scholarly journals The relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and the performance of Saudi listed firms

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 338-349 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mamdouh Abdulaziz Saleh Al-Faryan

This paper gauges, both qualitatively and quantitatively, the pertinent variables to corporate governance practices and their relationship to business productivity in the context of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This study was conducted in response to the limited literature in this context. A new code of corporate governance was issued by the Saudi Arabian Capital Market Authority as a direct consequence of the 2006 stock market crash; in 2010, the code was made mandatory for listed firms. Rigorous empirical studies are practical not only for Saudi Arabia and its policy makers but also potentially for solving global investment issues and ensuring security. This study found two variables to have a significant negative relation: chief executive officer turnover and independent board members. Thus, greater rates of chief executive officer turnover are associated with negative firm performance. In addition, independent board directors’ negative value was found to be very close to zero and significant only at the 10% level. Consequently, some caution is required when considering this result.

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 47-75
Author(s):  
Omar Al Farooque ◽  
Ali Hamid ◽  
Lan Sun

This paper investigates whether corporate governance has an impact on dividend policy in Australian listed firms. The empirical studies of corporate governance and dividend policy in the Australian context tend to have a limited scope and the findings are mixed. Unlike the existing literature, this paper provides a more comprehensive examination of the relationship between dividend policy and corporate governance mechanisms. Using a sample of 1,438 firm-year observations for the period of 2005 to 2011 and the panel data approach, this study finds that dividend payout is significantly positively (negatively) correlated with board size, board independence, institutional ownership and use of a Big-4 audit firm (CEO duality and managerial ownership). Moreover, dividend yield is significantly positively (negatively) correlated with managerial ownership (foreign ownership). These findings suggest that dividend policy and corporate governance mechanisms are complementary i.e. firms paying higher dividends are more likely to engage in good governance practices as well as having strong monitoring and control systems in place and therefore both dividend policy and corporate governance are considered as effective tools in reducing agency costs.


Risks ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 104
Author(s):  
Muhammad Yar Khan ◽  
Anam Javeed ◽  
Ly Kim Cuong ◽  
Ha Pham

This study used a researcher self-constructed corporate governance index as a proxy to measure the firm-level corporate governance compliance and disclosure with the 2002 Pakistani Code of Corporate Governance, to examine the relationship between corporate governance and cost of capital. We found a negative and significant association between the Pakistani Corporate Governance Index (PCGI) and block ownership with the firm-level cost of capital. On average, better-governed Pakistani listed firms tend to be associated with a lower cost of capital than their poorly governed counterparts are. As an emerging market, good corporate governance practices are mainly related to minimise corporate failure and assist firms in attracting capital at a lower cost.


2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 118-125
Author(s):  
Yap Voon Choong ◽  
Chan Kok Thim ◽  
John Stanley Murugesu

This study examines the effect of firm-level corporate governance variables on foreign equity ownership (FEO) in Malaysia. Foreign equity ownership can be an important source of capital for companies to fund their expansion and growth. To attract FEO, good corporate governance practices are vital because these practices are used to reduce or mitigate agency cost. Based on a sample of listed firms on Bursa Malaysia and employing multiple regression analysis, the study finds that a number of corporate governance mechanisms significantly improve the ability of companies to attract foreign equity ownership, especially, Insider Ownership, Government Ownership, Firm Size, Dividend Yield and Tobin’s Q. The results of the study indicate that firm-level efforts for better corporate governance sends positive signals and confidence to foreign investors.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
VITOR F. M. B. DIAS ◽  
MICHELE A. CUNHA ◽  
FERNANDA M. PEIXOTO ◽  
DUTERVAL JESUKA

ABSTRACT Purpose: To investigate whether the shareholder concentration and the board composition influence the export of Brazilian listed firms from 2010 to 2017. Originality/value: The study contributes to the literature on exports and corporate governance by highlighting that companies with good governance practices, measured by the board composition and ownership/control structure, might increase their exports. This research can serve as a guide for companies to structure their boards in order to positively influence exports and improve performance. In addition, the study raises the question of what would be the “optimal level” of firms’ shareholding concentration in order to improve the decision-making process involved in choosing to expand borders through export. Design/methodology/approach: The study performed logistic regression (logit model) and regression with the censored dependent variable (tobit model). Propensity to export and intensity of export were used as dependent variables. The logit regressions involved a sample of 307 exporting and non-exporting companies, and the tobit regressions involved a sample of 61 exporting firms. Findings: We found a positive relationship between board independence and exports, that is, the greater presence of independent members on the board, the higher the export level of firms. We also found that there is a non-monotonic relationship between shareholder concentration and level of exports. In summary, the study suggests that some corporate governance mechanisms may act as antecedents for firms’ export practices.


