The Impact of CEO Compensation On the Timing of Earnings Restatements

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nourhene BenYoussef
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Earnings Restatements ◽  
The Impact

The Impact of CEO' Compensation Incentive on the Future R&D Investment of the Company

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-210
Author(s):  
Seho Kwon ◽  
◽  
YoungJun Kim
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Impact ◽  
D Investment

The Impact of Incentives on the CEO Compensation and Firm Performance

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahmoud M. Nourayi ◽  
Sudha Krishnan
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
The Impact

scholarly journals CEO Monitoring and Board Effectiveness: Resolving the CEO Compensation Issue

2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-134
Author(s):  
Chiraz Ben Ali ◽  
Frédéric Teulon
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Board Governance ◽  
Board Effectiveness ◽  
Past Performance ◽  
Compensation Committee ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
The Impact

This study examines the impact of board governance mechanisms on the pay of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) using a sample of major French listed companies for the 2009–2011 period. The results show that CEO pay is negatively associated with the presence of a family CEO and positively associated with board size, busy directors, board meetings, and compensation committee independence. We provide further evidence that CEO compensation increases with firm size, and both present and past performance. Our study casts doubt on the effectiveness of formal board attributes in constraining CEO compensation.

scholarly journals CEO Compensation and Firm Performance: The Role of ESG Transparency

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 278
Author(s):  
Chetna Rath ◽  
Florentina Kurniasari ◽  
Malabika Deo
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
The Impact

Chief executive officers (CEOs) of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) firms are known to take lesser pay and engage themselves in corporate social responsibility activities to achieve the dual objective of the enhancement of firm’s performance as well as benefit for stakeholders in the long run. This study examines the role of ESG transparency in strengthening the impact of firm performance on total CEO pay in ESG firms. A panel of 67 firms for the period of 2014–2019 has been analyzed using the two-step system GMM model, with NSE Nifty 100 ESG Index as the data sample and ESG scores from Bloomberg database as a proxy for transparency. Findings reveal that environmental and governance disclosure scores have the potential to intensify the negative relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation, while social disclosure scores do not. In addition, various firm-specific, board-specific, and CEO-specific attributes have also been considered controls affecting remuneration. This paper contributes to the literature by exploring the effect of exhibiting ESG transparency and its nexus with CEO pay as well as firm performance.

CEO compensation, CEO attributes and tax aggressiveness: evidence from French firms listed on the CAC 40

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sawssan Jbir ◽  
Souhir Neifar ◽  
Yosra Makni Fourati
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Least Square ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Tax Aggressiveness ◽  
Ceo Tenure ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Ceo Attributes

Purpose This paper aims to examine the impact of CEO (chief executive officer) compensation and CEO attributes on the level of tax aggressiveness of French companies. Design/methodology/approach The sample comprises 180 firm-year observations of 40 companies listed on the CAC 40 during the period ranging from 2008 to 2018. For the purpose of overcoming the problems of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, the authors apply the generalized least square panel regression. Findings This study’s results corroborate the importance of CEO compensation and CEO attributes as determinants of tax aggressiveness. In addition, the authors come up with the fact that CEO compensation has a negative effect on tax aggressiveness, and that older CEOs and CEOs with accounting expertise are negatively linked with tax aggressiveness. The authors also find out that there is a positive relationship between the CEO tenure and tax aggressiveness. Moreover, the authors report that foreign CEOs are more likely to engage in tax aggressiveness practices than local CEOs. Research limitations/implications The unavailability of all annual reports and the use of only one proxy to measure tax aggressiveness present limitations. This study shows significant implications for shareholders, regulators and researchers. As a matter of fact, shareholders will observe the effect of appointing a foreign CEO on the tax aggressiveness level. This study may also provide regulators with new ideas regarding the role of the CEO and its impact on aggressive decision-making. And it brings forth new insight for researchers through adding a foreign CEO as a new determinant of tax aggressiveness. Originality/value According to the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to provide empirical evidence regarding the effect of both CEO compensation and CEO attributes on tax aggressiveness. It also looks into the impact of a foreign CEO on tax aggressiveness.

