Tax Subsidies for Retirement Provision: Taking a Broader View

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sylvester J. Schieber
Keyword(s):  
Tax Subsidies

Implicit Taxes Amid Race to the Bottom in a Global Tax Game

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 42
Author(s):  
Igor Semenenko ◽  
Junwook Yoo ◽  
Parporn Akathaporn
Keyword(s):  
Capital Mobility ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Corporate Tax ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Race To The Bottom ◽  
Tax Subsidy ◽  
Tax Subsidies ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Tax Returns ◽  
Tax Hypothesis

Growing tax competition among national governments in the presence of capital mobility distorts equilibrium in the international corporate tax market. This paper is related to the literature that examines impact of international tax policies on corporate accounting statements. Employing international firm-level data, this study revisits the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis and documents that tax exemptions lowering effective tax rates relative to statutory rates increase pre-tax returns. This finding directly contradicts the implicit tax hypothesis documented by Wilkie (1992), who provided empirical evidence on inverse relationship between pre-tax return and tax subsidy. We also find evidences that relative importance of permanent versus timing component depends on the geography and that decline in corporate tax rates reduces impact of tax subsidies on profitability. Our findings suggest that tax subsidies play a different role than in 1968-1985, which was examined by Wilkie (1992). These results are consistent with the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis and income shifting explanation

scholarly journals Active vs. Passive Decisions and Crowd-Out in Retirement Savings Accounts: Evidence from Denmark *

2014 ◽  
Vol 129 (3) ◽  
pp. 1141-1219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raj Chetty ◽  
John N. Friedman ◽  
Søren Leth-Petersen ◽  
Torben Heien Nielsen ◽  
Tore Olsen
Keyword(s):  
Government Expenditure ◽  
Wealth Accumulation ◽  
Retirement Savings ◽  
Total Saving ◽  
Savings Accounts ◽  
Retirement Accounts ◽  
Tax Subsidies ◽  
Crowd Out ◽  
Savings Rates

Abstract Using 41 million observations on savings for the population of Denmark, we show that the effects of retirement savings policies on wealth accumulation depend on whether they change savings rates by active or passive choice. Subsidies for retirement accounts, which rely on individuals to take an action to raise savings, primarily induce individuals to shift assets from taxable accounts to retirement accounts. We estimate that each $1 of government expenditure on subsidies increases total saving by only 1 cent. In contrast, policies that raise retirement contributions if individuals take no action—such as automatic employer contributions to retirement accounts—increase wealth accumulation substantially. We estimate that approximately 15% of individuals are “active savers” who respond to tax subsidies primarily by shifting assets across accounts; 85% of individuals are “passive savers” who are unresponsive to subsidies but are instead heavily influenced by automatic contributions made on their behalf. Active savers tend to be wealthier and more financially sophisticated. We conclude that automatic contributions are more effective at increasing savings rates than subsidies for three reasons: (i) subsidies induce relatively few individuals to respond, (ii) they generate substantial crowd-out conditional on response, and (iii) they do not increase the savings of passive individuals, who are least prepared for retirement.

Housing Affordability and Transaction Tax Subsidies

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anastasia Girshina ◽  
Francois Koulischer ◽  
Ulf von Lilienfeld‐Toal
Keyword(s):  
Housing Affordability ◽  
Tax Subsidies ◽  
Transaction Tax

New York Film Production Unions Enter the Political Arena in Search of Tax Subsidies

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Figueroa ◽  
Lois S. Gray
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Low Income ◽  
The Political ◽  
Urban Residents ◽  
Concentrated Ownership ◽  
Tax Incentive ◽  
Tax Subsidies ◽  
Labor Pool ◽  
Tax Benefits ◽  
High Skill

This chapter explains how labor's preference for tax incentives is conditioned by the highly concentrated ownership structure, flexible production system, and fragmented bargaining relations that characterize the film industry. Labor's preference for a tax incentive-based approach in New York encouraged greater coordination between local film unions, policymakers, employers, and local studios, and was successful in generating employment in the specific context of the city's deep talent and qualified labor pool. The chapter also shows how the strategy induced tensions among local film unions over the distribution of tax benefits within the sector, and between film unions and representatives of low-income urban residents, who find themselves subsidizing a high-skill/high-wage industry from which they are largely excluded.

scholarly journals Union Density Effects on Productivity and Wages

2020 ◽  
Vol 130 (631) ◽  
pp. 1898-1936
Author(s):  
Erling Barth ◽  
Alex Bryson ◽  
Harald Dale-Olsen
Keyword(s):  
Union Membership ◽  
Union Density ◽  
Selection Effects ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Taxable Income ◽  
Wage Effect ◽  
Density Effects ◽  
Tax Subsidies ◽  
Rent Sharing ◽  
Over Time

Abstract We exploit changes in tax subsidies for union members in Norway to identify the effects of changes in firm-level union density on productivity and wages. Increased deductions in taxable income for union members led to higher membership rates and contributed to a lower decline in union membership rates over time in Norway. Accounting for selection effects and the potential endogeneity of unionisation, the results show that increasing union density at the firm level leads to a substantial increase in both productivity and wages. The wage effect is larger in more productive firms, consistent with rent-sharing models.

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