scholarly journals El Derecho a la Intimidad y a la Protección de Datos Personales en el Ámbito Laboral

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (13) ◽  
pp. 357-385
Author(s):  
Antonio Felipe Delgado Jiménez

The balancing function, between worker and employer, of the fundamental rights in the field of the labor relationship is analyzed, while emphasizing that the right to privacy is not an unlimited right, but that it can yield to other constitutional rights. Likewise, the right to the protection of personal data is studied – distinguishing it from the right to personal privacy – which aims to guarantee the freedom of the individual in relation to their self-determination regarding the processing of their personal data by third parties.

2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-214
Author(s):  
Adrienn Lukács

Nowadays social media have a growing importance in several areas of our lives. They are used for numerous objectives: self-expression, keeping in touch with acquaintances, communication or obtaining information about the latest events and news. During their use the individual shares a significant amount of personal data. This conduct can have serious implications for employment. The (prospective) employer is interested in the surveillance of these sites for several reasons, as he/she can easily gain insight into the individual’s private life and obtain, without costs, detailed information about him/her. The legal problem arising is that the employee’s fundamental rights – namely the right to privacy and the right to data protection – collide with the employer’s legitimate interests.The aim of the paper is to highlight the different rights and interests present on the two sides of the parties in the employment relationship; focusing on the employee’s right to data protection and on the employer’s legitimate interests in monitoring employees. As a result of the paper, I will draw attention to the legal problems lying behind social network background checks and monitoring. I will provide recommendations on how users and employers can continue using these sites while still preserving privacy.


Author(s):  
Анастасия Юрьевна Сивцова

В статье приводится анализ источников, регламентирующих процесс регламентации персональных данных, анализ норм российских нормативных правовых актов, закрепляющих основные права человека и гражданина, основные конституционные права осужденных на жизнь, здоровье. Автором поясняются некоторые аспекты нормативного регулирования понятия «персональные данные осужденных», право на личную жизнь. На основе научного анализа мнений ученых-юристов автором выстраивается логическая цепочка нормативного регламентирования заявленных дефиниций. В ключевом выводе по данной работе автором дается определение категории информации в следующей трактовке: персональные данные в отношении лиц, содержащихся в следственных изоляторах и осужденных к лишению свободы, - любая информация, относящаяся к прямо или косвенно определенному или определяемому подозреваемому, обвиняемому или осужденному, включающая в себя сведения о частной жизни, связях с родственниками и друзьями, пристрастиях, половой идентификации и предпочтениях, социальном и финансовом положении, о взглядах и убеждениях, о состоянии здоровья, в том числе совокупность информации, способная привести к идентификации осужденного. Предлагается авторская классификация персональных данных специальных субъектов. The article provides an analysis of the sources that regulate the process of regulating personal data, an analysis of the norms of Russian normative legal acts that reflect the basic human and civil rights, the basic constitutional rights of convicts to life and health. The author explains some aspects of the statutory regulation of the concept of "personal data of convicts", the right to privacy. Based on the scientific analysis of the opinions of legal scholars, the author builds a logical chain of statutory regulation of the stated definitions. In the key conclusion of this work, the author defines the category of information in the following interpretation: personal data in relation to persons held in pre-trial detention centers and sentenced to imprisonment - any information related directly or indirectly to a certain or identifiable person, suspect, accused or convicted person, including information about private life, relationships with relatives and friends, addictions, sexual identification and preferences, social and financial status, views and beliefs, health status, including a set of information that can lead to the identification of the convicted person. The author's classification of personal data of special subjects is proposed.


Author(s):  
William Bülow ◽  
Misse Wester

As information technology is becoming an integral part of modern society, there is a growing concern that too much data containing personal information is stored by different actors in society and that this could potentially be harmful for the individual. The aim of this contribution is to show how the extended use of ICT can affect the individual’s right to privacy and how the public perceives risks to privacy. Three points are raised in this chapter: first, if privacy is important from a philosophical perspective, how is this demonstrated by empirical evidence? Do individuals trust the different actors that control their personal information, and is there a consensus that privacy can and should be compromised in order to reach another value? Second, if compromises in privacy are warranted by increased safety, is this increased security supported by empirical evidence? Third, the authors will argue that privacy can indeed be a means to increase the safety of citizens and that the moral burden of ensuring and protecting privacy is a matter for policy makers, not individuals. In conclusion, the authors suggest that more nuanced discussion on the concepts of privacy and safety should be acknowledged and the importance of privacy must be seen as an important objective in the development and structure of ICT uses.


