuitive self-consciousness, consciousness of oneself divided into reflection and apprehension, intellectual and empirical consciousness of one’s existence. Therefore, I focus on the philosophical meaning of the previous terms and their relation to the problem of inner experience, which depends upon the outer experience. Finally, I deal with the problem of the content of inner sense, suggesting that its content does not correspond to a single, simple thing, but rather to a flux of inner representations.

The New Philosophy

Anxiety ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 36-76
Author(s):  
Bettina Bergo
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Unity Of Consciousness ◽  
Inner Sense ◽  
The World ◽  
Logical Condition ◽  
Human Practice ◽  
Transcendental Apperception

Kant’s transcendental revolution temporarily cut through debates between Humian skeptics and rationalists of a Leibniz-Wolffian stripe. It established reason as an immanent tribunal, judging its possibilities and errors. Through an analysis of the structure of intuition and the deduction of the categories intrinsic to judgement, largely scientific, the edifice of the first Critique raised epistemology out of metaphysics and psychologism. Together, the Antimonies and Paralogisms of pure reason indicated the contradictions and misuse of concepts into which rational speculation had hitherto fallen. The paralogisms of the erstwhile rational psychology had argued in favor of the simplicity, substantiality, and the personality of the soul, thereby following a logic of substance and accidents where passions and affects were the latter, attaching to that soul. By showing the errors of the paralogisms, Kant effectively “dispatched” virtually all affects to his “science of man and the world,” the anthropology of human practice. However, the solution to Kant’s Paralogisms of the soul opened a new circle, such that our inner sense and its logical condition, transcendental apperception preceded, but could only be thought thanks to, the categories of understanding. At stake was the intrinsic unity of consciousness within the transcendental project. Although the Critique of Practical Reason retained a crucial intellectual affect, Achtung (attention and respect), Kant’s epistemology required clear distinctions between understanding, reason, and affects. In a sense, ontology and epistemology bifurcate into the domains of a transcendental approach to experience as representation and what lays outside it (including pre-reflective sensibility and affects).

scholarly journals KANTAS IR DELEUZE’AS: KOKIA YRA GILIAUSIA VAIZDUOTĖS PASLAPTIS?

Problemos ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 84 ◽  
pp. 153-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jūratė Baranova
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
Do So ◽  
Philosophical Understanding

Straipsnyje nagrinėjama Kanto nužymėtos ir Deleuze’o eksperimentiniame mąstyme rekonstruotos vaizduotės kaip vieno iš trijų proto gebėjimų raiškos lauko alternatyvos. Siekiama atsakyti į paties Deleuze’o išsikeltą kantišką klausimą: kokia yra giliausia paslaptis? Aptinkamos kelios atsakymo alternatyvos. Šiame tyrime paaiškėjo, kad Deleuze’o atsakymai į paties išsikeltą klausimą „kokia yra giliausia vaizduotės paslaptis?“ patiria metamorfozes, kurios apsuka ratą. Nuo pradinės pozicijos, kai vaizduotė veikia tik paklusdama intelektui ar protui, ji juda link laisvo trijų nepriklausomų sugebėjimų – intelekto, proto, vaizduotės atitikimo, paskui – link jų nedarnios dermės, jų kovos, kuri skatina kiekvienos naują atsiskleidimą, galiausiai – prie vaizduotės anihiliacijos, kuri leidžia užgimti naujai minčiai, taigi, ratas apsisuka ir grįžtama prie jų dermės naujame lygmenyje, moderuojant filosofiniam skoniui. Tačiau visas šias metaformorfozes jungia viena bendra Kanto suformuluota prielaida: vaizduotė niekada neišvengia triadinės priklausomybės, ji neveikia viena; ji galima tik santykyje su intelektu ir protu, t. y. kitais trimis jai paraleliais ir simultaniškais sugebėjimais.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: Kantas, Deleuze’as, vaizduotėKant and Deleuze: What is the Deepest Secret of Imagination? Jūratė Baranova Abstract The paper discusses the problem of possible philosophical understanding of imagination from the Kantian-Deleuzean point of view. At the begining of his philosophical carreer, one can say, “early Deleuze” in 1963 published the book „Kant’s Critical Philosophy“ (La philosophie critique de Kant). The same year he wrote an essay “The Idea of Genesis in Kant’s Esthetics”. In both texts returning to Kant’s book Critique of Pure Reason, Deleuze notices, that it is widely acknowledged that schematizing is an original and irreducible act of imagination: only imagination can and knows how to schematize. Nevertheless, the imagination does not schematize of its own accord, simply because it is free to do so. It schematizes only for a speculative purpose, in accordance with the determinate concepts of the understanding; when the understanding itself plays the role of legislator. This is why it would be misguided to search the mistery of schematizing for the last word on the imagination in its essence or in its free spontaneity. “Schematizing is indeed a secret, but not the deepest secret of imagination,” – writes Deleuze. Some questions arise at this point. The first one – who speaks here: Kant or Deleuze? The second one – what is this deepest secret of imagination, as an intrigue of this kantian-deleuzean voice? How many possible answers to this question one can discern passing from “early Deleuze” to “late Deleuze”? In this article the author discoved some possible metamorphosis or twists of imagination in the experimental reading of Deleuze. It starts from the submissive position being directed by Understanding or Reason, to the free accord of three independent faculties, towards their discord, even fight, even death of the imagination for the sake of the thought and at least – the whirl closes and comes to the same point but from a different point of view: imagination, together with understanding and reason participate as an integral part of philosophical taste in later Deleuze. But one point united all these different adventures of imagination. Imagination always acts only in relation to the understanding and reason, it never plays free. It could never be able to play alone. Keywords: Kant, Deleuze, imagination.

