One and the Same? An Exploration into Two Common Ideological Motivations for Lone-Actor Terror Attacks in the West Between 2010-2017

<p>Islamic extremism (IE) and right-wing extremism (RWE) are the two most common ideological motivations for perpetrating lone-actor terrorism in the West. This study explored the similarities and differences of these ideologies by coding for specific attack and personal characteristics of attacks that occurred between 2010-2017 in Western Europe, Australia, and North America. Lone-actor terrorism included attacks perpetrated by individuals, as well as isolated dyads and triads. A codebook was developed to capture the attack and personal characteristics, and data was obtained from media and other open-source reporting. The dataset included a total of 99 cases perpetrated by 102 individual actors. The study found that lone-actor attacks perpetrated by IE and RWE had increased significantly over the time period studied. Some key significant differences were found: IE were more likely to be an immigrant to the country of attack they were born in, were more likely to target civilians, and their plots or extremist activity were more visible to law enforcement and intelligence agencies, while RWE were more likely to be single, more likely to target social minorities less likely to have experienced tertiary level education or higher, less likely to have children, and are significantly older than IEs. However, for the majority of variables there were no significant differences between IE and RWE, including variables that may indicate strain in a perpetrator’s life (mental health, social isolation and experience of stressful events), indicating that overall the attacks perpetrated by individuals of the two ideologies share more commonalities than differences.</p>

One and the Same? An Exploration into Two Common Ideological Motivations for Lone-Actor Terror Attacks in the West Between 2010-2017

<p>Islamic extremism (IE) and right-wing extremism (RWE) are the two most common ideological motivations for perpetrating lone-actor terrorism in the West. This study explored the similarities and differences of these ideologies by coding for specific attack and personal characteristics of attacks that occurred between 2010-2017 in Western Europe, Australia, and North America. Lone-actor terrorism included attacks perpetrated by individuals, as well as isolated dyads and triads. A codebook was developed to capture the attack and personal characteristics, and data was obtained from media and other open-source reporting. The dataset included a total of 99 cases perpetrated by 102 individual actors. The study found that lone-actor attacks perpetrated by IE and RWE had increased significantly over the time period studied. Some key significant differences were found: IE were more likely to be an immigrant to the country of attack they were born in, were more likely to target civilians, and their plots or extremist activity were more visible to law enforcement and intelligence agencies, while RWE were more likely to be single, more likely to target social minorities less likely to have experienced tertiary level education or higher, less likely to have children, and are significantly older than IEs. However, for the majority of variables there were no significant differences between IE and RWE, including variables that may indicate strain in a perpetrator’s life (mental health, social isolation and experience of stressful events), indicating that overall the attacks perpetrated by individuals of the two ideologies share more commonalities than differences.</p>

TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE ISLAMIC EXTREMISM AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE “ISLAMIC STATE” (FROM THE END OF 20TH CENTURY TILL 2014)

The Islamic extremism has deep roots in the Middle East. They were especially active towards the end of the 20th century and in the first and second decades of the 21st century. They took on a new nature with the terrorist acts against the US on September 11 in 2001. In the mid-2000s new and dangerous trends of the Islamic extremism became evident in the Middle East, which became visible in Syria with the declaration of the “Islamic State” (IS) in 2014.

De-extremization Effort through Political Re-education Camps In China

The rise of Islamic extremism has prompted global Islamophobia and general hatred for Muslims, which is felt towards both the religion itself and ethno-religious groups such as the one present in China. The spread and acts of Islamic extremism in China might surprise the global community but the concerning level of threat on the issue affected domestic security policies. In explaining the case study, the qualitative research uses a combination of descriptive and explanatory approaches while simultaneously merging the three constructivist theory approaches from notable scholars such as Alexander Wendt, Martha Finnemore and Peter Katzenstein. The research concludes that while there may be variations of methods to combat Islamic extremism, the implementation of political re-education camp for the Uyghurs seems to be the best and most effective method in both de-extremizing the minority group from potential Islamic extremist ideology and enforcing the Chinese government’s interests. Justifications of the choice include the constructivist aspects of the international norms, repetition of historical and existing trajectories as well as the successful rate of cleansing troubled and infected people from negative ideologies based on the Chinese societal norms.

Ideology and Religion: A Balancing Act

This chapter reviews MBS and MBZ’s carefully balanced stances on various ideologies and religious issues, including their general reluctance to subscribe to popular regional ideologies and their primarily counter-ideological viewpoints. Firstly, their relatively strong positions against Islamic extremism and political Islam are considered, including their overall efforts to push back against organizations such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, and their attempts to marginalize local branches of the Muslim Brotherhood and its fellow travelers. However, it is also noted that in certain circumstances--especially in foreign conflicts such as Yemen and Libya--MBS and MBZ have proven willing to co-operate with, and in some cases even co-opt, such groups. Secondly, in the context of responding to perceived threats while also contributing to key economic and military objectives, their preference for promoting ‘state nationalism’ (as opposed to pan-Arab nationalism) is discussed, including their emphasis on building up more distinct Saudi and Emirati national identities, and their selective focus on western-friendly ‘liberal engineering’. Finally, their attempts to introduce secular liberal reforms and push for greater religious tolerance are studied, including their necessary curtailment of certain traditional practices, and (especially in Saudi Arabia) their strict supervision and in some cases repression of conservative religious establishments.

