Social Insurance and Redistribution with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin Boadway ◽  
Manuel Leite-Monteiro ◽  
Maurice Marchand ◽  
Pierre Pestieau
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Social Insurance

Moral hazard, adverse selection, and the optimal provision of social insurance

1983 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael D. Whinston
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Social Insurance

scholarly journals Optimal Provision of Social Insurance Under Adverse Selection and Moral hazard

2010 ◽  
Vol 24 (null) ◽  
pp. 193-222
Author(s):  
Joseph Stiglitz ◽  
윤정열
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Social Insurance

Social Insurance and Redistribution with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection*

2006 ◽  
Vol 108 (2) ◽  
pp. 279-298 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin Boadway ◽  
Manuel Leite-Monteiro ◽  
Maurice Marchand ◽  
Pierre Pestieau
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Social Insurance

scholarly journals Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance with Endogenous Private Insurance

2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raj Chetty ◽  
Emmanuel Saez
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Optimal Taxation ◽  
Social Insurance ◽  
Government Intervention ◽  
Private Insurance ◽  
Welfare Gains ◽  
Empirical Estimates ◽  
Fiscal Externalities ◽  
Private Market

We characterize welfare gains from government intervention when the private sector provides partial insurance. We analyze models in which adverse selection, pre-existing information, or imperfect optimization create a role for government intervention. We derive formulas that map existing empirical estimates into quantitative predictions for optimal policy. When private insurance generates moral hazard, standard formulas for optimal government insurance must be modified to account for fiscal externalities. In contrast, standard formulas are unaffected by “informal” private insurance that does not generate moral hazard. Applications to health and unemployment show that formal private market insurance can significantly reduce optimal government benefit rates. (JEL D82, G22, H21, H23, J65)

AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

Moral hazard and adverse selection in the originate-to-distribute model of bank credit

2009 ◽  
Vol 56 (5) ◽  
pp. 725-743 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antje Berndt ◽  
Anurag Gupta
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Bank Credit

Reputation and Exaggeration: Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in the Mortgage Market

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brent W. Ambrose ◽  
James Neil Conklin ◽  
Jiro Yoshida
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Mortgage Market

On the Efficiency of the Rank‐Order Contract under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

1997 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 466-494 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jungyoll Yun
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Rank Order
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