scholarly journals Prevention of Crime and the Optimal Standard of Proof in Criminal Law

Author(s):  
Henrik Lando
1972 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. R. Glazebrook

The sharp contrast between the vast number of detailed statutory provisions defining particular offences and the small handful of widely phrased provisions concerned with the general principles of criminal liability is, perhaps, the most striking feature of English criminal law, and, like the continued co-existence of both common law and statutory offences, one of the unhappy consequences of England's failure to enact a penal code. Among the few statutory provisions laying down general principles of liability or excuse there is none which comprehends a defence of necessity, and so commentators have inevitably looked to the case law for an answer to the question: Is there in English criminal law a defence of necessity? by which they have meant: Is there a defence of necessity in the sense in which there is a defence of, for instance, insanity, or infancy, or duress or prevention of crime? To the question understood in that sense, the answer returned must, it is thought, be a plain No. To ask and to answer the question in that sense may, however, be misleading: it may be more revealing (as this paper suggests) to ask, How does English law handle the plea of necessity when it arises? What, in other words, is the juristic technique employed?


Synthese ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 197 (12) ◽  
pp. 5253-5286 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clayton Littlejohn

AbstractCould it be right to convict and punish defendants using only statistical evidence? In this paper, I argue that it is not and explain why it would be wrong. This is difficult to do because there is a powerful argument for thinking that we should convict and punish defendants using statistical evidence. It looks as if the relevant cases are cases of decision under risk and it seems we know what we should do in such cases (i.e., maximize expected value). Given some standard assumptions about the values at stake, the case for convicting and punishing using statistical evidence seems solid. In trying to show where this argument goes wrong, I shall argue (against Lockeans, reliabilists, and others) that beliefs supported only by statistical evidence are epistemically defective and (against Enoch, Fisher, and Spectre) that these epistemic considerations should matter to the law. To solve the puzzle about the role of statistical evidence in the law, we need to revise some commonly held assumptions about epistemic value and defend the relevance of epistemology to this practical question.


Author(s):  
Mikhail Kleymenov ◽  
Ivan Kleymenov

Sport policy is a purposeful activity of various subjects connected with organizing and holding sports competitions. Such activity may be state-organized, administrative, financial, commercial, engineering and construction-related, military, security, professional, corporate, training, entertainment, relatively mass-scale, agent, referee, qualifying, and others. It should be taken into account that, besides officially recognized sports, there are also illegal competitions. Criminological aspects, connected with the possibility of crime, can be found everywhere. All of these leads to the necessity of establishing and developing sport criminology as a component of sport policy. Criminological aspects of sport policy are especially evident in the market conditions. Their analysis is necessary for the optimization of preventive work in the most important areas. The authors single out three such areas: criminal law prevention of crime in sports, enforcement of prevention policy for criminal and criminogenic sports, and counteracting sport extremism. The effectiveness of work in the first area is close to zero because special «sport» criminal law norms are not and will not be enforced. The analysis of the second area leads the authors to the conclusion that it is necessary to intensify the counteraction to criminal sports, primarily, dog fighting and street racing. As for the criminogenic sports, they can be conditionally broken into two categories: those promoting violence and cruelty, and those equipping athletes with the skills interesting for the criminal community (organized criminal groups). The first category includes MMA-type female fights. This disgusting spectacle, broadcast on TV, is absolutely contrary both to the female nature and to the traditional values of peoples of Russia. Such fights should be prohibited in the Russian Federation. The third area requires monitoring to prevent fans’ movements from turning into extremist organizations. The promotion of patriotic feelings among fans should be recognized as a strategic direction in the prevention of sport extremism.


Criminal Law ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-31
Author(s):  
Michael J. Allen ◽  
Ian Edwards

Course-focused and comprehensive, the Textbook on series provides an accessible overview of the key areas on the law curriculum. This introductory chapter answers the following questions: What is a crime? What purpose or function does the criminal law serve? What reasons are there for the criminalisation of some types of conduct? What are the purposes of punishment? What are the political and social contexts in which criminal law operates? The chapter provides an overview of key aspects of the criminal process, including mode of trial, the decision to prosecute, the burden and standard of proof, the functions of judge and jury, and sentencing. It also examines briefly discusses the impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on English law.


