scholarly journals Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance with Endogenous Private Insurance

2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raj Chetty ◽  
Emmanuel Saez
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Optimal Taxation ◽  
Social Insurance ◽  
Government Intervention ◽  
Private Insurance ◽  
Welfare Gains ◽  
Empirical Estimates ◽  
Fiscal Externalities ◽  
Private Market

We characterize welfare gains from government intervention when the private sector provides partial insurance. We analyze models in which adverse selection, pre-existing information, or imperfect optimization create a role for government intervention. We derive formulas that map existing empirical estimates into quantitative predictions for optimal policy. When private insurance generates moral hazard, standard formulas for optimal government insurance must be modified to account for fiscal externalities. In contrast, standard formulas are unaffected by “informal” private insurance that does not generate moral hazard. Applications to health and unemployment show that formal private market insurance can significantly reduce optimal government benefit rates. (JEL D82, G22, H21, H23, J65)

scholarly journals Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance with Endogenous Private Insurance

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raj Chetty ◽  
Emmanuel Saez
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Taxation ◽  
Social Insurance ◽  
Private Insurance

Moral hazard, adverse selection, and the optimal provision of social insurance

1983 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael D. Whinston
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Social Insurance

scholarly journals Optimal Provision of Social Insurance Under Adverse Selection and Moral hazard

2010 ◽  
Vol 24 (null) ◽  
pp. 193-222
Author(s):  
Joseph Stiglitz ◽  
윤정열
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Social Insurance

scholarly journals Optimal Taxation with Private Insurance

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yongsung Chang ◽  
Yena Park
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Markets ◽  
Optimal Taxation ◽  
Private Insurance ◽  
Borrowing Constraints ◽  
Welfare Effects ◽  
Sufficient Statistics ◽  
Pecuniary Externalities ◽  
Optimal Tax ◽  
Private Market ◽  
Asset Distribution

Abstract We derive a fully nonlinear optimal income tax schedule in the presence of private insurance. We fill the gap in the literature by studying the optimal tax formula with a comprehensive structure of the private markets—including incomplete markets models— both theoretically and quantitatively. As in the standard taxation literature without private insurance (e.g., Saez (2001)), the optimal tax formula can still be expressed in terms of standard sufficient statistics. With private insurance, however, the formula involves additional terms that reflect how the private market interacts with public insurance. For example, the optimal tax formula should also consider asset distribution and pecuniary externalities as well as the welfare effects of borrowing constraints.

Social Insurance and Redistribution with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection*

2006 ◽  
Vol 108 (2) ◽  
pp. 279-298 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin Boadway ◽  
Manuel Leite-Monteiro ◽  
Maurice Marchand ◽  
Pierre Pestieau
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Social Insurance

Participation in a Public Insurance Program: Subsidies, Crowd-Out, and Adverse Selection

2002 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 243-257 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen H. Long ◽  
M. Susan Marquis
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Health Program ◽  
Private Insurance ◽  
Public Insurance ◽  
Public Programs ◽  
Basic Health ◽  
Insurance Program ◽  
Private Market ◽  
Crowd Out ◽  
Design Characteristics

This paper examines how varying the level of subsidies affects participation in a public insurance program, crowd-out of private insurance, and adverse selection. We study the experience in Washington's Basic Health program in 1997. Findings show that adverse selection is not a problem in voluntary public programs. Increasing subsidies have only modest effects on participation in subsidized programs, though the gains are not at the expense of the private market. Overall participation in the subsidized plan is also modest, even though participants benefit from it. The challenge to policymakers is to find program design characteristics, beyond subsidies, that attract the uninsured.

Social Insurance and Redistribution with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin Boadway ◽  
Manuel Leite-Monteiro ◽  
Maurice Marchand ◽  
Pierre Pestieau
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Social Insurance

scholarly journals FALLOS DE MERCADO Y SEGURO DE PARO EN ESPAÑA ANTES DE 1936

2013 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 387-422 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergio Espuelas
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Trade Unions ◽  
Social Insurance ◽  
Private Insurance ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
European Countries ◽  
Working Population ◽  
Financial Difficulties ◽  
Coverage Rates

ABSTRACTBefore 1936, private insurance against unemployment was mostly run by trade unions. Commercial companies, meanwhile, did not penetrate into this insurance branch, which is probably due to the advantages that trade unions had when dealing with adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Nevertheless, union-based unemployment insurance reached a lower level of development than other private social insurance schemes, like sickness insurance, perhaps because of the financial difficulties that economic crisis involved for unemployment funds. Also, unemployment insurance spread specially among urban and high-wage workers, although coverage rates in Spain were below those of other European countries with higher income levels. However, even in the latter private coverage against unemployment did not reach 10% of the working population. As in other European countries, Spanish unemployment union-funds implemented strict economic incentives to deal with moral hazard, but precisely this hindered the spreading of private unemployment insurance.

AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

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