Cartography and Autobiography

2020 ◽  
pp. 263-288
Author(s):  
Alison Laywine
Keyword(s):  
Special Problem ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
Inner Sense ◽  
Empirical World ◽  
The World ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Special Case

This chapter completes the examination, started in Chapter Four, of the second half of the Transcendental Deduction, as found in the second edition of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. The focus of this chapter is §24 and §25. The special problem of these sections is empirical self-knowledge. The author argues that Kant treats self-knowledge as a special case of the cosmology of experience: the problem is how I situate myself in the empirical world. The solution to the problem is to build up in thought an understanding of the world by legislating universal laws to nature by means of the categories and to map my geographical and historical place in the world by means of the cartographic resources available to the productive imagination. The chapter has two parts. The first part is devoted to a paradox Kant claims to be associated with self-affection. It tries to understand his claim as a reflection on his own views in the mid-1770s about self-apprehension by inner sense and apperception. The second part of the chapter is devoted to the specialized cartography Kant takes to be involved in empirical self-knowledge and considers how Kant distinguishes between biography and autobiography.

Identity, Appearances, and Things in Themselves

Dialogue ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 421-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ermanno Bencivenga
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Possible World Semantics ◽  
Points Of View ◽  
Theoretical Philosophy

In his lucid and perceptive essay, “Recent Work on Kant's Theoretical Philosophy”, Karl Ameriks signals Kant's distinction between appearances and things in themselves as one of the (two) “central issues” of the Critique of Pure Reason. The reason why the issue is central (and complicated) is that Kant appears to say contradictory things on the matter. At times he says (or implies) that appearances are the same as things in themselves, and at other times he says (or implies) that they are different. Some interpreters have tried to make sense of these contradictions by claiming that “although for Kant there are not two objects involved, there are still two transcendental and intelligible aspects or points of view that are called for by his doctrine of things in themselves and appearances”. However, it is not immediately clear what kind of an animal an aspect or a point of view is, what kind of operation it is to “look at” an object from such different points of view, and what kind of results this operation is supposed to give. In the present paper, I make a fresh proposal. I propose to interpret Kant's conflicting claims on the relation between things in themselves and appearances in terms of the contemporary framework of possible-world semantics.