2005 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 719-734 ◽  
Author(s):  
Audrey Guinchard

In England and Wales, as elsewhere, criminal law stands in sharp contrast to other systems of social control. Criminal offences and their related penalties are clearly distinguishable from civil wrongs and their associated (civil) sanctions. And because the term ‘civil law’ refers not only to the domain of torts, but also encompasses administrative law, criminal penalties are, in addition, distinguished from the administrative or regulatory sanctions. This ‘distinction between criminal and civil justice has been such a basic feature of the common law’1that it shapes not only substantive law but also the organization of the courts into civil, criminal and sometimes administrative chambers or divisions. More importantly, the distinction between civil and criminal sanctions will lead to the application of different procedural rules: civil proceedings, used for the imposition of civil sanctions, are less stringent that their criminal counterpart applied when the offender faces a criminal sanction. This more gentle approach can be detected in both the burden and standard of proof.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Nicola Monaghan

Without assuming prior legal knowledge, books in the Directions series introduce and guide readers through key points of law and legal debate. Questions, diagrams, and exercises help readers to engage fully with each subject and check their understanding as they progress. This chapter begins by addressing the question: What is a crime? It then discusses the difference between criminal law, the law of tort, and contract law; the function of criminal law; sources of criminal law; the classification of offences; the criminal justice process; the hierarchy of the criminal courts; the burden and standard of proof; and the elements of an offence.


2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 229-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Cullerne Bown

Attempts to establish a quantitative framework for policy-making in the criminal justice system in recent decades have coalesced around the problem of the standard of proof and Kaplan’s influential 1968 paper. The central thread of work continues to use an equation he put forward while abandoning some of his foundational assumptions, an approach I call ‘Kaplanism’. Despite a growing awareness of deficiencies, elements of this school of thought, such as the parsing of concerns into the two categories of ‘error reduction’ and ‘error distribution’, have entered the general jurisprudential discourse. Here I launch a methodological attack and claim to kill this approach. This allows me to refute Laudan and other ‘consequentialist’ approaches to the standard identified by Walen, Walen’s own approach and an important part of Stein’s underpinnings. The same tools allow me to also refute Laudan’s earlier m/n meta-epistemology, Lippke’s ‘adage’, Stewart’s formalisation of Dworkin, Dahlman’s Bayesian work and (at least in criminal law) Kaplow’s law and economics approach. I also refute Hamer’s ‘conventional rationale’ for the current standard, Lillquist’s approach to the same and what Epps reports as ‘the Blackstone principle’. The law is left with no epistemic basis for policies, which, I argue, leaves it struggling for public trust in the modern era.


2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 213
Author(s):  
Richo Andi Wibowo

This paper aims at highlighting some odd court decisions on corruption typed “state financial loss” in public procurement sector. It is odd because of the following reasons: (i) the nature of the case is more about administrative or private law instead of criminal law; (ii) some consider that it will be unjust to sentence guilty the accused; (iii) the cases ensnare persons who are perceived as reformist and clean. The first point will be the focus of elaboration. It will be argued that the encroachment of criminal law towards the area of administrative and private laws are caused by the lower standard of proof for the corruption typed “state financial loss”. Currently, the applied standard is “more likely than not” instead of “beyond reasonable doubt”. The situation which some people are jailed while their faults are more about administrative and private is a justice issue. As the upright of justice is the mandate of the constitution, therefore, articles that create this injustice (Article 2 section (1) and Article 3 of the Eradication Corruption Act) should be re-reviewed by the Constitutional Court. Although the court has previously reviewed the Articles and, therefore, this should be seen as a final and binding; this paper will give some arguments which explain the needs for the court to re-settle this matter.


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