scholarly journals The Anarchist Movement in Ukraine at the Height of the New Economic Policy (1924-25)

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 173
Author(s):  
Viktor Savchenko

This paper examines a virtually unknown period of the development of the anarchist movement in Ukraine, ignored by both Soviet and post-Soviet historians, for whom the history of anarchism in the Soviet Union ended in 1921. The author,basing his information on archival materials,including the archives of the Soviet secret police agencies (ChK, GPU, OGPU), extends the life of the anarchist movement through the mid-1920s. This was a period of revitalization of the movement, especially among students, young workers, and the unemployed in the cities of Eastern and Southern Ukraine (Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, and Poltava). Despite repression by the government, the anarchist movement in the USSR in the 1920s was able to sustain itself by going underground.

Slavic Review ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 516-542 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julie Hessler

One of the firmest popular conceptions of the Soviet Union in the United States is of a system diat categorically banned private enterprise. Embraced by specialists and the general public alike, this conception reflects the official Soviet stance diat the private sector was eradicated during losif Stalin's “great break” of 1929-30. Indeed, over the course of diose two years, individual peasants were compelled to collectivize, private stores forcibly shut, private manufactures socialized, and even doctors and dentists pressured to cooperate or to close shop. The concept of an interdiction against all private economic activity found support in the words of the dictator–Stalin's assertions that the Soviet Union was a society “without capitalists, small or big,” that socialist, not capitalist, property was the “foundation of revolutionary legality,” and many other statements of a similar ilk. Stalin proved his commitment to this model by his readiness to resort to coercion against its violators: at his instigation, repressive laws threatened entrepreneurs with five to ten years in prison camp for profitable private business. Such developments appeared as unequivocal as they proved lasting; when commentators discussed perestroika in the late 1980s, the only historical precedent they could identify was Lenin's New Economic Policy six decades before.


2012 ◽  
pp. 96-114
Author(s):  
L. Tsedilin

The article analyzes the pre-revolutionary and the Soviet experience of the protectionist policies. Special attention is paid to the external economic policy during the times of NEP (New Economic Policy), socialist industrialization and the years of 1970-1980s. The results of the state monopoly on foreign trade and currency transactions in the Soviet Union are summarized; the economic integration in the frames of Comecon is assessed.


1963 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 345-364
Author(s):  
John Day ◽  
Frank Bealey ◽  
Justin Grossman ◽  
Allen Potter ◽  
Edgar Thomas ◽  
...  

2021 ◽  
pp. 213-239
Author(s):  
Aleksander Głogowski

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE MILITARY AND CIVIL UNDERGROUND IN THE VILNIUS REGION IN 1939-1941 The first years of the occupation of the Vilnius Region were an unusual period in terms of the history of the Polish Underground State and the Polish armed resistance movement. This area was occupied after September 17, 1939 by the Soviet Union, but part of it was transferred to the Republic of Lithuania, along with which it was re-incorporated into the Soviet Union. The Lithuanian occupation was a considerable challenge both for the Polish authorities in exile and for the inhabitants of the Vilnius Region. Meeting such a challenge required certain diplomatic talents (not to worsen the situation of Poles living in this area) as well as knowledge of the relations in the area, which was a problem for the Polish authorities in France, and especially in Great Britain. The Polish inhabitants of the Vilnius Region considered the legal status of their land to be illegal occupation, while the Lithuanians claimed that thanks to a new agreement with the USSR, the period of occupation of these lands by Poles ended. These opinions, together with the mutual resentments and stereotypes flourishing for nearly 20 years, made the peaceful coexistence of two nations difficult, or even impossible. The government of the Republic of Poland tried to prevent the attempts to start an anti-Lithuanian uprising, not wanting to provoke the other two occupiers into military intervention. To this stage, it sought an intermediate solution between the abandonment of any conspiracy (which carried the threat of forming armed groups beyond the control of the legal Polish authorities) and its development on a scale known, for example, from the German or Soviet occupation. The Vilnius Region was to become the personnel and organisational base for the latter. The dilemma was resolved without Polish participation at the time of the annexation of the Republic of Lithuania by the Soviets. Then the second period of the Soviet occupation began, characterised by much greater brutality than the first one, with mass arrests, executions and deportations. The policy of repression primarily affected the pre-war military staff and their families, who were the natural base for the resistance movement of the intelligentsia. Fortunately, this process ended at the time of the German aggression against the USSR. Those that survived the period of the “second Soviet invasion” could in the new conditions continue their underground activities and prepare for an armed uprising in the circumstances and in the manner indicated by the Home Army Headquarters and the Polish Government in London.


Author(s):  
Jay Bergman

Chapter 8 describes the origins of the debate over Thermidor—the phase in the French Revolution following the Jacobin Terror—in the New Economic Policy Lenin initiated in 1921. It also shows the role the concept played in the struggle for power to succeed Lenin. The debate over what its realization in the Soviet Union would entail reflected the very real fear among the Bolsheviks that their revolution might end before the construction of socialism had even begun. To them, Thermidor was virtually a synonym for counter-revolution. For mostly political purposes—but also because their fear of it was real—Stalin and Bukharin, in the mid-1920s, argued that to evoke the danger of a Soviet Thermidor was tantamount to advocating it. Trotsky, who always considered analogies with French revolutions instructive, in the 1920s defined Thermidor as a form of counter-revolution. But since, in his opinion, it had not yet occurred in the Soviet Union, there was reason to believe it could be avoided altogether.


