Public Participation in Environmental Enforcement . . . with Chinese Characteristics?: A Comparative Assessment of China’s Environmental Complaint Mechanism

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tseming Yang ◽  
Xuehua Zhang
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (17) ◽  
pp. 4696 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guo ◽  
Bai

As an essential stakeholder of environmental resources, the public has become the third force which assists in promoting environmental governance, together with local governments and polluting enterprises. In this paper, we construct a mediation model and a 2SLS (Two Stage Least Square) model to illustrate the role of public participation based on inter-provincial panel data of China from 2011 to 2015. The results indicate that the advantages of handling informational asymmetry and enhancing social supervision are the two logical starting points of involving public participation in environmental governance. As the public has no executive power, they can participate in environmental governance in an indirect way by lobbying local governments’ environmental enforcement of polluting enterprises. In addition, their deterrent of polluting enterprises can also generate effects similar to local governments’ environmental enforcement, and such a deterrent will help promote environmental governance directly. At the present time in China, the effects of public participation in environmental governance are mainly reflected in the form of back-end governance, while the effects of front-end governance are not remarkable enough. This research is of great significance in perfecting China’s environmental governance system by means of arousing and expanding the public’s rights to participate in environmental governance.


Author(s):  
Denise van der Kamp

China’s high-profile anti-pollution campaigns have fueled theories of authoritarian environmental efficiency. In a regime where bureaucrats are sensitive to top-down scrutiny, central campaigns are expected to be powerful tool for reducing pollution. Focusing on China’s nationwide pollution inspections campaign, I assess these claims of authoritarian efficiency. I find that central inspections (or “police patrols”) have no discernable impact on air pollution. I argue that inspections were ineffective because environmental enforcement requires a degree of sustained scrutiny that one-off campaigns cannot provide. The deterrent effect of inspections is also undercut by the regime’s ambivalence towards independent courts and unsupervised public participation. These findings suggest that China’s obstacles to pollution enforcement may be greater than anticipated, and theories of authoritarian efficiency overlook gaps in authoritarian state capacity.


Author(s):  
Lindsey Fransen ◽  
Antonio La Vina ◽  
Fabian Dayrit ◽  
Loraine Gatlabayan ◽  
Dwi Andreas Santosa ◽  
...  

2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (12) ◽  
pp. 59-63
Author(s):  
O.I. Parakhina ◽  
◽  
M.N. Lokachuk ◽  
L.I. Kuznetsova ◽  
E.N. Pavlovskaya ◽  
...  

The research was carried out within the framework of the theme of state assignment № 0593–2019–0008 «To develop theoretical foundations for creating composite mixtures for bakery products using physical methods of exposure that ensure homogeneity, stability of mixtures and bioavailability of nutrients, to optimize diets population of Russia». The data on the species belonging of new strains of lactic acid bacteria and yeast isolated from samples of good quality gluten-free starter cultures are presented. A comparative assessment of the antagonistic and acid-forming activity of strains of lactic acid bacteria and the fermentative activity of yeast was carried out. The composition of microbial compositions from selected strains of LAB and yeast was developed. The influence of the starter culture on the new microbial composition on the physicochemical, organoleptic indicators of the bread quality and resistance to mold and ropy-disease was investigated.


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