The impact of relative CEO compensation on not-for-profit contributions

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Stacey Kaden ◽  
Gary Peters ◽  
Juan Manuel Sanchez ◽  
Gary M. Fleischman
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Drop Out ◽  
Content Type ◽  
For Profit ◽  
Not For Profit ◽  
Survivorship Bias ◽  
Excess Cash ◽  
The Impact ◽  
A Current

PurposeThe authors extend research suggesting that external funders reduce their contributions to not-for-profit (NFP) organizations in response to media-reported CEO compensation levels.Design/methodology/approachEmploying a maximum archival sample of 44,807 observations from US Form 990s, the authors comprehensively assess the extent that high relative NFP CEO compensation is associated with decreases in future contributions.FindingsThe authors find that donors and grantors react negatively to high relative CEO compensation but do not react adversely to high absolute executive compensation. Contributors seem to take issue with CEO compensation when they perceive it absorbs a relatively large portion of the organizations’ total expenses, which may hinder the NFP’s mission. Additional findings suggest that excess cash held by the NFP significantly exacerbates the negative baseline relationship between future contributions and high relative CEO compensation. Finally, both individual donors and professional grantors are sensitive to cash NFP CEO compensation levels, but grantors are more sensitive to CEO noncash compensation.Research limitations/implicationsThe authors’ data are focused on larger NFP organizations, so this limits the generalizability of the study. Furthermore, survivorship bias potentially influences their time-series investigations because a current year large-scale decrease in funding due to high relative CEO compensation may cause some NFP firms to drop out of the sample the following year due to significant funding reductions.Originality/valueThe study makes three noteworthy contributions to the literature. First, the study documents that the negative association between high relative CEO compensation levels and future donor and grantor contributions is much more widespread than previous literature suggested. Second, the authors document that high relative CEO compensation levels that trigger reductions in future contributions are significantly exacerbated by excess cash held by the NFP. Finally, the authors find that more sophisticated grantors are more sensitive to noncash CEO compensation levels as compared with donors.

The Impact of the Use of Cross-Border Compensation Peers: The Case of Canadian Companies Using U.S. Peers

2020 ◽  
pp. 0148558X2093012
Author(s):  
Steven Balsam ◽  
Hong Fan ◽  
Amin Mawani ◽  
Daqun Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Peer Groups ◽  
The United States ◽  
Stage Model ◽  
Change Models ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Compensation Package ◽  
Time Period ◽  
Market Factors ◽  
The Impact

CEO compensation in Canada is significantly lower than that in the United States. In this article, we examine the choice of, and impact on Canadian CEO Compensation, using U.S. firms in their compensation peer groups. Using a two-stage model to control for endogeneity, while we find the choice of peers associated with labor market factors, we still find that the use of U.S. peers positively associated with higher Canadian CEO compensation. This finding is after controlling for the traditional determinants of CEO compensation, as well as use of domestic peers. While this result holds for all components of the compensation package, we also find that having U.S. peers is associated with a greater proportion of equity in the compensation package. Our results are robust to various formulations including change models and using an earlier time period when peer disclosure was voluntary.

Board independence, gender diversity and CEO compensation

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (5) ◽  
pp. 845-860 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ramzi Benkraiem ◽  
Amal Hamrouni ◽  
Faten Lakhal ◽  
Nadia Toumi
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Gender Diversity ◽  
Joint Effect ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Women Directors ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Corporate Managers ◽  
Board Decision Making ◽  
The Impact

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the joint effect of board independence and gender diversity on the effectiveness of boards in monitoring CEO compensation in a continental European context, i.e. France. Design/methodology/approach Fixed-effect regressions are used to study the impact of board independence, gender diversity and their interaction, i.e. the proportion of female independent directors on the different components of CEO compensation (total, fixed and variable). Findings The authors observe that both the proportions of independent directors and women sitting on the boards positively influence the various components of CEO compensation. However, the interaction of these factors, i.e. the proportion of female independent directors, is negatively associated with CEO compensation. These results suggest that independent women directors improve board effectiveness in monitoring CEO compensation, especially its fixed component. Originality/value The results of this research help to elucidate the importance of women being appointed to boards as independent directors to properly monitor managerial pay. These results provide support to the approach of the French Cope-Zimmerman law of January 2011, which promotes female representation on boards as independent directors to enhance board decision-making. Thus, evidence presented and discussed in this paper should provide useful insights for academics, corporate managers and regulators.

Settling up in CEO compensation: The impact of divestiture intensity and contextual factors in refocusing firms

2013 ◽  
Vol 35 (8) ◽  
pp. 1124-1143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seemantini Pathak ◽  
Robert E. Hoskisson ◽  
Richard A. Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Contextual Factors ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Settling Up
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