scholarly journals Is the Consumer Welfare Obsolete? A European Union Competition Law and Competition Perspective

Prolegómenos ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (47) ◽  
pp. 55-78
Author(s):  
Frédéric Marty
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
The United States ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
History Of ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
Competition Process ◽  
Market Practice ◽  
Sole Criterion ◽  
More Economic Approach

In 2005, the European Commission advocated for a more economic approach to enforcing competition laws. The sole criterion for assessing the lawfulness of a market practice should be the appraisal of its net effect on consumer welfare. The Court of Justice was reluctant to adopt such an approach until its 2017 Intel Judgment. Its endorsement—which is debatable insofar as the judgment may give rise to different interpretations—may appear paradoxical in that it is concomitant with a sharp challenge to the consumer welfare criterion in the United States. The purpose of this article is to retrace the history of this criterion, particularly its adoption in the context of EU competition law. We aim to show that the criticisms of the effects-based approach can be addressed not by moving away from the consumer welfare criterion but by integrating it into a broader perspective that also takes into account the protection of the competition process itself.

1 Introduction

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geradin Damien ◽  
Layne-Farrar Anne ◽  
Petit Nicolas
Keyword(s):  
Consumer Choice ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Press Releases ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
History Of ◽  
Area Of Concern

This introductory chapter provides an overview of EU competition law. Because it was first formally enacted in 1957, EU competition law is generally perceived as a relatively recent legal discipline. Its real, substantive, origins are however much older, and can be traced back to the history of ancient civilization. Today, the constraints imposed by EU competition law have become a major area of concern for decision-makers both in public and private sectors. Yet, beyond the cosmetics of press releases and business reports, the significance of EU competition law can be measured by its profound and lasting effects in economic activity. There are four possible objectives to the EU competition rules: the protection of fairness in competition; the promotion of economic freedom, plurality, and consumer choice; the promotion of economic efficiency; and the promotion of consumer welfare.

1. Competition policy and economics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Economic Context ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
Competition Process

This chapter provides an overview of competition law and its economic context. Section 2 describes the practices that competition laws attempt to control in order to protect the competition process. Section 3 examines the theory of competition and gives an introductory account of why the effective enforcement of competition law is thought to be beneficial for consumer welfare. Section 4 considers the expected functions of a system of competition law. Section 5 then introduces two key economic concepts, market definition and market power, that are important to a better understanding of competition policy. The chapter concludes with a table of market share figures that are significant in the application of EU and UK competition law.

The European Court of Justice and the More Economic Approach to EU Competition Law—Is the Tide Turning?

2019 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 172-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne C. Witt
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Economic Approach ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Eu Competition Policy ◽  
Legal Concepts ◽  
More Economic Approach

In the late 1990s, the European Commission embarked on a mission to bring EU competition policy more into line with contemporary economic theory. Over a period of ten years, it systematically revised key legal concepts of all three pillars of EU competition law. Most importantly, it adopted the consumer welfare aim, revised its understanding of competitive harm and countervailing effects accordingly, and committed itself to carrying out more in-depth assessments of the investigated conduct’s effects instead of relying on form-based presumptions of illegality. Initially, many tenets of the more economic approach were in conflict with the case law of the European Court of Justice, which had a broader understanding of the aims of EU competition law. However, after a few initial set-backs for the Commission, several recent judgments in cases such as MEO, Intel, Post Danmark I, and Cartes Bancaires suggest that the Court’s understanding of EU competition law is evolving and that it is willing to embrace at least a few of the Commission’s revised principles. In particular, it is adopting a more effects-based approach to assessing business conduct and is cautiously curbing its former concept of harm in exclusionary situations. At the same time, however, it continues to adhere to many of its former freedom- and fairness-based principles, so that a number of uncertainties and inconsistencies remain.

3. The goals and scope of competition and antitrust laws

2021 ◽  
pp. 28-37
Author(s):  
Ariel Ezrachi
Keyword(s):  
South Korea ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Competitive Process ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Antitrust Laws ◽  
The World ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
The Eu

‘The goals and scope of competition and antitrust laws’ evaluates the goals and scope of competition and antitrust laws. Competition laws seek to protect the competitive process in the marketplace from companies that seek to distort it. By safeguarding free and fair markets, competition laws promote consumer welfare as well as efficiencies in the marketplace. While key competition law principles are similar across the world, competition laws are not internationally uniform, but are instead customized by each jurisdiction. A comparison can be made between US Federal Antitrust Law and the EU competition law. There are also other jurisdictions that apply competition laws, including China, Japan, and South Korea.

