scholarly journals The Far Right in Western Europe: “From the Margins to the Mainstream” And Back?

2018 ◽  
pp. 75-97
Author(s):  
Beatriz Acha Ugarte

This paper analyses the rise of the Far Right in Western Europe and the widespread political, social and scholarly concern due to the extremist parties’ recent electoral performances. It holds that, already since the late 1980s, we are witnessing a new (third) “wave” of right-wing extremism in several European countries —with some of these parties having already undergone electoral and political consolidation— and joins other contributions that approach the issue of their “mainstreaming” process. It presents some data on the Far Right’s electoral and political evolution, which seem to confirm that some mainstreaming did take place in the decades between the 1980s and the 2000s. However, more recently the immigration issue and the “refugees’ crisis” seem to have prompted the radicalisation of many (if not all) of these parties, and even of some parties which were not thought to be extremist. The paper reflects on this process of alleged radicalisation of the Far Right. The conclusion speculates on its future evolution and highlights future avenues for research.Received: 23 February 2018 Accepted: 8 May 2018 Published online: 31 October 2018

1999 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 299-316 ◽  
Author(s):  
HANS-GEORG BETZ

Herbert Kitschelt in collaboration with Anthony J. McGann, The Radical Right in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 323 pp., $49.50, ISBN 0-472-10663-5.Peter Merkl and Leonard Weinberg (eds.), The Revival of Right Wing Extremism in the 90s (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 304 pp., £18.50/$24.50, ISBN 0-714-64207-X.Urs Altermatt and Hanspeter Kriesi, L'Extrême droite en Suisse. Organisations et radicalisation au cours des années quatre-vingt et quatre-vingt-dix (Fribourg: Les Éditions Universitaires, 1995), 293 pp. (pb.), SFr. 42.00, ISBN 2-827-10727-9.Mike Cronin (ed.), The Failure of British Fascism. The Far Right and the Fight for Political Recognition (London: Macmillan, 1996), 182 pp. (hb.), £35.00, ISBN 0-333-58438-4.Gerhard Feldbauer, Von Mussolini bis Fini. Die Extreme Rechte in Italien (Berlin: Elefanten Press, 1996), 224 pp. (pb.), DM 29.40, ISBN 3-885-20575-0.Helmut Reinalter, Franko Petri and Rüdiger Kaufmann (eds.), Das Weltbild des Rechtsextremismus. Entsolidarisierung und Bedrohng der Demokratie. Gesellschaftliche Bedingungen, Strukturen und Wirkungen rechtsextremen Denkens (Innsbruck/Vienna: Studienverlag, 1998), 576 pp., DM 82.00, ISBN 3-706-51258-0.Tore Bjørgo, Racist and Right-Wing Violence in Scandinavia: Patterns, Perpetrators, and Responses (Oslo: Tano-Aschehoug, 1997), 386 pp., Kr 298.00, ISBN 8-251-83665-4.Jeffrey Kaplan and Tore Bjørgo (eds.), Nation and Race: The Development of a Euro-American Racist Subculture (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1998), 273 pp. (pb.), £19.00, ISBN 1-555-53331-0.


Fascism ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nigel Copsey

The political science community would have us believe that since the 1980s something entirely detached from historical or neo-fascism has emerged in (Western) Europe - a populist radicalization of mainstream concerns - a novel form of ‘radical right-wing populism.’ Yet the concept of ‘radical right-wing populism’ is deeply problematic because it suggests that (Western) Europe’s contemporary far right has become essentially different from forms of right-wing extremism that preceded it, and from forms of right-wing extremism that continue to exist alongside it. Such an approach, as this First Lecture on Fascism argues, fails to appreciate the critical role that neo-fascism has played, and still plays, in adapting Europe’s contemporary far right to the norms and realities of multi-ethnic, liberal-democratic society. Political scientists should fixate less on novelty and the quest for neat typologies, and instead engage far more seriously with (neo) fascism studies.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (24) ◽  
pp. 11-45
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Izak

Kryzys imigracyjny w 2015 r. stał się motorem dla ruchów i partii negujących dotychczasowy porządek polityczny, także tych, które nie ukrywają swoich ksenofobicznych haseł i idei. Z perspektywy czasu jest coraz więcej oznak, że decyzja o niekontrolowanym przyjęciu uchodźców była bardziej wyrazem myślenia życzeniowego niż racjonalnym rozstrzygnięciem uwzględniającym rzeczywistą sytuację polityczną. Tym samym Europa znalazła się w niebezpiecznej sytuacji, kiedy to z jednej strony rosną w siłę ruchy skrajnie prawicowe, a z drugiej – radykalny islam. Każda z tych formacji legitymizuje swoje istnienie i metody działania istnieniem drugiej strony, a także próbuje doprowadzić do polaryzacji społeczeństwa i stworzenia takiej sytuacji, która niejako wymusi na obywatelach opowiedzenie się po stronie którejś z tych formacji. Paradoksalnie, decyzja kanclerz Merkel znacznie zwiększyła ryzyko wystąpienia takiego scenariusza, dlatego też niemieckie władze postrzegają i islamski, i prawicowy ekstremizm jako stwarzające jednakowe zagrożenie bezpieczeństwa państwa. Jednak dopiero ostatnie zamachy terrorystyczne w październiku i listopadzie 2020 r. we Francji i Niemczech przyczyniły się do zmiany politycznej narracji. Changes in the perception of immigration, integration, multiculturalism and threats of Islamic radicalism in certain EU member states The 2015 immigration crisis became a driving force for movements and parties that negate the current political order, including those that do not conceal their xenophobic slogans and ideas. In retrospect, there are more and more signs that the decision to accept the uncontrolled refugee influx was more an expression of wishful thinking than a rational decision, taking into account the actual political situation. Thus, Europe finds itself in a dangerous situation with far-right movements on the one hand, and radical Islam on the other. Each of these formations legitimizes its existence and methods of operation by the existence of the other side, trying to polarize society and create a situation that will somehow force citizens to opt for one of the two options. Paradoxically, Chancellor Merkel’s decision significantly increased the risk of such a scenario, hence the perception of Islamic and right-wing extremism by the German authorities as posing an equal threat to state security. However, it was only the recent terrorist attacks in October and November 2020 in France and Germany that changed the political narrative.


