scholarly journals Rehumanization of “Them”: Evolution of Representations of the “Enemy Number One” in American Cold War Cinema

Author(s):  
О.В. Рябов

Исследуется, как в кинематографе США на протяжении 1940–1960-х гг. менялись способы изображения СССР: от дегуманизации образа врага до деконструкции этого образа. Исследовании опирается на концепцию Н. Хэслема, согласно которой дегуманизация аутгруппы осуществляется в двух формах: анималистской (при помощи сравнения с животными) и механицистской (за счет уподобления машинам). Показано, что в 1940–1950-х гг. голливудские фильмы широко использовали обе формы де-гуманизации при создании образа «врага номер один». Регуманизация СССР происходит в фильме «Русские идут! Русские идут!» (1966), который выступил как своеобразный кинематографический манифест Realpolitik и философии разрядки. The article dwells upon evolution of the ways in which the U.S. Cold War films represented the USSR: from dehumanization of the image of enemy in 1940-1950s to deconstruction of this image in 1960s. The author applies Nick Haslam’s dual model of dehumanization, aс-cording to which dehumanization is visible in two forms: animalistic by associating members of out-group with animals and mechanistic by associating them with machine. The Hollywood movies of 1940-1950s actively employed both forms in creating the image of the “enemy number one”. The release of Norman Jewison’s film “The Russians are coming! The Russians are coming!” in 1966 marked the beginning of rehumanization of the USSR. The author points out that the film served as a sort of cinematic manifest of Realpolitik and philosophy of détente.

Asian Survey ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 33 (8) ◽  
pp. 832-847
Author(s):  
Allan E. Goodman
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  

2015 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 287-304
Author(s):  
Raphael B. Folsom

The writings of the U.S. scholar Philip Wayne Powell have had an enduring influence on the historiography of colonial Mexico and the Spanish borderlands. But his writings have never been examined as a unified corpus, and so the deeply reactionary political ideology that lay behind them has never been well understood. By analyzing Powell’s political convictions, this article shows how contemporary scholarship on the conquest of northern Mexico can emerge from Powell’s long shadow. Los escritos del estudioso estadounidense Philip Wayne Powell han ejercido una influencia perdurable sobre la historiografía del México colonial y las zonas fronterizas españolas. Sin embargo, dichos escritos nunca han sido examinados como un corpus unificado, de manera que la ideología política profundamente reaccionaria detrás de ellos nunca ha sido bien comprendida. Al analizar las convicciones políticas de Powell, el presente artículo muestra cómo puede surgir un conocimiento contemporáneo sobre la conquista del norte de México a partir de la larga sombra de Powell.


1996 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 465-493 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcia Olander

The years following World War Two produced a strong resurgence of U.S. intervention in Central America and the Caribbean couched in Cold War terms. Although the U.S. intervention in Guatemala to overthrow the government of Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 has generally been seen as the first case of Cold War covert anti-Communist intervention in Latin America, several scholars have raised questions about U.S. involvement in a 1948 Costa Rican civil war in which Communism played a critical role. In a 1993 article in The Americas, Kyle Longley argued that “the U.S. response to the Costa Rican Revolution of 1948, not the Guatemalan affair, marked the origins of the Cold War in Latin America.” The U.S. “actively interfered,” and achieved “comparable results in Costa Rica as in Guatemala: the removal of a perceived Communist threat.” Other authors have argued, even, that the U.S. had prepared an invasion force in the Panama Canal Zone to pacify the country. The fifty years of Cold War anti-Communism entitles one to be skeptical of U.S. non-intervention in a Central American conflict involving Communism. Costa Ricans, aware of a long tradition of U.S. intervention in the region, also assumed that the U.S. would intervene. Most, if not all, were expecting intervention and one key government figure described U.S. pressure as like “the air, which is felt, even if it cannot be seen.” Yet, historians must do more than just “feel” intervention. Subsequent Cold War intervention may make it difficult to appraise the 1948 events in Costa Rica objectively. Statements like Longley's that “it is hard to believe that in early 1948 … Washington would not favor policies that ensured the removal of the [Communist Party] Vanguard,” although logical, do not coincide with the facts of the U.S. role in the conflict.


