scholarly journals Emergence of the Individual as an International Juristic Entity: Enforcement of International Human Rights

2004 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 534-572 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julie Cassidy
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
Minority Groups ◽  
The State ◽  
International Human Rights ◽  
International Norm ◽  
State Practice ◽  
International Rights ◽  
The Many ◽  
The Individual

In this article it is contended that state practice, as evidenced in the declarations of the judiciary and the many treaties and conventions guaranteeing human rights, reveals a consensus of opinion acknowledging the individual to be an international juristic entity. So extensive is this practice that it could be seen as marking the emergence of a new customary international norm; or at least a general principle of international law, yet to crystallise into a custom; acknowledging the individual as the beneficiary of international rights. This is important for individuals and minority groups because if they possess international rights independently of the State, enforcement of their rights will no longer depend on the interests of the State. Where the State is often the offender of human rights, international law will not effectively confer any real rights unless the individual is so recognised as an inter- national juristic entity.

Diplomatic Assurances Against Torture – An Effective Strategy? A Review of Jurisprudence and Examination of the Arguments

2008 ◽  
Vol 77 (4) ◽  
pp. 319-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lena Skoglund
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
War On Terror ◽  
The State ◽  
Security Threats ◽  
International Human Rights ◽  
Actual Risk ◽  
Substantial Risk ◽  
International Human ◽  
Controversial Area

AbstractHuman rights organisations have warned repeatedly that basic human rights are being challenged in the so-called 'War on Terror'. One particularly controversial area is the use of diplomatic assurances against torture. According to international human rights instruments, the state shall not return anyone to countries in which they face a substantial risk of being subjected to torture. In the 'War on Terror', an increasing number of non-citizens are being deemed 'security threats', rendering them exempt from protection in many Western states. To be able to deport such 'threats' without compromising their duties under international law, states are increasingly willing to accept a diplomatic assurance against torture – that is, a promise from the state of return that it will not subject the returnee to torture. There is wide disagreement as to whether and/or when diplomatic assurances can render sufficient protection to satisfy the obligations of non-refoulement to risk of torture. Whereas the human rights society label such assurances as 'empty promises', others view them as effective, allowing states to retain their right to remove non-citizens without violating international law. This article reviews international and selected national jurisprudence on the topic of diplomatic assurances against torture and examines if and/or when such assurances might render sufficient protection against torture to enable removals in accordance with international law. The courts and committees that have reviewed the use of diplomatic assurances against torture have identified essential problems of using them, thus rejecting reliance on simple promises not to torture. However, they have often implied that sufficient protection might be rendered by developing the assurances. I argue that this approach risks leading the governments into trying to perfect a system that is inherently flawed – whilst, incidentally, deportations to actual risk of torture continue. Even carefully modelled assurances render only unreliable protection against torture. For this, and reasons connected to undesirable side-effects of their use, I argue that the practice should be rejected.

Remarks by Sean D. Murphy

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 ◽  
pp. 193-199
Author(s):  
Sean D. Murphy ◽  
Claudio Grossman
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Human Right ◽  
Human Rights Movement ◽  
Interstate System ◽  
International Human ◽  
The Individual

Our conversation might begin by looking backward a bit. The human rights movement from 1945 onward has been one of the signature accomplishments of the field of international law, one that refocused our attention from a largely interstate system to a system where the individual moved in from the periphery to the center. Human rights champions point to numerous landmark treaties, numerous institutions, and the rise of NGOs as a critical vehicle for developing and monitoring human rights rules. Yet others look at the international human right system and still see the state as overly central, tolerating and paying lip service to human rights, but too easily discarding them when they prove to be inconvenient. The persistence of racism comes to mind. As a general matter, how would you assess the strengths and weaknesses of the system that was built essentially during your lifetime?

Jurisdictional Immunities of the State for Serious Violations of International Human Rights Law or the Law of Armed Conflict

2013 ◽  
Vol 50 ◽  
pp. 243-287 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul David Mora
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
The State ◽  
International Human Rights Law ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
International Human Rights ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
Law Of Armed Conflict ◽  
International Human

SummaryIn its recent decision in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece Intervening), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that Italy had failed to respect immunities enjoyed by Germany under international law when the Italian courts allowed civil actions to be brought against Germany for alleged violations of international human rights law (IHRL) and the law of armed conflict (LOAC) committed during the Second World War. This article evaluates the three arguments raised by Italy to justify its denial of immunity: first, that peremptory norms of international law prevail over international rules on jurisdictional immunities; second, that customary international law recognizes an exception to immunity for serious violations of IHRL or the LOAC; and third, that customary international law recognizes an exception to immunity for torts committed by foreign armed forces on the territory of the forum state in the course of an armed conflict. The author concludes that the ICJ was correct to find that none of these arguments deprived Germany of its right under international law to immunity from the civil jurisdiction of the Italian courts.