1. Competition policy and economics

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-48
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Economic Context ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
Competition Process

This chapter provides an overview of competition law and its economic context. Section 2 describes the practices that competition laws attempt to control in order to protect the competition process. Section 3 examines the theory of competition and gives an introductory account of why the effective enforcement of competition law is thought to be beneficial. Section 4 considers the goals of competition law. Section 5 introduces two key economic concepts, market definition and market power, that are important to a better understanding of competition policy. The chapter concludes with a table of market share figures that are significant in the application of EU and UK competition law, while reminding the reader that market shares are only ever a proxy for market power and can never be determinative of market power in themselves.

15. Enforcement of EU competition law

2019 ◽  
pp. 686-698
Author(s):  
Elspeth Berry ◽  
Matthew J. Homewood ◽  
Barbara Bogusz
Keyword(s):  
Burden Of Proof ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
Complete Series ◽  
Explanatory Text ◽  
The Relationship

Titles in the Complete series combine extracts from a wide range of primary materials with clear explanatory text to provide readers with a complete introductory resource. This chapter discusses the enforcement of EU competition law. It covers the enforcement regime; burden of proof; the relationship between Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, and national competition laws; cooperation with national authorities; cooperation with national courts; the powers of the competition authorities of the Member States; the European Commission’s powers; safeguards for undertakings; the 2006 Leniency Notice; and private enforcement.

1. Introduction to Competition Law

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-74
Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin ◽  
Niamh Dunne
Keyword(s):  
Economies Of Scale ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Perfect Competition ◽  
Competition Analysis ◽  
Elasticity Of Demand ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Demand Curves ◽  
Producer Surplus ◽  
Total Welfare

This chapter provides an introduction to, and basis for, the material discussed in the subsequent chapters. It introduces some relevant concepts of microeconomics including demand curves, consumer and producer surplus, elasticity of demand, and economies of scale and scope. It discusses the model of perfect competition and the concepts of allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency; the problems in competition terms of monopoly and oligopoly; and the concept of welfare, particularly consumer welfare and total welfare. It considers various schools of competition analysis and theories and concepts relevant to competition law. It discusses the possible objectives of competition law, and particularly considers what objectives are pursued by EU competition law. The chapter also looks at US antitrust law; competition law and the digital economy; competition law and regulation; and at some basic issues in the application of EU competition law.

Is protecting sunk investments an economic rationale for antitrust law?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Darryl Biggar ◽  
Alberto Heimler
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Hypothesis ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
Specific Investments ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Trading Partners ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
Economic Foundation

Abstract In recent years, the economic foundation of antitrust law is increasingly being called into question. The hypothesis that antitrust law seeks to promote consumer welfare has historically been extremely popular but in recent years has come under attack. In part, this is due to the fact that neither the law, nor the decisions of competition law enforcers, can be fully explained as consistent with a strict consumer welfare standard. Neither do competition laws promote a textbook concept of total economic welfare, neither in their wording, nor in the way they are enforced. Some commentators argue that competition law should protect the competitive process, but this approach lacks a foundation in welfare economics and therefore lacks the ability to make basic trade-offs between desirable goals. This article puts forward an alternative hypothesis, which focuses on the sunk, relationship-specific investments made by market participants. We propose that an important, and overlooked, role of competition law is to protect trading partners from the threat of hold-up, where it is unreasonable for the parties to use conventional mechanisms to protect those sunk investments themselves. This approach can help to explain features of competition law and law enforcement that cannot be explained by the traditional consumer welfare or total welfare frameworks. We suggest that this approach offers promise as providing a consistent, comprehensive, economic foundation for competition law.

Us Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The Helms-burton and D'Amato Acts

1997 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 378-390 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vaughan Lowe
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Large Measure ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
History Of ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
1960S And 1970S ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction ◽  
National Governments

The history of clashes over extraterritorial jurisdiction between the United States of America and other States in the Americas, Europe and elsewhere is a long one. That history is commonly traced back to the antitrust claims arising from the Alcoa case in 1945, in which the “effects” doctrine was advanced in the peculiar and objectionable form in which it is applied, not simply to acts which constitute elements of a single offence but which occur in different jurisdictions but, rather, to the economic repercussions of acts in one State which are felt in another. The conflict persisted into the 1950s, with the clashes over US regulation of the international shipping and paper industries. In the 1960s and 1970s there were further clashes in relation to the extraterritorial application of US competition laws, notably in disputes over shipping regulation and the notorious Uranium Antitrust litigation, in which US laws were applied to penalise the extraterritorial conduct of non-US companies, conducted with the approval of their national governments, at a time when those companies were barred by US law from trading in the United States. It was that litigation which was in large measure responsible for the adoption in the United Kingdom of the Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, which significantly extended the powers which the British government had asserted in the 1952 Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act to defend British interests against US extraterritorial claims.

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