Creditor Control Rights, Loan Enforcement and Bankruptcy Regimes

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luh Luh Lan ◽  
Yew Kee Ho
Keyword(s):  
Control Rights

Business-groups in Russian industries

2004 ◽  
pp. 121-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Avdasheva
Keyword(s):  
Industrial Organization ◽  
Economic System ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Business Groups ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
Organization And Management ◽  
Russian Economy ◽  
Main Determinants ◽  
Soviet Economic System

The chapter of “Institutional Economics” textbook is devoted to the development of business-groups as a specific feature of industrial organization in the Russian economy. The main determinants of forming and functioning of business-groups such as allocation of property rights in Soviet enterprises, networks of directors and executive authorities in the Soviet economic system as well as import of new institutes and inefficient state enforcement are in the center of analysis. Origins, structure, organization and management within the groups and the role of shareholding and informal control rights are considered.

How Do Corporate Control Rights Transactions Create Shareholder Value? Evidence from China

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liping Dong ◽  
Konari Uchida ◽  
Xiaohong Hou
Keyword(s):  
Shareholder Value ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Control Rights

Parental Control Rights

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Altman
Keyword(s):  
Parental Control ◽  
Control Rights

Credit Control Rights and Resource Allocation within Firms

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nuri Ersahin ◽  
Rustom M. Irani ◽  
Hanh Le
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Control Rights

scholarly journals Licensing Contracts: Control Rights, Options, and Timing

2017 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 1131-1149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pascale Crama ◽  
Bert De Reyck ◽  
Niyazi Taneri
Keyword(s):  
Control Rights

Control Rights Over Intellectual Property

2013 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 564-591 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sudipto Bhattacharya ◽  
Sergei Guriev
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Control Rights

Debt Covenants and Accounting Manipulation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Volker Laux
Keyword(s):  
Firm Value ◽  
Accounting Information ◽  
Debt Covenants ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Per Se

This paper studies the effects of allocating control rights to lenders via debt covenants when managers can sometimes misreport the accounting information on which the covenants are based. When contract renegotiation is exogenously prohibited, including a covenant in the contract is ex ante optimal because it increases both the probability that poor projects are liquidated and the manager's effort incentive. When the parties can renegotiate the contract, the results can flip: Granting the lender more control can lead to less frequent liquidations of low-quality projects and lower managerial effort incentives and thereby reduce the manager's ex ante payoff. The key behind these results is not the manager's incentive to misreport per se but her desire to take subsequent actions that conceal the misreporting. The model generates predictions regarding the determinants of accounting-based covenants, and the effects of covenants on misreporting, managerial effort, the frequency of liquidations, and firm value.

Do Negative Corporate Social Responsibility Events Signal Financial Misreporting? — Empirical Finding from Taiwan

2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (01) ◽  
pp. 2150004
Author(s):  
Ching-Lung Chen ◽  
Hann-Pyng Wang ◽  
Hung-Shu Fan ◽  
Shiu-Chieh Chiu
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Cash Flow ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Empirical Finding ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
Corporate Social

This study examines whether negative corporate social responsibility events (NCSRs) signal potential firm misreporting and pending financial reporting restatements. Without formal opinions on the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting in Taiwan, we hypothesize NCSRs can represent and/or signal a firm’s internal control weakness, which may in turn result in poor financial reporting. Note that the concern with controlling owners expropriating wealth through ineffective internal controls is given important weight by investors and regulators. We further examine whether the signaling function of NCSRs is more pronounced in contexts with a serious agency problem, such as is found in the high divergence of control and cash flow rights case (denoted as high excess control rights) in Taiwan. Empirical results indicate that, as conjectured, incidence of NCSRs is positively associated with the likelihood of reporting restatements. Further evidence reveals that this result is particularly pronounced in the high divergence of control and cash-flow rights subsample test. We demonstrate several diagnostic tests and show the results are robust in various specifications.

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