scholarly journals Sztuka zwierząt i „paradygmat siatkówkowy” — czym nie jest estetyka ewolucyjna

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 89-105
Author(s):  
Jerzy Luty

In the article I defend some of the thesis presented in my book ‘Art as Adaptation: Universalism in Evolutionary Aesthetics’ (Sztuka jako adaptacja: uniwersalizm w estetyce ewolucyjnej) (2018) against the claims of my critics. I focus especialy on some misreadings regarding the explanatory power of evolutionary science. I try to show that even though evolutionarily informed aesthetics is not a handy tool for analyzing the intrinsically diverse currents of modern and neo-avant-garde art, it does an excellent job of explaining the mental tendencies and typical behaviors behind these practices. I also focus on the artistic abilities of animals and the problematic dominance of the visuality paradigm in the evolutionary approach, topics that are unjustifiably considered to be most momentous in evolutionary aesthetics.

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-48
Author(s):  
Agnieszka Bandura

In this paper I try to defend contemporary art (avant-garde and post-modern) from the criticism of evolutionary aesthetics. Referring to selected theses put forward by Jerzy Luty in his book Art as Adaptation. Universalism in Evolutionary Aesthetics (2018), I propose an alternative to them in the form of philosophical anthropology (Gehlen) and evolutionary theory considered as bricolage (Jacob). Above all, I challenge the hypotheses of the evolutionarily and biologically adaptive function of art and the condition of pleasure it must necessarily provide.


2012 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johan C. Karremans ◽  
Reine C. van der Wal

AbstractThe target article's evolutionary approach provides an excellent framework for understanding when and why people retaliate or forgive. We argue that recent findings on the basic processes in forgiveness – particularly, the role of executive control – can further refine the authors' proposed model. Specifically, the lack of executive control may restrict the explanatory power of relationship value and exploitation risk.


2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-117
Author(s):  
Jerzy Luty

The criticisms I address in this article provoke questions about the very nature of aesthetic discourse and its relation to scientific approach in art theory. In the article, I try to respond to the author who criticizes me (and evolutionary aesthetics) for disliking avant-garde art and, worse, contemporary aesthetics. I also try to explain that I am not a biological determinist, that I do not consider art an evolutionary adaptation, that I do not practice reductionism, and that I know how evolutionary mechanisms work. I also describe the reasons why the contemporary aesthetics, which the critic represents, is afraid of being scientific, and what this has to do with the need for prestige and belonging to the art world.


Author(s):  
Ekaterina V. Uskova ◽  

The article analyzes naturalistic theories of consciousness in the framework of analytical philosophy. The choice of these theories is due to the monistic interpretation of consciousness in them. This position seems, on the one hand, to be logically sound, and, on the other hand, to have sufficient explanatory power. However, there are weaknesses in this position, some of which are considered in the article. One of the obvious difficulties for any theory of consciousness, especially the naturalistic one, is the interpretation of qualia or the qualitative scope of our mental states. Scientists are faced with such questions as: «Why does it even exist?» and «What is its practical meaning?» We find possible answers to them in the theories of J. Searle, N. Humphrey, and F. Peters. Each of them agrees that consciousness is generated by the brain, but they differ in the interpretation of its ontological status. Nevertheless, their understanding of the epistemic status of consciousness is similar: correlation of views on consciousness from the position of the 3rd and 1st person is always problematic. At the same time, both consciousness itself and its qualitative scope can and should be explained within the framework of the evolutionary approach. It is obvious that none of the naturalistic theories of consciousness has yet given answers to all questions (if it is even possible), but the search for these answers, in our opinion, should be carried out precisely within this approach.


Author(s):  
Shiping Tang

Why hasn’t international relations (IR) been an evolutionary science? This article contends that a properly constructed evolutionary approach, or what I call the “social evolution paradigm (SEP),” is a powerful paradigm, perhaps the ultimate paradigm, for theorizing social changes. It first introduces some basics of evolutionism and key elements for a genuinely social evolutionary approach toward social change. It then examines several key studies in IR with an evolutionary flavor. The article goes on to identify five key issue domains of peaceful international changes that will be fertile ground for evolutionary theorization. They are as follows: the future of a rule-based international system, niche construction of the international and regional system and order, changes in states’ behaviors, the future of state and state building without wars, and finally, nontraditional security from climate change to epidemics and artificial intelligence. Finally, the article highlights the power of the social evolutionary approach and calls for more social scientists to embrace the approach.


2016 ◽  
Vol 40 (5) ◽  
pp. 233-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Riadh Abed ◽  
Paul St John-Smith

SummaryEvolutionary science remains an overlooked area in psychiatry and medicine. The newly established Royal College of Psychiatrists' Evolutionary Psychiatry Special Interest Group aims to reverse this trend by raising the profile of evolutionary thinking among College members and others further afield. Here we provide a brief outline of the importance of the evolutionary approach to both the theory and practice of psychiatry and for future research.


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Del Giudice

Abstract The argument against innatism at the heart of Cognitive Gadgets is provocative but premature, and is vitiated by dichotomous thinking, interpretive double standards, and evidence cherry-picking. I illustrate my criticism by addressing the heritability of imitation and mindreading, the relevance of twin studies, and the meaning of cross-cultural differences in theory of mind development. Reaching an integrative understanding of genetic inheritance, plasticity, and learning is a formidable task that demands a more nuanced evolutionary approach.


1980 ◽  
Vol 25 (7) ◽  
pp. 573-574
Author(s):  
JAMES LULL
Keyword(s):  

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