scholarly journals Green Supply Chain Pricing and Performance: a Fairness Preferences and Green Marketing Perspective

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong Huo ◽  
Haiyan Zhong ◽  
Xiaoli Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Marketing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Efficient Operation ◽  
And Performance ◽  
The Impact

This study investigates optimal decisions in a green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a leading retailer considering the green marketing and fairness preferences of member firms. Four Stackelberg game decision models are constructed in which the manufacturer and the re-tailer engage in green marketing separately when the manufacturer has no and has fairness preferences. The impacts of fairness preferences and green marketing on the optimal decision in the green supply chain are comparatively analyzed. The study finds that member firms perform green marketing regardless of the presence or absence of fairness preferences and that such be-havior increases the wholesale price, retail price, and market demand of low-carbon products as well as the profits of member firms and the supply chain. A more interesting finding is that the profit growth of member firms and the supply chain due to the manufacturer’s green marketing is more pronounced than that due to the retailer’s green marketing. When the retailer and the manufacturer engage in conduct green marketing, the manufacturer's fairness preferences have different effects on the wholesale price, retail price, market demand, level of green marketing efforts, member enterprises and profits of supply chain. Therefore, firms should consider the impact of green marketing and fairness preferences to make pricing and performance decisions, so as to achieve efficient operation of the whole supply chain and avoid double marginal effects. Finally, the above conclusions are verified through numerical simulation, providing a reference for the decision-making of member firms in the green supply chain.

scholarly journals Research on the Dynamics Game Model in a Green Supply Chain: Government Subsidy Strategies under the Retailer’s Selling Effort Level

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xigang Yuan ◽  
Xiaoqing Zhang ◽  
Dalin Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Principal Agent Theory ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Selling Effort

Based on dynamic game theory and the principal-agent theory, this paper examined different government subsidy strategies in green supply chain management. Assuming that the retailer’s level of selling effort involved asymmetric information, this study analyzed the impact of different government subsidy strategies on the wholesale price, the product greenness level, retail price, the level of selling effort, the manufacturer’s profit, and the retailer’s profit. The results showed that (1) the government’s subsidy strategy can effectively not only improve the product greenness level but also increase the profits of an enterprise in a green supply chain, which helps the retailer to enhance their selling effort; (2) regardless of whether the retailer’s level of selling effort was high or low, as the government’s subsidy coefficient increased, the wholesale price continued to decrease, and the product greenness level and retailer’s selling effort level also increased.

The Impact of Dual-Fairness Concerns Under Different Power

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Tianjian Yang ◽  
Guangdong Liu ◽  
Yao Wei ◽  
Xuemei Zhang ◽  
Xinglin Dong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Equilibrium Structure ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Total Profit ◽  
The Impact

By analyzing the impact of different fairness concerns on a green supply chain, this study determines the optimal decisions under different power structures and conducts a comparative analysis of them. The findings of this study are summarized as follows: 1) under the manufacturer-dominated structure, retail price, wholesale price, product greenness, the manufacturer's profit, the total profit of the supply chain, the manufacturer's utility, and the retailer's utility are all negatively correlated with fairness concerns, but positively correlated with the retailer's profit; 2) under the retailer-dominated structure, fairness concerns have no impact on retail price, product greenness, or the total profit of the supply chain, are positively correlated with wholesale price and the manufacturer's profit and utility, and are negatively correlated with the retailer's profit and utility; 3) under the Nash equilibrium structure, fairness concerns have no impact on the green supply chain.

Decision Models of Supply Chain Under Asymmetric Information with Demand Disruption

2010 ◽  
Vol 143-144 ◽  
pp. 773-781
Author(s):  
Xin Rong Jiang ◽  
Yong Chao Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Expected Profit ◽  
Decision Models ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Optimal Production ◽  
Production Quantity

This paper studied the influence of asymmetric information and demand disruption on the decision of the supply chain. We analyzed the supply chain decision models based on a Stackelberg game under normal circumstances and demand disruption situation. The conclusion indicates when the market demand is disrupted, the optimal wholesale price, the retail price, the supplier’s expected profit and the supply chain system’s expected profit change in the same direction as the demand disruption, while the optimal production quantity and the retailer’s profit both have certain robustness under disruption. Finally we gave a numerical example to illustrate our analysis.