Significance The government consists largely of newcomers and politicians with dubious links to the far right. It embarks upon a five-year reform programme for Austria which is thin on detail but could lead to radical changes. Impacts A tougher stance on migrants and asylum seekers could foster a wider reluctance in some EU states to accept refugees. Major constitutional changes are unlikely as the government would need the support of the SPOe or the small Neos party. Any extreme right-wing tendencies will concern Brussels and Israel, which will keep a close eye on the government. Austria will be an unpredictable ally, sometimes siding with Macron and at other times favouring alliances with Eastern European countries. The SPOe’s loss of office could lead to changes in personnel and programmatic position.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (24) ◽  
pp. 375-403
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Izak

The 2015 immigration crisis became a driving force for movements and parties that negate the current political order, including those that do not conceal their xenophobic slogans and ideas. In retrospect, there are more and more signs that the decision to accept the uncontrolled refugee influx was more an expression of wishful thinking than a rational decision, taking into account the actual political situation. Thus, Europe finds itself in a dangerous situation with far-right movements on the one hand, and radical Islam on the other. Each of these formations legitimises its existence and methods of operation by the existence of the other side, trying to polarise society and create a situation that will somehow force citizens to opt for one of the two options. Paradoxically, Chancellor Merkel’s decision to admit immigrants significantly increased the risk of such a scenario, hence the perception of Islamic and right-wing extremism by the German authorities as posing an equal threat to state security. However, it was only the recent terrorist attacks in October and November 2020 in France and Germany that changed the political narrative.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Tylah Fitzgerald

<p>Islamic extremism (IE) and right-wing extremism (RWE) are the two most common ideological motivations for perpetrating lone-actor terrorism in the West. This study explored the similarities and differences of these ideologies by coding for specific attack and personal characteristics of attacks that occurred between 2010-2017 in Western Europe, Australia, and North America. Lone-actor terrorism included attacks perpetrated by individuals, as well as isolated dyads and triads. A codebook was developed to capture the attack and personal characteristics, and data was obtained from media and other open-source reporting. The dataset included a total of 99 cases perpetrated by 102 individual actors. The study found that lone-actor attacks perpetrated by IE and RWE had increased significantly over the time period studied. Some key significant differences were found: IE were more likely to be an immigrant to the country of attack they were born in, were more likely to target civilians, and their plots or extremist activity were more visible to law enforcement and intelligence agencies, while RWE were more likely to be single, more likely to target social minorities less likely to have experienced tertiary level education or higher, less likely to have children, and are significantly older than IEs. However, for the majority of variables there were no significant differences between IE and RWE, including variables that may indicate strain in a perpetrator’s life (mental health, social isolation and experience of stressful events), indicating that overall the attacks perpetrated by individuals of the two ideologies share more commonalities than differences.</p>


2020 ◽  
pp. 147490412094789
Author(s):  
Anja Giudici

Since the 1980s, right-wing extremism, radicalism, and populism have emerged as transformative forces in European politics. This unexpected resurgence has triggered an interdisciplinary scholarly effort to refine our understanding of the far right. Educationalists, however, have largely been absent from this endeavour, leaving us unable to theorise and address the potential effects of the far right’s political and cultural growth on European education. This article aims to provide an empirically based conceptional groundwork for educational research on the far right. Drawing on archival research and content analysis of programmatic material produced by diverse and influential far-right organisations in France, (West) Germany, and Italy, I show that the post-war European far right disposes of the two essential features of a social movement: an action-oriented frame that reduces educational reforms to a common contentious theme, and a dense organisational network. The latter engages in institutional and contentious politics, as well as education. Theoretically, these findings suggest that, in the realm of education, the far right ought to be conceptualised as a social movement that seeks to influence education policy, and represents itself an educational actor. Addressing the far right’s multifaceted educational engagement thus requires a combined effort across European education research.


Author(s):  
Nitzan Shoshan

This chapter examines how Germany's young right-wing extremists articulate their relations to cultural and ethnicized difference as they discursively constitute their own political selves, focusing in particular on their identification and self-identification as easterners. It considers some developments that have reshaped the extreme right in Germany over the past couple of decades, paying attention to the contemporary legacy of the East–West divide in the post-reunification era and its political significance both nationally and, more specifcally, for the young right-wing extremists. It also analyzes the vulnerability of Ossis (East Germans) to right-wing extremism right-wing extremism in today's Germany and concludes with a discussion of important trends that have reconfigured far right nationalism across the Continent, including Germany, in recent decades.


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