1998 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 14-16
Author(s):  
Daniel P. Volman

Studies of U.S. government relations with Africa have generally focused on the role of the executive branch, specifically by examining and analyzing the views and activities of administration officials and the members of executive branch bureaucracies. This is only natural, given the predominant role that the executive branch has historically played in the development and implementation of U.S. policy toward the continent. However, the U.S. Congress has always played an important role in determining U.S. policy toward Africa due to its constitutional authority over the appropriation and authorization of funding for all foreign operations conducted by the executive branch. Furthermore, Congress enacted legislation on several occasions during the Cold War period that directly affected U.S. policy. For example, Congress approved the Clark Amendment prohibiting U.S. intervention in Angola (although it later voted to repeal the amendment) and also passed the 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, which imposed sanctions on South Africa over the veto of the Reagan administration.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 23-44
Author(s):  
Adam Potočňák

The article holistically analyses current strategies for the use and development of nuclear forces of the USA and Russia and analytically reflects their mutual doctrinal interactions. It deals with the conditions under which the U.S. and Russia may opt for using their nuclear weapons and reflects also related issues of modernization and development of their actual nuclear forces. The author argues that both superpowers did not manage to abandon the Cold War logic or avoid erroneous, distorted or exaggerated assumptions about the intentions of the other side. The text concludes with a summary of possible changes and adaptations of the American nuclear strategy under the Biden administration as part of the assumed strategy update expected for 2022.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Oleg Riabov

This article deals with the US Cold War cinematographic construction of the Soviet enemy. The researcher focuses on the means of dehumanising the communist enemy, external and internal, by equating it to a machine. The author applies Nick Haslam’s dual model of dehumanization (2006), according to which dehumanization is visible in two main forms: animalistic, by associating members of the out-group with animals, and mechanistic, by associating them with a soulless machine. The materials used consist of US films from the “Long Fifties”, in which Hollywood, equating the enemy to machines, developed three plots: the robotic existence of individuals in a totalitarian society; the transformation of Americans into zombies by communists by means of Soviet science; and the body snatching of Americans by an alien mind, an allegory of a future communist occupation of the USA. The article demonstrates that dehumanization was implemented by directly labeling the representatives of the communist world as robots and by attributing to them a lack of emotions, consciousness, will, individuality, initiative, warmth, love, friendship, creative abilities, and even the ability to smile. Such an image of the enemy implied a moral exclusion, treating them as an inanimate object unworthy of empathy, including in the event of their destruction. The author points out that the use of mechanistic dehumanization was very effective. Essentialization of the differences between “us” and “them” occurred: the symbolic border between them is presented as a boundary between living and nonliving. The image of mortal danger was created: the “Red Machine” is strong and merciless, it cannot be moved to pity, and so it is permissible to destroy it. This image contributed to the legitimation of power: the political opponents of the authorities are represented as internal enemies who are anxious to turn Americans into obedient executors of someone else’s will and to deprive them of humanity. At the same time, the machine also has weaknesses, and it is possible to defeat it: since it is devoid of human creativity, it is clearly inferior to the free human spirit embodied in America.


Author(s):  
Rohani Hj Ab Ghani ◽  
Zulhilmi Paidi

The Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation between 1963-1966 was an important event attracting the attention of politicians and scholars alike as the conflict had threatened the long existing relations between the two countries. Indonesian confrontation with Malaysia was due to its refusal to accept the formation of the new federation of Malaysia, founded on 16th September 1963. Sukarno’s confrontational stand on this had broken the long-standing sentiments of regional brotherhood or “saudara serumpun” that had nurtured between the two countries for many years. The conflict also saw the involvement of major powers like the United States (U.S.), Britain, China and Russia in the midst of bipolar power struggle between the communist and the anti-communist as part of the ongoing Cold War. The three years of confrontation witnessed great attempts at peace efforts by U.S. Although U.S. involvement in the conflict was merely as a moderator for both countries it was also fueled by its efforts of containment of communism in the Southeast Asian region. The U.S. viewed that the conflict should be resolved in the context of “Asian solution” as it involved two Asian countries A settlement to the Malaysia-Indonesia confrontation was finally achieved through the Bangkok Agreement, signed in August 1966. This paper discusses the role of U.S. in its attempts at finding an amicable settle to the confrontation in the form of “Asian solution.”  


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