The theology of non-violenct Islamic education based on Al-Sira Al-Nabawiyya

Al-Sira Al-Nabawiyya is often used as a reference to violence in Islam, mainly because war narration is so dominantly displayed. The tendency of using Al-Sira Al-Nabawiyya as the basis of violence conception in Islam drives Islamic teaching practices to become violence-oriented. This article presents a re-reading of Al-Sira Al-Nabawiyya by Wakhiduddin Khan, Tariq Ramadan and Satha-Anand, with a mimetic anthropology framework. The reading on Al-Sira resulted in three conclusions. Firstly, there are many non-violence stories at all stages in the life of Prophet Muhammad, since the pre-prophetic era until his death. Secondly, the Prophet Muhammad was a teacher who based his activities on the principles of tawhîd, patience, love, forgiveness and appreciation for humanity. Thirdly, educational activities are Muhammad’s exemplary activities which are full of non-violent values. The findings of this article can be used as the basis for the reformulation of Al-Sira Al-Nabawiyya teaching materials in Islamic Education as well as the basis of teaching activities for Islamic teachers.Contribution: This article contributes to a paradigm shift in teaching the History of the Prophet Muhammad in a peaceful Islamic education system. The peaceful paradigm in this article can also divert the tendency of Islamic extremism to become an Islam that provides peace and prosperity to the universe (rahmatan lil ‘alamin).

Ideological Extremism among Syrian Refugees Is Negatively Related to Intentions to Migrate to the West

The conflict in Syria created a dire humanitarian situation, as nations around the world struggled with how best to deal with the more than 6.6 million Syrian refugees that fled their homes to escape aggression. Resistance to granting refugee status to individuals often originates in the belief that the influx of refugees endangers national security because of the presumably extremist religious and political beliefs refugees hold. The present research surveyed Syrian refugees residing in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq (N = 1,000). The results revealed that the majority of surveyed refugees did not intend to migrate to the West and would rather return to their home country. More importantly, refugees most interested in moving to Western countries were the least likely to subscribe to Islamic extremism, or to harbor negative sentiment toward the West. Theoretical and practical implications for addressing the current refugee crisis are discussed.

Women in Violent Extremism in Sweden

This presentation summarizes a register-based study on women who have been identified as belonging to three violent extremist milieus in Sweden: violent Islamic, violent far-right, and violent far-left extremism. We studied the women in these milieus along a number of analytical dimensions, ranging from demographic and educational to criminal background and network relationships, and compared them to three reference groups: (i) non-extremist biological sisters to female extremists in the study population; (ii) men in the respective extremist milieus; and (iii) female members of other antagonistic milieus such as organized crime. Our results showed that there are both similarities and differences between groups. In some cases, like age and region of birth, there are commonalities between violent far-right and violent far-left women. Regarding region of birth and migration background, women affiliated to violent far-right and violent far-left extremism are predominantly born in Sweden. Women affiliated to violent Islamic extremism tend to be born in Sweden to a greater extent than men in the same milieu, but to a much lesser degree than women in the violent far-right and violent far-left. When it comes to education, women in the violent Islamic milieu are closer to women in violent far-right extremism. Women in violent far-left extremism perform best at school, with consistently higher grades. The average score of women in violent far-left extremism is identical to that of their sisters, and women in violent far-left extremism perform on average substantially better than men in the same milieu. Women in violent Islamic extremism, in contrast, perform on average similarly to men in violent far-left extremism, and they perform better than their biological sisters. Regarding labor market attachment, violent Islamic extremists have the weakest attachment and the highest dependency upon financial assistance as well as a low employment share (36 percent in 2016), but also a relatively high share of individuals with a high number of unemployment days, suggesting that women in violent Islamic extremism experience higher social exclusion. We find the highest employment share among women in violent far-left extremism, where 89 percent are gainfully employed in 2016 (80 percent for at least three of the last five years) and about a 20 percent unemployment share. Men in violent far-left extremism have an employment share around 10 percent below that of the women in far-left extremism for 2016. The highest fractions of individuals that have not been in contact with the health system due to mental disorders are among violent Islamic extremism, with the women’s fraction at 84 percent, compared to their non-extremist sisters and men in the same milieu that are just above 79 percent. Women in violent far-left extremism have the highest share of in-patient major mental disorders among the extremist milieus (3 percent), higher than men in the same milieu (less than 1 percent) as well as than women and their sisters in the other categories. During the period 2007–2016, 68 percent of individuals in the extremist milieus are covered by the register of suspected individuals. The coverage is substantially higher for men, 72 percent than for women, 43 percent. Compared to their sisters, women in all three milieus are criminally active to a much higher extent. However, women in all three milieus are less criminally active than women in other antagonistic milieus, among whom 67 percent have been suspected at least once. In all three milieus, the share of men with a criminal record is about twice as large as that of women. As far as the gender aspect is concerned, we know that extremist milieus generally have a conservative view of the role of women in society. In our results, this is reflected in the low rates of crime in women compared to men, and relatively marginal positions in the co-offending networks. The fact that women in violent far-left extremism have stronger positions in their networks than the other women in the study population is expected, given that the ideology of this milieu allows for greater equality. This means that women in violent far-left extremism participate more often than, e.g., women in violent far-right extremism, in political actions where violence is common. This pattern of gender roles and criminal involvement also holds concerning women in violent Islamic extremism. This milieu has a more traditional view of the role of women than views among even violent far-right extremists. Women in violent Islamic extremism are less involved in crime and, in particular, violent crime.

Islamic Extremism

On November 25, 2020, Dr. Rizwan Mustafa presented Islamic Extremism at the 2020 CASIS West Coast Security Conference. The presentation was followed by a question and answer period with other speakers. The key points of discussion focused on why understanding the Muslim worldview is important in understanding terrorism, the concept of Jihad and terrorism, and the faith proposition of the Qur’an.