Biometric Authentication in the Digital Age

The increased use of biometric traits to digitally authenticate people has the potential to conveniently and accurately grant or deny individual access to information and services. Unlike passwords or smart cards that are also used to authenticate a user, biometrics are not replaceable if lost or stolen—yet there are no universal rights protecting people against unauthorized use of their biometrics. Moreover, there are no clear accommodation rights for users who might not be able to provide some biometrics, for example due to cultural reasons or because of a disability. If users cannot be guaranteed the recovery of stolen biometrics, do people have a right to only provide those biometrics that cannot be stolen? While biometric technology by itself does not raise intrinsic ethical issues, the authors identify a number of extrinsic ethical arguments about the ethical status of applications of this technology and its consequences, namely, those that are linked to distributive justice issues and risk. They explore some of these concerns and discuss strategies to mitigate them within the context of balancing the rights of individuals and the need to ensure collective security.

The Right to Privacy and the Protection of Personal Data in a Digital Era and the Age of Information

As information technology is becoming an integral part of modern society, there is a growing concern that too much data containing personal information is stored by different actors in society and that this could potentially be harmful for the individual. The aim of this contribution is to show how the extended use of ICT can affect the individual’s right to privacy and how the public perceives risks to privacy. Three points are raised in this chapter: first, if privacy is important from a philosophical perspective, how is this demonstrated by empirical evidence? Do individuals trust the different actors that control their personal information, and is there a consensus that privacy can and should be compromised in order to reach another value? Second, if compromises in privacy are warranted by increased safety, is this increased security supported by empirical evidence? Third, the authors will argue that privacy can indeed be a means to increase the safety of citizens and that the moral burden of ensuring and protecting privacy is a matter for policy makers, not individuals. In conclusion, the authors suggest that more nuanced discussion on the concepts of privacy and safety should be acknowledged and the importance of privacy must be seen as an important objective in the development and structure of ICT uses.

The (Rebuttable) Presumption of the European Union Member States as ‘Safe Countries’ under the Dublin Regulation

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze a particular aspect of the so-called Dublin Regulation, whose aim is to determine the European Union (EU) Member State responsible for examining an asylum application, that is, the presumption that the EU Member States are “safe countries.” Although the notion of “safe country” is on the base of the Dublin Regulation functioning mechanism, as it implies that any EU Member States can transfer an asylum seeker to any other EU country which is responsible, the authors contend that the safety of an EU Member State can be given as presumed for the purpose of asylum seekers. The analysis of the present work starts, firstly, with the examination of the notion of “safe country” under the Dublin Regulation. In the second part, relying on the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECHR) case-law, it will be discussed to what extent the Court of Strasbourg clarifies the notion of “safe countries” and the test it applies to it. Finally, the Commission’s proposal for a recasting of the Dublin Regulation will be analysed with the aim of foresee possible future developments of the EU law mechanisms to rebut such a presumption as applied to the EU Member States. It will emerge that in order to assess the safety of an EU Member State, attention has to be given to the prohibition of both direct and indirect refoulement as well as to the effective remedy at the EU Member State’s domestic level.

State Aid Control in the Broadcasting Sector

The application of the State aid rules to public service broadcasting has never been a straightforward exercise for the European Commission (hereafter the Commission). The picture became more complex in the digital era in light of the expansion of public broadcasting organizations to new media markets. Yet, in spite of the challenges it faced, the Commission has not limited itself to a marginal compatibility assessment checking solely whether the provision of related services outweighs the harm to competition. Through its decision-making and the adoption of a soft law instrument, the Broadcasting Communication, the Commission gradually managed to inject into national schemes supporting broadcasting activities its own perspective of “good” State aid policy. This chapter discusses the impact that the Commission State aid practice has had on national systems and reflects on whether the latter has struck the right balance between the conflicting values involved, namely competition and public service broadcasting. The chapter argues that, while in several instances the Commission went beyond the Treaty letter, its control over relevant State measures has contributed substantially to ensuring a level playing field between public broadcasters and commercial undertakings operating in the wider context of the media market.

