A simply transformative view of the single-transferable vote: Looking through a gendered lens at electoral reform in British Columbia

1969 ◽  
pp. 15-29
Author(s):  
Annabel Kristin Rixen
Keyword(s):  
British Columbia ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Feminist Studies ◽  
Gender Inequalities ◽  
Research Attention ◽  
Staff Members ◽  
Gender Parity ◽  
Single Transferable Vote ◽  
Legislative Assembly

In 2009, British Columbians voted for the second time on the adoption of a new electoral system, the single-transferable vote (STV), as proposed by the Province's own Citizens' Assembly on electoral reform. The failure of the BC-STV to pass in this referendum generated much discussion on electoral reform, yet little research attention has been devoted to the role of gender in this process. This paper highlights the connections that can be drawn between the BC-STV and feminist studies, analyzing how electoral reform may influence gender parity in the Province's legislative assembly and how gender, in turn, influenced BC's electoral reform deliberations. The first section argues that electoral reform would have significantly improved gender parity in BC's legislative assembly. This conclusion is based upon an analysis of BC’s political culture in connection with three theoretical advantages of the STV system: its use of multi-member districts, its compatibility with affirmative action initiatives, and its susceptibility to the so-called “contagion effect.” The second section of this paper explores how gender dynamics influenced the ability of various “gendered actors” to influence the BC Citizens’ Assembly (BCCA). Female participants, feminist activists, and male staff members each enjoyed differing levels of influence that can be traced back to pre-existing gender inequalities. This work thereby demonstrates that an application of feminist theory can significantly enrich the study of electoral reform movements, both in British Columbia and elsewhere.

scholarly journals Alberta’s forgotten experiment with electoral reform: the hybrid single transferable vote/alternative vote and the quasi-party system

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-32
Author(s):  
Darren C Choi
Keyword(s):  
Hybrid System ◽  
Party System ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Single Transferable Vote ◽  
Social Credit ◽  
Alternative Vote ◽  
Potential Case

A persistent yet understudied aspect of Alberta’s “quasi-party system” is the role of the electoral system. While many authors have rightly pointed out that a majoritarian single-member plurality system has helped Alberta’s ruling parties produce disproportionate majorities, the province has not always operated under this electoral arrangement. From 1926 until 1955, Alberta had a “hybrid” system, consisting of the Single Transferable Vote in multi-member constituencies in Edmonton and Calgary and the Alternative Vote in single-member constituencies in the rest of Alberta. This unusual attempt at electoral reform played an important role in the dominance of the United Farmers of Alberta and the early Social Credit Party (until 1955). AV acted as an essentially majoritarian system in rural Alberta, producing statistically indistinguishable results from FPTP. This contrasts the Albertan case with other attempts at implementing the Alternative Vote. On the other hand, STV benefited the UFA and Social Credit in two distinct ways. STV increasing proportionality in Edmonton and Calgary, as it has in many other jurisdictions. However, due the hybrid system, the urban opposition in Edmonton and Calgary to the UFA was fragmented by a proportional system like STV. Social Credit, with its larger urban base, used STV to maximize its urban vote through a process of voter transfers. Finally, rural malapportionment is a key feature in both the hybrid system and the subsequent return to single-member plurality. Rural seats, operating under both AV and FPTP, have been the electoral bedrock for Alberta’s long lived political dynasties. The unique case of Alberta’s hybrid electoral system serves as an important potential case study in debates surrounding electoral reform in Canada and around the world.   Please be aware that a revision to this article was submitted on April 30, 2021. Therefore, there may be some differences between the online version of this submission and the print version.

Electoral System Reviews in New Zealand, Britain and Canada: A Critical Comparison

2007 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 471-490 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Carl Lundberg
Keyword(s):  
British Columbia ◽  
New Zealand ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Reform Process ◽  
The Public ◽  
Critical Comparison

AbstractThis article compares the use of people outside government to consider electoral reform in three countries using the single-member plurality electoral system. The composition of electoral reform bodies, ranging from commissions of experts (New Zealand) and ex-politicians (Britain) to assemblies of randomly selected citizens (British Columbia), appears to have influenced how well their recommendations were received by the public. Governments should be careful not to assume that they can retain control of the electoral reform process once they let it out of their hands, as the cases of New Zealand and British Columbia show, where majorities of the voters chose reform.

