Governor Ciampi and the “Ambrosiano Case”: International Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rainer Masera
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
International Banking ◽  
Banking Supervision

Cannons over the EU legal order: The decision of the BVerfG (5 May 2020) in the Weiss case

2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-142
Author(s):  
Filippo Annunziata
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Preliminary Ruling ◽  
Banking Supervision ◽  
The Public ◽  
Changes Over Time ◽  
Over Time ◽  
The Eu

The Weiss affair, culminating in the BVerfG ruling of 5 May 2020 ( Weiss II), marks a break-up point in the long-standing dialogue between the BVerfG and the CJEU. The judges in Karlsruhe refused to follow the decision rendered by the CJEU in a preliminary ruling ( Weiss I) and ordered EU institutions to provide further clarifications on the proportionality assessment of the Public Sector Purchase Programme. This paper claims that the principles applied by the BVerfG in Weiss I are quite similar to those employed in the Gauweiler and Landeskreditbank-Banking Union cases. Considering that background, it will be argued that the construction of the principles employed by the BVerfG for the judicial review of EU acts did not undergo dramatic changes over time. The different outcome of Weiss II is due to the fact that, according to the BVerfG, insufficient elements of explanation and justification were provided by the ECB and the CJEU. Therefore, the central problem of Weiss II ends up being a procedural question of allegedly insufficient statements of reasons. From Gauweiler to Weiss II, one also sees the development of the standards for the judicial review of the ECB’s decisions, in the fields of both monetary policy and banking supervision.

MONETARY POLICY AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION IN BASEL III: GLOBAL TRENDS

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 39-47
Author(s):  
Larysa BATIUK
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
Global Economy ◽  
Financial Intermediation ◽  
Macroeconomic Fluctuations ◽  
Basel Iii ◽  
Banking Supervision ◽  
Basel Committee ◽  
Real Wealth

Introduction. The article deals with the peculiarities of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in the implementation conditions of the Basel Committee requirements on Banking Supervision "Basel III". The problem of the mechanism violation of the classical monetary multiplier, the imbalance of the monetary circulation system, the frequency increase of debt defaults and the amplitude of macroeconomic fluctuations in the global economic system are marked as a study result of the effects of the credit mitigation policy conducted by the US Federal Reserve amid the global financial crises of the last decade and changes in the nature of financial intermediation based on the synthesis of asset securitization and structured finance instruments. The purpose of this article is to investigate changes in monetary policy and financial intermediation in the implementation context of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Basel III as a source of imbalance in the global economy. Research methodology. The system method, method of scientific abstraction, methods of analysis and synthesis, statistical, comparison, generalization, scientific prediction were used. Results. The article deals with the implications of implementing the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Basel I and Basel II in the area of monetary policy and financial intermediation; peculiarities of monetary multiplier mechanism operation in modern conditions are revealed; the possible consequences of implementing Basel III requirements for the mechanism of monetary supply formation in the world economy are analysed; the change in the role of gold as monetary metal in central bank foreign exchange reserves and the implications of these changes in terms of price dynamics and the distribution of real wealth in the global economy are examined. Conclusions. It is proposed to consider the requirements of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision "Basel III" as such, which will exacerbate the volatility of global financial markets, increase the likelihood of increasing the frequency of debt defaults and, given the possibility of using gold as a means of redistribution of real wealth in the global economy, will cause an increase in the amplitude of macroeconomic fluctuations. Keywords: monetary policy; financial intermediation; the central bank; US Federal Reserve; Basel III; bank capital structure, monetary base; money multiplier, correspondent accounts; money supply; monetary gold; global economy.

scholarly journals FUNGSI BANK INDONESIA SEBAGAI PENGAWAS PERBANKAN DI INDONESIA

2007 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 514
Author(s):  
Mutiara Hikmah
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Payment System ◽  
Banking Supervision ◽  
Command Economy ◽  
The Law