scholarly journals Green Supply Chain Management with Nash Bargaining Loss-Averse Reference Dependence

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (24) ◽  
pp. 3154
Author(s):  
Wentao Yi ◽  
Zhongwei Feng ◽  
Chunqiao Tan ◽  
Yuzhong Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Reference Point ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Bargaining Solution ◽  
Efficiency Coefficient

This paper investigates a two-echelon green supply chain (GSC) with a single loss-averse manufacturer and a single loss-averse retailer. Since the Nash bargaining solution exactly characterizes endogenous power and the contribution of the GSC members, it is introduced as the loss-averse reference point for the GSC members. Based on this, a decision model of the two-echelon GSC with loss aversion is formulated. The optimal strategies of price and product green degree are derived in four scenarios: (a) the centralized decision scenario with rational GSC members, namely the CD scenario; (b) the decentralized decision scenario with rational GSC members, namely the DD scenario; (c) the decentralized decision scenario with the GSC members loss-averse, where the manufacturer’s share is below its own loss-averse reference point, namely the DD(∆m ≥ πm) scenario; (d) the decentralized decision scenario with the GSC members loss-averse, where the retailer’s share is below its own loss-averse reference point, namely the DD(∆r ≥ πr) scenario. Then, a comparative analysis of the optimal strategies and profits in these four scenarios is conducted, and the impacts of loss aversion and green efficiency coefficient of products (GECP) on the GSC are also performed. The results show that (i) GECP has a critical influence on the retail price and the wholesale price; (ii) the GSC with loss aversion provide green products with the lowest green degree; (iii) the retail price, the wholesale price and product green degree are decreasing monotonically with the loss aversion level of the GSC member without incurring loss; (iv) furthermore, the effect of the loss aversion level of the GSC member with incurring loss on the optimal strategies is related to GECP and the gap between the GSC members’ loss aversion levels.

scholarly journals The Influence of Buyer Power on Supply Chain Pricing with Downstream Competition

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (10) ◽  
pp. 2924
Author(s):  
Qiu Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Retail Market ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Buyer Power ◽  
Downstream Competition ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Vertical Market

This paper aims to investigate the impact of buyer power on the wholesale price and retail price of, in the case, downstream competition. Based on a summary of the competitive characteristics of China’s retail market, a model of a vertical market was constructed to examine the influence of buyer power on the pricing decisions of manufacturers and retailers, and to analyze the mechanism of price decisions. The results showed that the buyer power of national retailers reduced the wholesale price, but the impact on local retailers remained uncertain. Although increasing buyer power initially increased the local retailer’s wholesale price and caused the ‘waterbed effect’, we found that this effect reverted when the buyer power reached a point at which the ‘anti-waterbed effect’ appeared. The opposite was true of the retail price. However, buyer power reduced the average retail price, and consumer welfare improved.

Joint Decision for Price Competitive Inventory Model with Time-Price and Credit Period Dependent Demand

2017 ◽  
pp. 341-352
Author(s):  
Nita H. Shah
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
The Other ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Joint Decision ◽  
Credit Period ◽  
Time Price ◽  
Delay In Payments ◽  
Dependent Demand

The problem analyzes a supply chain comprised of two front-runner retailers and one supplier. The retailers' offer customers delay in payments to settle the accounts against the purchases which is received by the supplier. The market demand of the retailer depends on time, retail price and a credit period offered to the customers with that of the other retailer. The supplier gives items with same wholesale price and credit period to the retailers. The joint and independent decisions are analyzed and validated numerically.

scholarly journals Green Supply Chain Decisions Considering Consumers’ Low-Carbon Awareness under Different Government Subsidies

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 2281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chang Su ◽  
Xiaojing Liu ◽  
Wenyi Du
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Green Products ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Emission Level ◽  
The Government

This study examined how to arrange the generation and pricing of supply chain members in the case of consumer green preference with different government subsidies. The green supply chain comprises a manufacturer and a retailer; the government subsidizes manufacturers who produce green products and consumers who buy green products. The study built a green supply chain pricing decision model with different forms of subsidy under various power structures. By backward induction and sensitivity analysis, this study analyzed optimal strategies of green supply chain under various modes, and we discuss how the government subsidy coefficient affects the optimal decision of a green supply chain. The results show that, firstly, whether the government subsidizes the manufacturers or the consumers, the wholesale price offered by the manufacturer is directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the two power structures. Secondly, when the government subsidizes the manufacturer, the carbon-emission level and the retail price are inversely proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the manufacturer leader; the carbon-emission level and the retail price are all directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the retailer leader. Finally, when the government subsidizes the consumers, the carbon-emission level and the retail price are directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the two power structures.