5 Combatants and Non-Combatants

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ipsen Knut
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Direct Part ◽  
Minimum Standard ◽  
Individual Protection ◽  
The Many ◽  
Enemy Combatant ◽  
The Individual

This chapter examines the regulation of combatant status in treaty law and the many challenges for combatant status in recent armed conflicts. The primary status under international law of persons in an international armed conflict will be one of two categories of persons: ‘combatants’ and ‘civilians’. Combatants may fight within the limits imposed by international law applicable in international armed conflict, that is, they may participate directly in hostilities, which members of medical or religious personnel and ‘non-combatants’ may not do because they are excluded—by international law and by a legal act of their party to the conflict—from the authorization to take a direct part in hostilities. The chapter then discusses ‘unlawful combatants’, or what may be considered the better term: ‘unprivileged belligerents’. The term ‘unlawful enemy combatant’ was particularly used after 11 September 2001, to introduce a third category of persons which under existing law may be either combatants or civilians, but are denied such status as not fulfilling essential conditions. To use this third category in order to reduce the individual protection below the minimum standard of human rights is under no circumstances legally acceptable.

Implementing Decisions of International Human Rights Institutions – Evidence from the United Nations Human Rights Committee

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 753-777
Author(s):  
Vera Shikhelman
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
United Nations ◽  
International Law ◽  
The State ◽  
International Human Rights ◽  
Human Rights Protection ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
International Human ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
Internal Capacity

Abstract In recent years, there has been an increasing amount of research about the implementation of international law. However, there has been almost no empirical research about implementing decisions of international human rights institutions. The decisions of those institutions are usually regarded as soft law, and states do not have a clear legal obligation to implement them. In this article, I bring original empirical data about how and when states implement decisions of the United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC) in individual communications. I hypothesize that the following factors influence the readiness of states to implement the views of the HRC: (i) the level of democracy and human rights protection in the state; (ii) internal capacity; (iii) strength of civil society; (iv) type of remedy; (v) representation on the HRC; (6) subject matter of the communication. I find that the most important factor for implementing remedies granted by the Committee is the high human rights score of the state. The internal capacity of the state is also significant but to a lesser extent than found in previous studies. Also, I find a certain connection between the state being represented on the HRC and its willingness to implement the remedies.

Sovereign Rights of the State and the Scope of their Implementation in the Context of Development of the International Human Rights Law

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 164
Author(s):  
Iryna PROTSENKO ◽  
Кostiantyn SAVCHUK
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
International Human Rights Law ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
International Human Rights ◽  
Adequate Treatment ◽  
International Human ◽  
The Right

In the contemporary science of international law, the state sovereignty issue lacks adequate treatment. In particular, the list and essence of sovereign rights and duties of the state are not defined, although these are referred to in some international legal instruments and resolutions of international courts and arbitrations. In addition, particular circumstances are being under development, which require if not precise outlining of the catalogue of fundamental rights of states, then at least determining the essence of some of these rights and the scope of their implementation. It goes about developing the practice to limit specific sovereign rights of the state to ensure the implementation of human rights (notably, the ones not directly related to the respective rights of the state). In this very way, the state is limited in its right to determine its own immigration policy. The fact is that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has ruled in some of its judgments that by implementing this right, the state violates the right to respect for private and family life provided for by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (ECHR). This resulted in ECtHR`s practice to be somewhat considered in the draft articles on the expulsion of aliens elaborated by the International Law Commission (ILC) in 2014. The examples from ECtHR`s practice analyzed in this paper provide the basis for the conclusion that the development of the International Human Rights Law is gradually narrowing the scope of the internal sovereign rights of the state.

scholarly journals Introduction to the AJIL Unbound Symposium on Recognition of Governments and Customary International Law

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 199-200
Author(s):  
James Gathii
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Cold War ◽  
International Law ◽  
Democratic Governance ◽  
The State ◽  
Effective Control ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
Regime Changes ◽  
State Practice