1957 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 649-655

Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary: The Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, at its last meeting, June 7, 1957, adopted its report to the General Assembly. The committee, composed of representatives of Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia, and Uruguay, had been appointed by the General Assembly at its second emergency special session to provide information regarding the situation created by Soviet intervention in the internal affairs of Hungary as well as the developments relating to the Assembly's recommendations on this subject. The report, based on available documentation and the testimony of in witnesses, dealt with a brief history of the Hungarian uprising, the movement as seen by the Soviet Union and by the government of Janos Kadar, the Soviet military intervention and its political background, the effects of the use or threat of use of force on the political independence of Hungary, and specific acts violating other rights of the Hungarian people. The committee believed that the uprising in October and November 1956 had been a spontaneous, improvised national movement, stemming from resentments caused by longstanding grievances, particularly against the inferior status of Hungary in relation to the Soviet Union. The thesis put forth by the Soviet Union and the Kadar government that the uprising had been fomented by Hungarian reactionary circles and strengthened by western “imperialists” was unacceptable to the committee, which felt that the movement had been led by students, workers, soldiers and intellectuals, who had demanded, inter alia, that democratic socialism should be the basis of the Hungarian political structure and that such social achievements as land reform should be safeguarded. Reporting that Soviet authorities had taken steps as early as October 20 to make armed intervention possible, the committee felt that it could not say whether the Soviets had anticipated the occurrence. It stressed, however, that the Warsaw Treaty did not provide for Soviet armed intervention to dictate political developments within any signatory's frontiers.


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-84
Author(s):  
Sergey G. Bandurin ◽  
Igor B. Tsvetkov

Introduction. World and domestic economic history are the history of ups and downs, the history of finding ways out of difficult, sometimes crisis and critical situations, most often manifested both during and after wars. The Great Patriotic War, which dealt a blow to all spheres of life of the belligerent countries, was no exception. Testing the viability of the country’s economic model, in particular the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, began directly during the war and continued after the end of hostilities. The relevance of the topic under study lies in the study of a positive example of the country’s recovery from the economic crisis, as well as the study of the reaction of the general population to the measures taken. The purpose of this article is to retrospectively analyze the economic situation of those years, to model the reader’s understanding of the reaction of society at that time to events and the way of solving the problem chosen by the party, as well as to demonstrate the results of the government’s activities. Materials and Methods. This study is based on the traditional methods used in the national historical science: problem-chronological, systemic and comparative-historical. Research Results. The analysis of the measures taken in the financial and economic sphere showed the consistency of the methods chosen by the government, however, the general assessment of the measures among the population turned out to be versatile. The assessments of the researchers of this problem, both Soviet and modern, are generally positive. Discussion and Conclusion. As a result of the monetary reform of 1947, the Soviet Union managed to avoid the depreciation of the ruble, the surplus of banknotes issued during the war years was eliminated, the state’s internal debt on bonds was significantly reduced, and the salaries of the population were preserved. This money was used to rebuild the post-war country. The abolition of cards ensured a decrease in market prices for many groups of goods and significantly reduced the number of speculators.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (8) ◽  
pp. 130-143
Author(s):  
Niiaz Valiev ◽  
◽  
Vladimir Propp ◽  
Aleksandr Vandyshev ◽  
◽  
...  

The article is dedicated to the history of the Department of Mining Engineering establishment and development. The Department of Mining Arts used to be its original name. The department has been reformed several times over its centennial history. In 1931 the country was in urgent need in engineers with narrow specializations and the department was divided into 6 departments: sheet deposits development, ore mining, mine construction, mine aeration and work safety, mine transport, and industrial management. Each of the departments still exists making its contribution to high-skilled mining engineers training. The departments of sheet deposits development and ore mining were an exception, as soon as they amalgamated 78 years later to establish the Department of Mining Engineering in 2009. Over the entire period of its existence, the departments of mining art-mining engineering have trained more than 10 thousand mining engineers, including 52 thousand specialists for foreign countries. The graduates have been working successfully in all regions of the Soviet Union and still work for mining enterprises in Russia and abroad. There are 2 academicians, 18 Doctors of Science, more than 60 PhDs, 3 Lenin and State Prize laureates, 6 Heroes of Socialist Labour, 2 Deputy Ministers of the Government of the Russian Federation, local Government Chairmen, and Governors of the regions of the Russian Federation among the graduates of the department.


1964 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 65-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Franz Schurmann

Until a short time ago, it appeared that much of what was going on in China could be characterised by the cynical aphorism plus ça change plus c'est la même chose. Many things became manifest in the country that were reminiscent of themes centuries old. China had gone through two radical phases, one during the First Five-Year Plan period when the Chinese Communists tried to repeat the Soviet experience of industrialisation, and the second during the Great Leap Forward when they used their own mobilisational means to try to achieve economic break-through. The ninth Plenum in January 1961 called a dramatic halt to the extreme policies of the Great Leap Forward, and launched a period that bears strong similarities to the N.E.P. (New Economic Policy) period of the early 1920s in the Soviet Union. Many traditional patterns that were effaced during the years of radicalism began to reappear. There was talk of the need “to study very well traditional economic relationships.” It seemed that for a while the leadership had decided that only a truly voluntary response from below, and not coercion of any sort, could rescue China from the morass in which it found itself. But as of the time of the writing of this article, there are ominous signs that China may be approaching another “1928.” The Party drums are rolling once again, and the themes are not those of the N.E.P., but more like those which preceded the great Soviet collectivisation drive of 1928. During the last few years, the leadership made no attempt to hide the facts of China's poverty and isolation. But now a new note of defiance, of toughness has crept out. Where it will lead is hard to say.


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