Wahlsystemreform in Deutschland

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peggy Matauschek
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Parallel Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Suitable Alternative ◽  
Representation Systems ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Alternative Vote

Is plurality or majority electoral reform a sensible option in Germany’s muddled electoral system debate? Yes, it is. Since Germany’s mixed-member proportional system fails to concentrate the party system in a sufficient way, Peggy Matauschek searches for a suitable alternative to the principle of proportional representation. She discusses the following options according to their contextual conditions: single-member plurality and majority electoral systems—like the alternative vote system—, parallel systems, proportional representation systems with a low district magnitude and majority bonus systems. In light of its balanced performance, the study advocates the introduction of a system with a majority bonus for a coalition.

The Queensland Electoral System and Indigenous Representation

2005 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-90
Author(s):  
Tereza Smejkalová
Keyword(s):  
Torres Strait Islander ◽  
Indigenous Population ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Party Member ◽  
National Party ◽  
Torres Strait Islander People ◽  
Indigenous Representation ◽  
Torres Strait ◽  
Aboriginal Person ◽  
Legislative Assembly

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people represent more than 3 per cent of the Queensland population, but only one Aboriginal person has so far been elected to the Queensland Legislative Assembly. (Mr Eric Deeral was the National Party member for Cook from 1974 to 1977.) This fact suggests that the Indigenous population and minorities in general do not have much influence on government in Queensland. Questions therefore arise as to why and what can be done to address this deficiency.

The 2016 Electoral Reform in Mongolia: From Mixed System and Multiparty Competition to FPTP and One-Party Dominance

2017 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 511-531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pavel Maškarinec
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
District Level ◽  
Mixed System ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Party Dominance ◽  
Duverger's Law

This article tests the effects of a new electoral system that was introduced in Mongolia for the June 2016 elections. The decision to implement a first-past-the-post (FPTP) system instead of a mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system, which was first and last used in the previous elections of 2012, was due to the April 2016 ruling of the Mongolian Constitutional Court on unconstitutionality of the list tier as one of the mechanisms for distributing seats within MMM. Through an analysis of national- and district-level results, this article addresses the question whether electoral competition at the district level was consistent with Duverger’s law and resulted in the restoration of bipartism, which had been disrupted in 2012 due to the use of MMM.

Electoral Reform and the Electronic Voting System

2020 ◽  
pp. 182-204
Author(s):  
Dashbalbar Gangabaatar
Keyword(s):  
Electoral System ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Electronic Voting ◽  
Mixed System ◽  
Parliamentary Election ◽  
Election Process ◽  
Election System ◽  
Voting System ◽  
Election Results ◽  
Electronic Voting System

Mongolia introduced a new electronic voting system for the first time for the 2012 parliamentary election. E-voting empowers citizens by making voting simpler and providing better opportunities for certain groups of citizens to participate in the election process. The electoral reform was one of the major steps the parliament carried out in order to restore public trust lost in the violent protests against the 2008 parliamentary election results. A free, transparent, and fair electoral system was important to correct the fraud in the old election system. This chapter examines the effectiveness of the mixed system of election, the electronic voting system, the constitutionality of the electoral systems, and other changes to the electoral system in Mongolia.

The Electoral System, the Party System and Accountability in Parliamentary Government

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (3) ◽  
pp. 744-760 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER KAM ◽  
ANTHONY M. BERTELLI ◽  
ALEXANDER HELD
Keyword(s):  
Policy Making ◽  
Party System ◽  
Necessary Conditions ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Electoral Accountability ◽  
Parliamentary Elections ◽  
Parliamentary Government

Electoral accountability requires that voters have the ability to constrain the incumbent government’s policy-making power. We express the necessary conditions for this claim as an accountability identity in which the electoral system and the party system interact to shape the accountability of parliamentary governments. Data from 400 parliamentary elections between 1948 and 2012 show that electoral accountability is contingent on the party system’s bipolarity, for example, with parties arrayed in two distinct blocs. Proportional electoral systems achieve accountability as well as majoritarian ones when bipolarity is strong but not when it is weak. This is because bipolarity decreases the number of connected coalitions that incumbent parties can join to preserve their policy-making power. Our results underscore the limitations that party systems place on electoral reform and the benefits that bipolarity offers for clarifying voters’ choices and intensifying electoral competition.

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