2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aart C. Hendriks ◽  
Rachèl E. van Hellemondt

The Netherlands does not have any specific legislation pertaining to human biological materials and data collection by biobanks. Instead, these issues are governed by a patchwork of laws, codes of practices, and other ethical instruments, where special emphasis is given to the right to privacy and self-determination. While draft legislation for biobanking was scheduled to enter into force in 2007, as of mid-2015 such legislation was still under consideration, with the intent that it would focus particularly on individual self-determination, the interests of research, the use of bodily materials collected by biobanks for criminal law purposes, and dilemmas around results that are clinically relevant for biobank participants. Under the current framework, the amount of privacy protection afforded to data is linked to its level of identifiability. International sharing of personal data to non-EU/European Economic Area countries is allowed if these countries provide adequate protection.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (05) ◽  
pp. 722-733 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentin M. Pfisterer

AbstractIn recent years, the CJEU has impressively brought to bear the protection of the fundamental rights to privacy and protection of personal data as contained in the CFREU. The Court’s decisions in the Digital Rights, Schrems, Tele2, and PNR cases have reshaped the political and legal landscape in Europe and beyond. By restricting the powers of the governments of EU Member States and annulling legislative acts enacted by the EU legislator, the decisions had, and continue to have, effects well beyond the respective individual cases. Despite their strong impact on privacy and data protection across Europe, however, these landmark decisions reveal a number of flaws and inconsistencies in the conceptualization of the rights to privacy and protection of personal data as endorsed and interpreted by the CJEU. This Article identifies and discusses some of the shortcomings revealed in the recent CJEU privacy and data protection landmark decisions and proposes to the CJEU a strategy aimed at resolving these shortcomings going forward.


2016 ◽  
Vol 64 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Abbt

AbstractThe notion of ‘forgetting’ has assumed a new dimension in the digital age. Here I will examine a particular kind of forgetting as reflected in a ruling of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). What the ruling of the ECJ of May 13, 2014 (C-131/12) formulates and invokes as a “right to be forgotten” encompasses the right to co-determine whether certain personal data in the Web should immediately show up or not when a first name and surname is entered as part of a search. When a user has invoked the “right to be forgotten”, and it is determined that it applies, information is, however, not made irretrievable. It continues to remain possible to find this information in a roundabout way, i.e., by means of more precise search queries, although the information should not immediately become visible the moment a person’s full name is typed into a search engine. I will argue that this ruling can be seen as corroborating the fundamental rights of the individual. The idea of the “right to be forgotten” is to give a person a second chance in society. Not all forms of forgetting and remembering can be subsumed under this idea. As will be expounded, this court decision offers a useful normative fundament for the distinction between (1) legitimate attempts at reintegration, (2) legitimate attempts at rehabilitation and (3) unjustified recourse to a right to be forgotten.


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 16-29
Author(s):  
Andrea Erdősová

It is essential to address in particular the comprehensive prevention of breaches of the right to informational self-determination and whether the persons concerned are aware that they “voluntarily agree” to pass on their identity information to third parties. It is alarming nowadays what amount of private data are available at their disposal for companies or private persons regarding other persons and how easy it seems to obtain this data. In today’s information age and the era of more advanced use of artificial intelligence, it will be more necessary than in the past to define what the individual intended, what he agreed with, and what he eventually approved as data privacy.In order to ensure the protection of the individual and his/her privacy, it is therefore necessary to respond to and refine the existing sources of law, especially to establish codes of ethics taking into account the modern technological and social development.