Author(s):  
João Teodósio

This study provides a literature review of the research on the corporate governance mechanisms of Portuguese firms. Based on a sample of 47 articles published, between 2004 and 2019, it is documented that research is predominantly focused on corporate governance mechanisms as determinants of the performance on non-financial listed firms. Literature reports, in its majority, that board size decreases firm performance while CEO (Chief Executive Officer) non-duality promotes it; board size, board independence, and CEO non-duality improve the level of firms' information disclosure; CEO age is positively associated with an increase of CEO pay but CEO duality has an opposite effect; board independence increases firm risk-taking. These results should be of interest to national authorities in the development of future regulation related to firms' corporate governance and to national and international investors that intend to invest in Portuguese companies.


2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 390-407 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ramanathan Geeta ◽  
Krishna Prasanna

The paper examines the role and impact of corporate governance mechanisms upon the operating risks of Indian listed firms. The recent global financial crisis was primarily attributed to excess risk–taking. This turmoil in the financial markets had a widespread effect on all industries and raised pertinent questions on the effectiveness of firm level governance practices. Impact of corporate governance practices, vide a constructed board governance index, has been examined on the risk taking behaviour of firms. Utilising a sample of 377 firms with yearly data for 6 years from 2006 to 2012, 2262 firm year observations have been analysed. Results confirm that firms with good corporate governance practices are effective in constraining excess risk taking. An instrumental variable approach is adopted to control for endogeneity, which also supports and substantiates the results.


GIS Business ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 01-09
Author(s):  
Asma Rafique Chughtai ◽  
Afifa Naseer ◽  
Asma Hassan

The crucial role that implementation of Code of Corporate Governance plays on protecting the rights of minorities, shareholders, local as well as foreign investors cannot be denied. Companies all over the world are required to implement their respective Code of Corporate Governance for avoiding agency conflicts between companies management and stakeholders and for assuring transparency in accountability. This paper aims at exploring the impact of implementation of corporate governance practices (designed by Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan) have on the financial position of companies. For explanatory variables of the study, composition of the board as per the Code of Corporate Governance that comprises of presence of independent, executive and non-executive directors has been taken into consideration. Return on equity has been taken as an indicator of firms profitability i.e. the dependent variable. For this study, companies listed on food producing sector of Karachi Stock Exchange have been screened for excogitation of the relationship. It is an empirical research based on nine years data from 2007–2015. Using Hausman Test for selecting the data analysis technique between Fixed or Random, Fixed Cross Sectional Panel Analysis has been used for analysis of the data collected. Findings indicate that presence of independent, executive and non-executive directors as per the code requirements levies a significant impact on the profitability of companies indicated by return on equity. It is, thus concluded that companies should ensure compliance with code of governance practices to reduce not only the agency issues but also to increase their profitability.


2007 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 11-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria da Conceição da Costa Marques

A corporate governance na perspectiva dos Estados Unidos influenciou largamente a Europa, mas não serviu assim tão bem quanto isso. A corporate governance é para assegurar que as empresas apresentam melhor performance, melhor monitorização e protecção dos investidores. No modelo anglo-saxónico, os accionistas estão longe da empresa, mas nos Estados Unidos as administrações são dominadas pela gestão, e existe algum conflito real entre o CEO (Chief Executive Officer) e o Presidente. Sob várias perspectivas, o modelo europeu é um bom modelo porque a maioria das empresas têm um grupo de accionistas que exercem uma influência directa no controlo dos negócios das empresas, mesmo que alguns não o façam. Em Portugal, esta situação requer novas estruturas e atitudes. As empresas locais ainda não quantificaram os custos de uma fraca governação. O teste deste sucesso será o encaminhamento do capital para mercados onde os investidores têm confiança. Um caminho português deve ser encontrado. Neste estudo pretende-se apresentar como os princípios da corporate governance podem ser aplicados ao sector público.


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