In the lead essay in this symposium, Professor Erika de Wet contends that notwithstanding all of the post-Cold War enthusiasm for a right to democratic governance and the non-recognition of governments resulting from coups and unconstitutional changes of government, a customary international law norm on the nonrecognition of governments established anti-democratically has not emerged. De Wet’s position, primarily based on state practice in Africa, is vigorously debated by six commentators.Jure Vidmar agrees with de Wet that the representative legitimacy of governments still lies primarily in effective control over the territory of the state. Vidmar, in his contribution, examines recent collective practice when neither the incumbent government nor the insurgents control the territory exclusively, arguing that in such cases states may apply human rights considerations. Like de Wet, however, Vidmar regards state practice as ambivalent and unamenable to ideal-type distinctions between coups (against a democratically legitimate government) and regime changes (to a democratically legitimate government).

scholarly journals The State Duty to Protect against Human Rights Violations through Transnational Business Activities

2018 ◽  
Vol 23 ◽  
pp. 13-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Krajewski
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Human Rights Violations ◽  
Due Diligence ◽  
Environmental Laws ◽  
Human Rights Abuses ◽  
State Practice ◽  
Duty To Protect ◽  
Respective State

Transnational corporations are currently not formally bound by international human rights obligations. Instead, states have a duty to protect individuals against human rights abuses by third parties, including corporations. While it is undisputed that this obligation extends to all individuals living on the territory of the respective state, the extraterritorial scope of the duty to protect remains contested. This is especially the case for human rights violations through transnational business activities. The state on whose territory the violation occurs has a duty to protect human rights by adopting and implementing labour and environmental laws applicable in that state. However, it is less clear if and to what extent the state of the main seat of the mother company or the global ordering company — the ‘home state’ — also has a human rights duty to regulate transnational business activity. This article argues that such a duty can be based on existing human rights doctrine and standards of general international law such as the ‘no harm’ rule and the due diligence principle. It argues that states have a duty to regulate transnational business activities of corporations over which they exercise jurisdiction if human rights violations caused by such activities are predictable and preventable. In its final part, the article assesses various approaches in state practice which could be seen as instruments in the fulfilment of the duty to regulate transnational business activities.

Nationality, State Succession, and the Right of Option: The Case of Québec

1999 ◽  
Vol 36 ◽  
pp. 151-180
Author(s):  
Gibran van Ert
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Human Right ◽  
State Practice ◽  
State Succession ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
Nationality Law

SummarySome advocates of Québec separatism claim that Quebecers could retain their Canadian nationality following Québec’s secession from Canada. This article examines international nationality law to test the accuracy of that claim. A device known as an option exists in international law as a means of allowing individuals to determine for themselves the effect of state succession upon their nationality. This article considers the place of options in the law of state succession, both as it now stands and as proposed by the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of States, 1997. Four possible arguments in favour of a Québécois option are given, the most convincing of which arises by analogy to state practice in the use of plebiscites. This argument suggests that international law would require the state of Québec to grant all Canadians affected by Québec’s secession a right to opt for Canadian nationality instead of Québécois nationality with the caveat that those opting to retain Canadian nationality could face expulsion from Québec. Finally, the article suggests that the development of human rights in international law should extend to recognize a true human right of option in cases of state succession. Regrettably, the ILC Draft hinders, rather than encourages, this desirable development.

Immigration Policy: Between Demographic Considerations and Preservation of Culture

2008 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Na'ama Carmi
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Immigration Policy ◽  
Minority Groups ◽  
Demographic Factors ◽  
The State ◽  
International Human Rights Law ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
International Human Rights ◽  
International Human ◽  
The Right

Cultural rights of minority groups are recognized in international human rights law. These rights include the right of minority groups to adopt various measures to protect their cultural identity, which may include closure of the group’s community from outsiders. The state in which such groups reside has a concurrent duty to respect these rights and sometimes even to take positive measures to ensure their implementation. The consideration of demographic factors, then, is regarded as legitimate when designed to protect minority groups. The rights of majority groups, on the other hand, are often ensured by the mere fact that they constitute a majority within the state and as such do not require special measures.This state of affairs is challenged, however, in face of mass immigration that could change the relation existing between majority and minority groups within the state. Under these circumstances, does a majority have the right to preserve its own culture through an immigration policy that takes into account demographic factors? I argue that the duty of states under international human rights law to protect rights of minority groups might serve as an incentive to restrict immigration endangering the character of the state. This character—the state’s public culture—is the outcome of collective preferences of the majority of its citizens, which is assumed ought to be respected.

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