AbstrakThis article giving elaboration regarding Bank Indonesia role as centralbank that hold significant's role and position in Indonesian economicprogress, so Bank Indonesia ought to take position in the change of economicsystem from command economy to market economy. Considering thatcircumstance the role of Bank Indonesia under Article 23D of Constitution ofRepublic Indonesia has been endorsed to promulgating Peraturan BankIndonesia (Bank Indonesia Regulation) which is has same level withPresidential regulation. That regulation considers to the Bank Indonesiaroles to accomplishing through implementation of Law Number 23 year 1999regarding Bank Indonesia. Under the Law central bank have responsibilityto assure and conserve toward rupiah stability. monetary policy. continuityof payment system and banking supervision

Actual Problems of Banking Regulation in Kazakhstan

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 544
Author(s):  
Kulyash Zh. SADVOKASSOVA ◽  
Gaukhar S. KODASHEVA ◽  
Nazgul KHAMITKHAN ◽  
Aizhan Ye. ZHAMIYEVA ◽  
Rustem K. SADVOKASSOV
Keyword(s):  
Financial Market ◽  
Current Practice ◽  
Banking Regulation ◽  
Practical Significance ◽  
Regulation System ◽  
Basel Iii ◽  
International Banking ◽  
Banking Supervision ◽  
University Professors ◽  
The Face

The article discusses the current problems of banking regulation in Kazakhstan in the face of growing uncertainty in the financial market. In this context, an assessment of the current practice of banking regulation has been given, the strengths and weaknesses of this process have been identified, as well as problems with the introduction of Basel III international banking supervision standards and ways to further improve the national banking regulation system in modern conditions. All these questions considered in this article determine the relevance of the presented material. The materials of the article suggest practical significance for university professors of economic specialties.  

scholarly journals Global Bank Capital and Liquidity after 30 Years of Basel Accords

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harald Benink
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Capital Requirements ◽  
International Banking ◽  
Bank Capital ◽  
Banking Supervision ◽  
Basel Accords ◽  
Capital Ratios ◽  
Working Together ◽  
Recent Financial Crisis ◽  
Global Financial System

In this paper we analyze the effectiveness of more than 30 years of efforts by international banking supervisors, working together in the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, to harmonize capital and liquidity standards for internationally active banks. Notwithstanding the great efforts and progress made by international banking supervisors since the financial crisis of 2007–2009, two important issues require further attention. First, although bank capital ratios have been raised significantly since the recent financial crisis, they are still at historically low levels. In a world in which global debt ratios have risen even further during the past decade, this is a worrying signal of fragility in the global financial system. Second, bank liquidity requirements may have become too complex and could also have unintented and unpredictable interaction effects with bank capital requirements.

scholarly journals Mehr Sicherheit mit zentraler Bankenaufsicht

2021 ◽  
pp. 53-57
Author(s):  
David Gmür
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Big Data ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Banking Supervision ◽  
Discussion Paper ◽  
Cepr Discussion Paper

ZusammenfassungDie Wirtschaft braucht Kredit, und die Gesellschaft mehr Sicherheit. Die Banken müssen in der Kreditvergabe auf Ertrag und Risiko gleichzeitig achten. Damit die Regulierung effektiven Schutz bieten kann, muss die Bankenaufsicht die Einhaltung der Vorschriften überwachen und frühzeitig das Entstehen übermässiger Risiken aufdecken. In der Bankenunion kann eine zentrale Aufsicht eher für gleich lange Spiesse im europaweiten Wettbewerb der Banken sorgen, kann unabhängiger als nationale Aufsichtsbehörden agieren, und dank besserer Ressourcen auch komplexe Grossbanken wirksam beaufsichtigen. So wird die Kreditvergabe sicherer, indem die Banken angehalten sind, faule und riskante Kredite zügig abzubauen und mehr Kredit auf die produktiveren Unternehmen mit besseren Aussichten lenken.Christian Keuschnigg und Michael Kogler, Herausgeber.Altavilla, Carlo, Miguel Boucinha, José-Luis Peydró, und Frank Smets (2020), Banking Supervision, Monetary Policy and Risk-Taking: Big Data Evidence from 15 Credit Registers, CEPR Discussion Paper Nr. 14288.

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