Rawls’s Difference Principle and Maximin Rule of Allocation: A New Analysis

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippe Mongin ◽  
Marcus Pivato
Keyword(s):  
Difference Principle ◽  
Maximin Rule

Rawls’s difference principle and maximin rule of allocation: a new analysis

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippe Mongin ◽  
Marcus Pivato
Keyword(s):  
Difference Principle ◽  
Maximin Rule

A SATISFACTORY MINIMUM CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE: RECONSIDERING RAWLS'S MAXIMIN ARGUMENT

2013 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 349-369 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Kaufman
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Minimum Level ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Marginal Value ◽  
Primary Goods ◽  
Maximin Rule ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

John Rawls argues that it is possible to describe a suitably defined initial situation from which to form reliable judgements about justice. In this initial situation, rational persons are deprived of information that is ‘irrelevant from the standpoint of justice’. It is rational, Rawls argues, for persons choosing principles of justice from this standpoint to be guided by the maximin rule. Critics, however, argue that (i) the maximin rule is not the appropriate decision rule for Rawls's choice position; (ii) the maximin argument relies upon an imprecise account of the satisfactory minimum to be secured under the maximin rule; or that (iii) Rawls relies upon unrealistic assumptions about diminishing marginal value. These critics, I will suggest, argue from a number of assumptions that are confused or false. The satisfactory minimum that choosers in the original position – employing the maximin rule – seek to achieve is not a minimum level of primary goods, nor is the satisfactory minimum sought under the maximin rule supplied by the difference principle. I will argue that the maximin argument is more robust than has generally been recognized and that this argument performs a number of important functions in clarifying the nature and implications of Rawls's argument for justice as fairness.

The Difference Principle, Capitalism, and Property-Owning Democracy

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 151-172
Author(s):  
Andrew Lister
Keyword(s):  
Welfare State ◽  
Equal Opportunity ◽  
Main Idea ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Income Growth ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
State Capitalism ◽  
Long Run ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Difference

Abstract Jason Brennan and John Tomasi have argued that if we focus on income alone, the Difference Principle supports welfare-state capitalism over property-owning democracy, because capitalism maximizes long run income growth for the worst off. If so, the defense of property-owning democracy rests on the priority of equal opportunity for political influence and social advancement over raising the income of the worst off, or on integrating workplace control into the Difference Principle’s index of advantage. The thesis of this paper is that even based on income alone, the Difference Principle is not as hostile to property-owning democracy as it may seem, because the Difference Principle should not be interpreted to require maximizing long run income growth. The main idea is that it is unfair to make the present worst off accept inequality that doesn’t benefit them, for the sake of benefitting the future worst off, if the future worst off will be better off than they are anyway.

The Place of the Market in a Rawlsian Economy

2013 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jahel Queralt
Keyword(s):  
Economic System ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Instrumental Value ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Just Society

AbstractRawls identifies only two arrangements, the liberal socialist regime and the property-owning democracy, as being compatible with justice. Both are market-based economies, suggesting that a just society must include the market. This article questions this idea by looking at three Rawlsian arguments in favour of the market. Two arguments, which link the market to certain basic liberties, are unsound because the market is shown to be nonessential in protecting these liberties. A third argument points at the instrumental value of the market to make the least advantaged as well off as possible. R. is based on an interpretation of the difference principle in which justice requires maximizing the position of the worst off within the most productive economic system. Although commonly accepted, this reading of the principle should be questioned, and thus the third argument is also inconclusive.

Deverbal nouns, lexicalization and syntactic change

2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Øivin Andersen
Keyword(s):  
Language Use ◽  
Morphological Type ◽  
Frequency Data ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Token Frequency ◽  
Syntactic Change ◽  
Central Elements

Deverbal nouns are often referred to as hybrids, containing both verbal and nominal features. In many languages deverbal nouns tend to develop into what Vendler (1967) called perfect nouns. Various stages of this development in Norwegian are proposed, drawing on Grammaticalization Theory and Lexicalization Theory. Frequency data are provided from a large newspaper corpus. The deverbal nouns are analyzed as going through a process of lexicalization where reduction in compositionality, reduced token frequency and increased idiosyncrasy are central elements. This process is triggered by relevance to the root, language use, isomorphism and the maximal difference principle. The article shows that Norwegian deverbal nouns are in a state of flux and that even different members of the same morphological type may behave quite differently syntactically and semantically.

Chain-Connnection, Close-knitness, and the Difference Principle

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hun Chung
Keyword(s):  
Difference Principle ◽  
The Difference

Are Special Education Programs Unjust to Nondisabled Children?: Justice, Equality, and the Distribution of Education

1998 ◽  
Vol 180 (2) ◽  
pp. 17-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Nathanson
Keyword(s):  
Special Education ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Special Needs ◽  
Children With Disabilities ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Education Programs ◽  
Social Consensus ◽  
Principle Of Justice ◽  
Philosophical Standpoint ◽  
The Difference

This article deals in depth with perhaps the most troubling education issue of the day—funding and proper distribution of educational resources. How is the money raised and how is its allocation decided? Can the ideals of both justice and equality be served? Is “extra” spending on behalf of children with special needs justified? Stephen Nathanson raises the central questions and, approaching them from a moral-philosophical standpoint, presents and evaluates the arguments of those who defend extra spending for children with disabilities and those who believe that “unequal” spending violates the principle of justice. Nathanson treats various theories of distributive justice—entitlement, utilitarianism, the “difference principle,” and the “decent level” idea. In focusing on the latter, he contends that social consensus developed around “decent level” may be the touchstone, more helpful than any rationale (or rhetoric) in satisfying the claims of justice and equality.

scholarly journals A Simple Model of the Difference Principle

2018 ◽  
Vol 08 (10) ◽  
pp. 1869-1888
Author(s):  
Takashi Suzuki
Keyword(s):  
Simple Model ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
The Difference
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