Private Power and New Media

The focus of this chapter will be the recent conduct of various corporations in withdrawing Internet services provided to information portal WikiLeaks in light of the controversy surrounding WikiLeaks’ publishing classified documents of correspondence between the US State Department and its diplomatic missions around the world in late 2010. The implications for freedom of expression (especially the right to access information) on the Internet will be examined in the wake of WikiLeaks, particularly in the context of the infringer being a private actor, and one comprising a mono- or oligopoly. The motivation of these private actors in contributing to the suppression of WikiLeaks will be assessed to examine whether it constitutes an example of Birnhack and Elkin-Koren’s “invisible handshake,” i.e. the “emerging collaboration” between the state and multinational corporations on the Internet that they posit is producing “the ultimate threat.” The legal recourse open to WikiLeaks and its users for the infringement of fundamental rights will be examined, especially the First Amendment to the US Constitution since the geographic location for these events has mostly been the USA. Finally, the postscript to the WikiLeaks controversy will be considered: the “information warfare” conducted by hackers will be examined to determine whether the exercise of power of these Internet corporations in a way which infringes fundamental rights can be checked by technological means, and whether hackers are indeed the true electronic defenders of freedom of expression.

Assessing the Evaluation of the EC Data Retention Directive

The focus of this chapter is the first evaluation of European legislation designed to harmonise domestic laws on the retention of telecommunications data for the purpose of assisting law enforcement efforts. The European Union introduced the EC Data Retention Directive in 2006. This Directive requires the retention of every European citizen’s communications data for up to two years for the purpose of investigation, detection, and prosecution of serious crime, as defined by each Member State in their domestic legislation. The Directive was the source of considerable unease amongst legislators, Data Protection authorities, and the private sector. This chapter analyses the results provided in this evaluation on the use and operation of the Directive by individual Member States of the EU.

Balancing Digital Freedoms and Digital Liberties

This chapter focuses on consumer and human rights through technological application in today’s globalized world. Being a well-versed citizen of technology provides better understanding of restrictions and limitations of protections as well as securities. Companies, corporations, countries, individuals, and unsuspecting parties may willingly or unwilling neglect freedoms or even place liberties in jeopardy, depending on the statutes in place for protection. In an effort to protect the individual, it is important to safeguard the roles we play as a society in the technological globalized enterprise.

Cultural Property and Identity Issues in International Law

Indigenous peoples have historically experienced countless losses of cultural relics and material and spiritual treasures as well as destruction of their sacred cultural sites, a situation that continues to prevail. This desecration of ancestral sites and pillaging of sacred objects results in the cultural debasement of indigenous peoples, causing a serious threat to their continuing collective existence as distinct societies. Unfortunately, the present international law regime for the protection, repatriation, and return of stolen and illegally exported cultural property presents serious deficiencies as regards its ability to reverse this state of affairs and effectively safeguard indigenous peoples’ heritage.

Human Rights, the Global War on Transnational Terror, and the Mixed Roles of ICT

An international human rights regime is a major motivator of nation-states and peoples in the global war on transnational terror. It sets normative understandings for how citizens are treated—by their own governments, by each other, and by terrorist groups. A human rights regime also serves as a restraint on governments against brutal repressions in response to terrorism because terrorists are considered dissidents in extremis, and in all cases, the rules of law apply to them (and legal findings by governments are necessary before certain police or military actions may be taken). The contested roles of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in this dynamic context vary, but these technologies are used by all sides for their own objectives. This chapter explores the mixed roles of ICT in supporting a global human rights regime, which underpins the global war on transnational terror.

The “Right to be Forgotten” in the Era of Social Media and Cloud Computing

The globalization and ubiquitous character of information in the era of social media and cloud computing has led to a loss of control over individuals’ own data, who face significant difficulties to understand and measure the consequences of the disclosure of their personal information on the Internet, as well as the means and the context in which they are or will be processed. Under the reviewing process of the EU Data Protection Directive, the “right to be forgotten” appears to be the means by which individuals will be able to regain control over their data. However, implementing the new right in the ICT environment and striking the proper balance between conflicting rights, such as the freedom of expression, will not be easy. The purpose of the chapter is to identify the challenges that Web 2.0, Web 3.0, and cloud computing technologies raise, focusing on how these challenges are addressed under the new “right to be forgotten” and providing an insight of the alternative “quasi legal” measures that emerge.