scholarly journals How Different Government Subsidy Objects Impact on Green Supply Chain Decision considering Consumer Group Complexity

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Qingfeng Meng ◽  
Mengwan Li ◽  
Zhen Li ◽  
Jing Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Green Products ◽  
Consumer Group ◽  
Environmental Preferences ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

This paper fully considers the complexity characteristics of the consumer group, such as the heterogeneity of consumer environmental preferences and consumption levels and constructs a two-stage price decision model of green supply chain composed of the manufacturer and retailers. Under the four different scenarios, no government subsidies, government subsidies are given to the manufacturer, government subsidies are given to the green product retailer, and government subsidies are given to green product consumers, the impact of government subsidies on green supply chain member price decisions is analyzed, and the validity of the model is verified by an example. The results show that compared with the no government subsidies, government subsidies to the manufacturer will reduce the wholesale and sales prices of green products, and subsidies to the green product retailer will lead to higher wholesale prices and lower sales prices of green products, and subsidies to green product consumers will increase the wholesale and sales prices of green products. No matter which object is subsidized by the government, the wholesale price of general products will not change and the sales price will decrease. Government subsidies will facilitate the sales of green products, thereby expanding the market share of green products.

scholarly journals Green Supply Chain Management with Cooperative Promotion

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 3204
Author(s):  
Ke Yan ◽  
Guowei Hua ◽  
Edwin Tai Chiu Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Management ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Channel Structure ◽  
Green Supply Chain Management ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Chain Management ◽  
On Demand ◽  
Green Investment

Green supply chain management has received increasing attention as consumers have become more environmentally conscious. Manufacturers are making green investments to meet consumers’ demands, while retailers in different markets often engage in cooperative promotion to attract more consumers. This study develops game theoretic models for investigating cooperative promotion for two cross-market firms with different channel structures, i.e., decentralized and centralized. The manufacturer determines the wholesale price for the retailers and the green investment of a product, and the retailers determine the promotional effort and retail price. This study finds that whether the firms join in cooperative promotion mainly depends on the wholesale price, as well as the impacts of the price, green investment, and cooperative promotional activities on the demand. When the wholesale price is relatively low, the retail price of the decentralized green supply chain must be lower than that of the centralized green supply chain. On the contrary, the difference in the retail price between the two green supply chains varies with the impacts of green investment and cooperative promotional activities on demand. In addition, due to the influence of channel structure, the contribution to cooperative promotion of the centralized supply chain is more than that of the decentralized supply chain with the most given conditions. Moreover, as the impact of cooperative promotional activities on demand increases, the centralized green supply chain does not necessarily result in higher profits than the decentralized green supply chain.

scholarly journals Pricing Strategies of Dual-channel Green Supply Chain Considering Big Data Information Inputs

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pan Liu ◽  
Feng-jie Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Big Data ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Pricing Rules ◽  
Green Production ◽  
Online Channel

Abstract In the Big Data environment, when green manufacturers invest in the green production technology, to satisfy consumer demand timely and accurately, they may begin to gain consumer performance information (hereafter, CBDI) to design and produce product. However, these will go up their extra costs. Meanwhile, for a green manufacturer who sells the green product through the online channel and the offline channel, the expression of its market demand needs to rethink in the new environment. In these conditions, for a dual-channel green supply chain (hereafter, DGSC), chain members pay more attention on the pricing problems considering the inputs of CBDI and greening R&D. Hence, to resolve this question, a DGSC a green manufacturer selling by the online channel and with one retailer selling by the offline channel was chosen. Afterwards, the demand function of the DGSC was revised, and we analyzed the profits models and its pricing rules in the proposed four common cost-sharing models. Results indicate that whether the retailer bears the CBDI costs or the greening R&D costs, the retailer will not change its retail price. If the retailer can bear some CBDI costs, the alteration tendencies of the best wholesale price are related to the cost-sharing parameter.

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