Is Ethical Nihilism True?

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. J. Donahue
Keyword(s):  
Ethics ◽  
1941 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-199
Author(s):  
Siegfried Marck
Keyword(s):  

2008 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 321-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shane Weller
Keyword(s):  

This essay re-examines Beckett's relation to nihilism in the light of his 1930s reading notes on pre-Socratic philosophy, in particular Democritus, Gorgias and Thrasymachos. Focusing on the distinction between "cosmological nihilism" and "ethical nihilism" in John Burnet's , I chart Beckett's abiding concern with the "nothing" conceived both ontologically and ethically, and assess the importance for him of Archibald Alexander's phrasing of the atomist paradox and the cosmological nihilism of Gorgias.


Author(s):  
Nicholas L. Sturgeon

Ethical naturalism is the project of fitting an account of ethics into a naturalistic worldview. It includes nihilistic theories, which see no place for real values and no successful role for ethical thought in a purely natural world. The term ‘naturalism’ is often used more narrowly, however, to refer to cognitivist naturalism, which holds that ethical facts are simply natural facts and that ethical thought succeeds in discovering them. G.E. Moore (1903), attacked cognitivist naturalism as mistaken in principle, for committing what he called the ‘naturalistic fallacy’. He thought a simple test showed that ethical facts could not be natural facts (the ‘fallacy’ lay in believing they could be), and he took it to follow that ethical knowledge would have to rest on nonsensory intuition. Later writers have added other arguments for the same conclusions. Moore himself was in no sense a naturalist, since he thought that ethics could be given a ‘non-natural’ basis. Many who elaborated his criticisms of cognitivist naturalism, however, have done so on behalf of generic ethical naturalism, and so have defended either ethical nihilism or else some more modest constructive position, usually a version of noncognitivism. Noncognitivists concede to nihilists that nature contains no real values, but deny that it was ever the function of ethical thought to discover such things. They thus leave ethical thought room for success at some other task, such as providing the agent with direction for action. Defenders of cognitivist naturalism deny that there is a ‘naturalistic fallacy’ or that ethical knowledge need rest on intuition; and they have accused Moore and his successors of relying on dubious assumptions in metaphysics, epistemology, the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind. Thus many difficult philosophical issues have been implicated in the debate.


The article presents a philosophical analysis of the “Catechism of a Revolutionary” in the light of its paradoxically and nihilistic boundedness which resulted in the system of practical actions of S. G. Nechaev, led to the murder of student Ivanov. In this connection the identification of the philosophical foundation of the Catechism of a Revolutionary becomes relevant, as well as the definition of its nature in the scale of textuality and effectiveness. The author proposes to consider the “Catechism of a Revolutionary” as a philosophical text on the basis of the presence of metaphysical and existential aspects in the article. At the same time, the author highlights such key features: a focus on practice (rejection of theorizing in favour of the action “here and now”), substitution of purpose by means (replacing the value of the public weal with total destruction and the paradox of the struggle for equality through formation of a rigid hierarchy), as well as extreme ethical nihilism and cynicism. All these premises allow the author to designate the ideological foundation of the “Catechism of a Revolutionary” as a holistic and consistent philosophy of destruction. In addition, this philosophy is considered in the context of its direct embodiment, implemented by S. G. Nechayev: lie, blackmail, compromising, and most importantly – murder. The author of the article concludes that it is impossible to explore the “Catechism of a Revolutionary” apart from the actual consequences of the implementation of his philosophy, and therefore one cannot speak only of his textual nature, detached from the real life. Instead, it should be considered as a fusion of textuality and effectiveness, which directly transforms being and affects people’s lives. Thus, the “Catechism of a Revolutionary” is presented by the author as a killer-text, consisting of a philosophy of destruction on the one hand and its embodiment into reality on the other. Such an approach allows not only to comprehensively explore the nature of the “Catechism of a Revolutionary”, but also to identify a number of dangers that the philosophy of destruction bears inside.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 155-172
Author(s):  
Jan Gresil Kahambing

AbstractIn this paper, I critique the prevalent notion that only in the abyss can one emerge to be the Übermensch, or to use Hollingdale’s term, the Superman. To support this, I will first expound on the notion of the abyss as ethical nihilism from the perspective of the death of God to Nietzsche’s critique of morality. I argue that ethical nihilism as an abyss is insufficient in constituting Nietzsche’s Superman. I will then set how the Superman emerges through counter-stages. The paradox is that such tragic an abyss that serves as conditio sine qua non for the Superman falls flat when looked at in the perspective of life. There underlies a fundamental difficulty in simply accepting the proposals of acknowledging the abyss or ‘becoming what one is.’ Later, Nietzsche’s anti-romanticism and anti-Darwinism are explored to support such difficulty.


1954 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 1103-1113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmette S. Redford

There are two aspects of the relation between government and interest groups which are of primary significance for the political scientist. One is the realistic approach to the study of interest groups, which gives attention to the demands of groups, their pressure on government, and the ways government yields to or tries to accommodate their conflicting demands. The other is the idealist tradition that the purpose of the state is the common weal, which has been expressed diversely, as for example, in the concepts of salus populi suprema lex and “public office is a public trust.” If these two were necessarily in conflict, we should have to choose between ethical nihilism and utopianism. This paper moves from the assumptions that realism and idealism both have a place in the study of political science, today as in ancient tradition, and that in the study of the particular problem of government control of the economy, analysis of the upward impact of interest pressures and their accommodation through government policies should be supplemented by a search for the best means of strengthening the impact of the concept of the common weal in the decision-making process.


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