2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Barnert ◽  
Natascha Doll

On January 15th 1958, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court - FCC) pronounced a judgement deemed to be a prime example for the Court's early jurisprudence concerning the scope of fundamental rights in Germany: The Court's famous “Lüth”-decision resulted from a constitutional complaint brought by Erich Lüth, former member of the Hamburg senate.* In the early 1950s, Lüth had called upon film distributors and the public to boycott Veit Harlan's tearjerker movie Unsterbliche Geliebte (Immortal Beloved). Cause for his appeal was Harlan's prominent role in the Nazi propaganda machinery as Goebbels' protégé and director of the movie Jud Süss in 1940, which counts as one of the worst anti-semitic films released during the Nazi regime. After having lost several civil lawsuits, Lüth asserted the violation of constitutional rights. Over six years later, he was to be proved correct: The Federal Constitutional Court ruled that Lüth's complaint was covered by the right to freedom of speech guaranteed in Art. 5 of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz). The Court stated that the fundamental rights as laid down in the Grundgesetz are not only of importance as subjective rights protecting the individual against state intrusions on the private sphere. As a whole they also unfold an objective dimension in representing society's crucial values. Therefore, they govern the entire legal order - including civil law and private law relations! This was indeed understood as a staggering conclusion with which the Court went far beyond the issue at stake. Since Lüth, German legal discourse characterizes this phenomenon as the third-party or horizontal effect of basic rights (Drittwirkung).


2014 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 569-597 ◽  
Author(s):  
Orla Lynskey

AbstractArticle 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights sets out a right to data protection which sits alongside, and in addition to, the established right to privacy in the Charter. The Charter's inclusion of an independent right to data protection differentiates it from other international human rights documents which treat data protection as a subset of the right to privacy. Its introduction and its relationship with the established right to privacy merit an explanation. This paper explores the relationship between the rights to data protection and privacy. It demonstrates that, to date, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has consistently conflated the two rights. However, based on a comparison between the scope of the two rights as well as the protection they offer to individuals whose personal data are processed, it claims that the two rights are distinct. It argues that the right to data protection provides individuals with more rights over more types of data than the right to privacy. It suggests that the enhanced control over personal data provided by the right to data protection serves two purposes: first, it proactively promotes individual personality rights which are threatened by personal data processing and, second, it reduces the power and information asymmetries between individuals and those who process their data. For these reasons, this paper suggests that there ought to be explicit judicial recognition of the distinction between the two rights.


Author(s):  
Vitalii Serohin

The paper attempts to expose the basic concepts of informational privacy reflected in Western jurisprudence, as well as to outline the author's vision of the content and scope of informational privacy, to distinguish the relevant powers from which this right consists, to reveal its place and role from the standpoint of system-structural approach. It is noted that in the modern scientific literature, dedicated to ensuring the privacy and respect for his / her privacy, clearly distinguishes two main approaches to understanding the informational advantage - broad and narrow. Proponents of the narrow approach consider the primes solely in the informational aspect, and other constituents (physical, visual, phonetic privacy, etc.) tend to relate to the content of other fundamental rights. However, one group of authors interprets information privacy as the right of the person to control their personal data, while the second group considers it more rational and efficient to consider information pricing as the right of ownership of personal data. Attempting to unite both camps of supporters of a narrow interpretation of the information front is the Restricted Access / Limited Control (RALC) theory. Proponents of the broad-based approach view information primacy as important, but only one of the many substantive elements of constitutional law in favor. At the same time, the authors' exit beyond the information sphere when considering the content of the precedence can be considered progressive and more consistent with the essence of this right and its purpose in ensuring personal freedom and autonomy. In view of the author, revealing the content of the right to privacy, it should be borne in mind that the object of this right includes several areas (aspects), in each of which a person may be in different states of privacy, and the privacy itself has certain measurements. On this basis, information is regarded by the author as an element of the constitutional right of privacy, distinguished by the aspects of privacy and the form (method) of its objectification. Unlike other aspects of privacy, the informational aspect is detached from the physical body of the individual and exists independently, and relevant information continues to exist even after the death of the individual. Therefore, even the death of a person does not make sense of the information associated with that person, and sometimes even enhances its value and significance. It is noted that unlike other aspects of the case, information privacy has no states (such as loneliness, intimacy, anonymity, etc.); it merely provides information protection for such states and does not allow them to be disclosed without the consent of the entity itself.


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