Kant and Anthropology

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Naveeda Khan
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
German Romanticism ◽  
Central Question ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Relational Thinking ◽  
Early 21St Century ◽  
Point Of Entry ◽  
The World

Actual, possible, and potential relations between Kant and anthropology in early-21st-century scholarship are worth exploring. Within the realm of actual relations, classical figures within anthropology took up Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Practical Reason to understand the nature of thinking and morality within so-called primitive societies. They sought to put society before mind within Kant’s architectonic of thought and to posit classification, or relational thinking, as equally important as cognition. Within possible relations, contemporary anthropologists engaged Kant’s anthropology or Kant as a possible anthropologist in his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View or “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” or set apart their enterprise of studying ethics from his on morality. A very central question that Kant’s writings posed for them was whether the figure of the human was knowable, to which anthropology added its own nuance by asking whether we can assume it is the same human or reason across all contexts. Within potential relations, writings on the history and method of anthropology both critiqued and celebrated the inheritance of German romanticism, understood as an intellectual trend, a methodology, a sensibility, a mystical orientation, and a celebration of individual singularity and genius within anthropology. In contrast to this mode of inheriting romanticism, a more Kantian-inflected understanding of the romantic movement, mediated by different figures, suggested itself as a productive point of entry for anthropology to understand the philosophical underpinnings of its preferred methods (e.g., fieldwork), its engagement with philosophy beyond that of agonism and possible arrogation, and its re-engagement with the question of the human in relation to itself, other humans and nonhumans, and nature. The fragment, one of romanticism’s greatest creations and a complex response to Kant’s two world metaphysics, appears to anthropology through both trajectories and, in keeping with anthropology’s evolving relation to philosophy, anthropology provides its own spin on the importance of the fragment for inhabiting the world.

scholarly journals Guest Editor Note

1969 ◽  
Vol 2 (02) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nuria Sánches MADRID
Keyword(s):  
Guest Editor ◽  
Natural Science ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Special Issue ◽  
Extensive Experience ◽  
International Group ◽  
Daunting Task ◽  
History Of

As guest editor of this special issue of the journal Estudos Kantianos, I am honored to introduce the contributions gathered under the general title Kant and the empirical sciences. This monographic number two of the second issue of EK contains twelve articles, writtenby an outstanding international group of Kant scholars who have extensive experience on the questions addressed by the issue, published in five languages (English, Spanish, German, French and Portuguese), meeting the multilingual scope of the journal. The original idea of the monographic issue was to discuss whether Kant’s firm reduction of science, according to the proper sense of this term, to the condition of apodictic certainty could exhaust his concern withthe methodical grounding of science and scientificity. The following excerpt of Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786) displays neatly Kant’s point of view about science as a product of reason: “Only that whose certainty is apodictic can be called science properly; cognition that can contain merely empirical certainty is only improperly called science” (MAN, AA 04: 468). However, an earlier Kant’s work aiming at defending the Critique of Pure Reason against its early misunderstandings, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783), points out that all empirical research could be subordinated to the legislation of reason, which therefore will shed some doubts on the legitimacy of the preceding severe categorical statement. Kant formulates this suggestion as follows in the Prolegomena (AA 04: 364): “whether or notexperience is in this way mediately subordinate to the legislation of reason may be discussed by those who desire to trace the nature of reason even beyond its use in metaphysics, into the general principles of a history of nature; I have represented this task as important, butnot attempted its solution, in the book itself ”. This excerpt encourages the reader to extend the study about the legislative scope of reason beyond the field covered by metaphysics, i.e. descending to the humble bathos where the empirical sciences are cultivated. All the articles of this monographic number attempt to cast light on such a valuable and daunting task that Kantleft without an ultimate solution. 

Kants kritische Psychologie als Aufklärung

2020 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-273
Author(s):  
Hyeongjoo Kim ◽  
Carina Pape
Keyword(s):  
Important Change ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Human Soul ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Ongoing Process ◽  
The Enlightenment ◽  
Complete Rejection ◽  
Age Of Enlightenment

In his famous essay from 1784, Kant denied that we "live in an enlightened age"; yet he claimed that we "live in an age of enlightenment". If we should answer the question if we live in an enlightened age now, we could basically give the same answer. The enlightenment as an ongoing process can be found throughout Kant's whole work. This article focuses on how the concept of enlightenment can be applied to the Kantian psychology, which marks an important change of theory of the soul within modern western metaphysics. Kant's idea of enlightenment and 'critique' will be illustrated with reference to the "Paralogisms" of the Critique of Pure Reason. Finally, an analysis of some passages of the "Paralogisms" shall demonstrate that Kant's critique of the previous metaphysical doctrine of the human soul should not be understood as a complete rejection of this doctrine; rather, Kant's critique of what is called rational psychology should be understood as a critical transformation.

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